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Empathy, Ethics, and Justice in Children’s War Literature 
Abstract 
Vera Nelleke Veldhuizen 
 
Using cognitive narratology, this theoretical thesis examines how the three linked concepts of 
empathy, ethics and justice are created and communicated in children’s war literature. Due to 
the divisive nature of war literature, the basis of this thesis lies on the in- and outgroup theory 
of empathy, according to which the extend of our empathy is strongly tied to who we identify 
as “like us” (ingroup) or “unlike us” (outgroup). The limits of our empathy have a direct 
influence on both our moral frameworks and our ability to perceive the ethical implications of 
textual actions and characterisation; if we are not empathically engaged, the consequences of 
a character’s motivations and actions are irrelevant to us. In complex situations like those in 
war stories there is another layer of moral importance; justice. The reason for going to war, 
how it is conducted, and how it is resolved are so specific that they have their own justice 
philosophy. Children cannot be assumed to be aware of this, or to have the power to influence 
it. Yet it plays a significant part in children’s war literature. This thesis argues that in 
children’s war literature empathy, ethics, and justice build on each other in a bottom-up 
manner. It then further examines how this is achieved in the genre, and what its potential 
impact on the reader may be. 
The thesis examines this by analysing the construction and communication of each concept 
separately in a bottom-up approach, starting with empathy and ending with justice. These 
sections are divided up into two chapters dedicated to the narrative techniques most relevant 
to the concept analysed, in a top-down approach, starting with narrators and ending with 
scripts. A different novel is analysed for each technique, both to demonstrate the argument 
using the most appropriate example, and to showcase the patterns within the genre. The thesis 
concludes that through these narrative techniques a complex web of empathy, ethics, and 
justice is constructed, in which each technique plays a direct role in the concept 
communicated to the reader. Because young readers are still developing cognitively, as well 
as building their life experience and reading skills, children’s war literature can provide a 
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Children’s War Literature: 






It is conspicuous that in a traditionally didactic field such as children’s literature, texts dealing 
explicitly with violence and powerlessness such as war stories are as widespread as they are. 
Historically, the implied reader of children’s literature was presented with protectionist stories 
(Sainsbury 2013, 6-7) and morals (Mills 2014, 1), and characters who were models of desired 
behaviour rather than empathy-conducive creations (Barker 2014, 102). However, as 
exemplified by the increased complexity of many contemporary children’s stories, this is no 
longer the case. Empathy, which as a concept has become popular to the point of becoming a 
buzzword, has become a priority both in entertainment and scholarship. Children’s literature 
protagonists are now allowed to be flawed, engaging beings rather than simple moralistic 
devices, and texts employ deliberate techniques to encourage empathy between reader and 
text. Allowing for flawed characters and difficult empathy further paints the ethical picture of 
children’s war literature. 
The rise of narrative empathy in children’s literature is not reserved only for the 
protagonists, or even characters presented to be “like” the implied reader. An increasing 
challenge is placed on readers to emphasise with both those “like” and “unlike” them, which 
is particularly evident in children’s war literature. Whereas Captain Biggles was wholly 
devoid of empathy for “the enemy”, some more modern novels like Michael Morpurgo’s 
Friend or Foe (1977), Jan Needle’s A Game of Soldiers (1985), and Paul Dowswell’s Eleven 
Eleven (2012) purposefully aim for the reader to empathise with both the in- and the 
outgroup. With this increased complexity comes a potentially higher ethical ambiguity; it is 
no longer necessarily the case that a war is waged between clearly set up Good Guys and Bad 
Guys, or even that the protagonist is a Good Guy at all. Child characters can perform horrible 
acts, like Ender in Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game (1977/1991), or Todd and Viola in 
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Patrick Ness’ Chaos Walking trilogy (2008-2010). Yet their status as children inevitably 
changes the dynamic in the war text: they cannot be assumed to have the same agency, or 
understanding of the situation, as an adult character. This difficult dynamic is majorly 
complicating for the ethical framework and impact of the story a war novel is trying to tell. 
I’ve Got the Power! 
Power is an inevitable issue in children’s literature, again highlighted by war stories. Children 
do not yet have the life experience of adults (Nikolajeva 2014a, 15), and in most Western 
societies are in positions of relative powerlessness compared to adult authority over their 
lives. This power dynamic bleeds into the nature of texts written for children, as children’s 
literature is generally produced, edited, and selected by adults for children. As a result, adults 
shape both the text and the audience of children’s literature; children’s literature is written for 
the adults’ understanding of what children are and need, rather than specific children. As 
summarised by Clémentine Beauvais, post-Jacqueline Rose’s landmark Case of Peter Pan 
(1984), children’s literature scholarship has largely been divided into two problematic models 
or theories of childhood: the difference model, and the deficit model (2015, 16). Both models 
are based and focused on the same thing; claiming that either the main difference between 
adults and children is power, or the main thing children are lacking is power (17-18). Both 
models assume an inherent powerlessness of the child. It is in response to the debate 
surrounding these models that Maria Nikolajeva coined the term aetonormativity, which 
refers to the “adult normativity that governs the way children’s literature has been patterned 
from its emergence until the present day” (2010, 8). Beauvais aptly notes that adult-child 
theories differ inherently from other power theories because unlike power theories based on 
generally less flexible distinctions such as race, the division between the child and the adult is 
based on “the passing of time” (18) and adults and children have distinct yet overlapping 
temporalities. She therefore proposes another childhood model based not on power but on 
time either left or lived instead (ibid). In this model children are “mighty” because we as 
adults do not know what they might do with the time they (and we do not) have left.  
Beauvais sees the didactic discourse inherent in children’s literature as a request made 
of the child reader, a question without the possibility or even expectation of a definite answer: 
When the overtly didactic adult asks the child to do something, they are 
implicitly asking the child to carry that something into another temporality. 
And why are they doing so? Because it is a time that adults cannot access: it is 
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a temporality that is out of their power. They can influence it, but not act upon 
it directly; that power is the child’s. This gesture implicitly indicates an 
awareness of child might (Beauvais 2015, 19). 
Admittedly I am much more cynical in my view on this relationship than Beauvais, in that I 
contend that this model of child might as opposed to adult power is still inherently about a 
power difference between the adult and the child – something Beauvais does not dispute but 
considers a side effect of the issue of time. Although through the passage of time this power 
can be acquired, and the theorisation of this power can therefore not be the same as 
theorisations of other power criticisms, within their child-temporality children are 
disempowered in the eyes of an aetonormative society.  
 I would be remiss to not mention here an alternative approach to child-adult power 
dynamics proposed by Marah Gubar; the kinship model. She argues that the difference and 
deficit models are insufficient because they do not allow for individualism; in both models, 
she claims, children and adults are considered as two homogenous groups (2016, 299-301). 
Certain combinations of identities, for instance sex and race, she argues may make an adult 
more disenfranchised than a child (301). She proffers her kinship model as a solution to a 
potentially essentialist approach to child-adult relations and differences. The model does 
admit that there are differences and “deficiencies” between children and adults, but aims to 
shift the emphasis to general humanist commonalities rather than the differences between the 
two. Although I agree with Gubar that both the deficiency and difference model are 
potentially harmful to children as they can cause Othering, I cannot employ her kinship model 
for this project because in aetonormative societies (which Anglo-American cultures are) 
children are considered in these disenfranchised ways. Especially in the case of ethics 
children are seen as lacking (Sainsbury 2013). Considering I am analysing not real children 
but the implied reader of children’s war literature, which is considered marginalised whether 
maliciously or not, the kinship model would be inappropriate. The narratives I analyse are 
constructed in certain ways with the aim of socialisation in mind, considering the implied 
reader subjects rather than agents. Gubar’s model is interesting and challenging to both 
children’s literature and childhood scholarship, but not suitable here.  
The power imbalance between the child and the adult is a prominent and contentious 
feature of children’s literature. This literature does not come from a neutral place; one of its 
primary goals is socialisation (Nikolajeva 2014a, 31). Its form and content serve to 
communicate to the generation after us what we want them to believe when they become 
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adults, which is why historiographical analyses of children’s literature can reveal norms and 
values held by the society that produced the text. Included in this are “counter-ideological” 
texts, which argue against certain values (and often preach to the choir); these narratives’ 
reaction against the societal norm reveals which norm they are reacting against. The 
expectation that reading impacts children’s development comes from the belief that children 
are incomplete projects of socialisation (Beauvais 2015, 55); that they are “becoming” rather 
than being (Hollindale 2011, 12). Aetonormativity also means that adult morals are seen as 
the norm and must be taught to the child in order to change their (from the adult perspective) 
naïve and “primitive” beliefs.  
Another important factor to consider regarding the ongoing child project of children’s 
literature is that literature is a safe zone in which readers can train their empathic skills and 
Theory of Mind (Keen 2007, 350-351) or mind-modelling skills (Stockwell, Mahlberg 2015, 
132), and play with ethical choices without the fear of extra-textual consequences (Vermeule 
2010, 6-7). Cognitively, the implied readers of children’s literature are both vulnerable to 
narrative strategies and undergoing tremendous development and change. The challenging 
and playful environment created by reading potentially sets up a valuable scenario where 
young readers can learn about themselves, others, and the way the world around them works. 
Filling the narrative gaps engages the implied child reader cognitively, an activity which 
potentially leads to intense personal development. Empathic engagement with a narrative can 
open up the possibility of moral engagement and learning, leading to an increased conceptual 
and practical understanding of empathy, ethics, and justice. War is a narrative situation which 
can serve to foreground these three issues; empathy and ethics are problematised by the nature 
of war, which equally foregrounds the perceived need for justice and retribution. Engaging 
with war literature therefore has an incredible potential impact on the child reader’s cognitive 
development. 
Wait, What Are We Talking About Again? 
War is an important and prevalent theme, subject, and genre of literature. Laura Ashe and Ian 
Patterson state that "war was the first subject of literature; at times, war has been its only 
subject" (2014, xi), Catherine Savage Brosman concurs by claiming that “[w]ar and narrative 
have been wedded to each other from the earliest sacred books and other literature of the 
Mediterranean and India” (Brosman 1992, 75). This begs the question: what is war literature? 
In this dissertation I am analysing children’s war literature as a genre, and therefore need to 
clarify what it is that I am working with. A definition of war literature is unfortunately hard to 
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come by, as generally sources talking about it phrase it as war in literature or avoid a 
definition in general. For example, Jay Winter simply stated the following: 
Kipling' s tales drew on wartime legends and tell, in a highly ambiguous 
manner, of the spiritualist way of remembering the dead after the war. Other 
writers did so too. Poetry conjured up the dead in metaphors common to all 
languages. In later years, the publication of soldiers' writings, both fiction and 
autobiography created a new genre of 'War literature'. Much of this prose was 
in itself a kind of war memorial, a ritual entombment of and separation from 
those who had fallen by those who had survived (Winter 2014, 73). 
Although this “definition” hints at potential functions of war literature (a memorial site and a 
space to work through war caused trauma), it is still incredibly vague. Do we consider any 
soldiers’ writing as war literature? What if it is not about war at all? Reed Bonadonna 
continues this thought by considering war literature to be, roughly “[l]iterary depictions of the 
soldier’s experience” (2008, 241). Both scholars ground their definition of war literature with 
the author and exclude narratives which are not written by someone with soldiering 
experience – a feature of their working definition which is highly problematic. Like Winter, 
most scholarly work on war literature roots its definition of the genre firmly in extra-textual 
historical wars, not defining the term war literature but using it in conjunction with particular 
events, such as the Vietnam War (Newman 1996); WWI (Winter 2014); the American Civil 
War (Hutchison 2015); and the Cold War (Seed 1999; Matthews 2016), or as personal 
accounts of war experience (Caddick 2018). This is the most common way that scholars view 
war literature; for example, although Alex Houen and Jan-Melissa Schramm refer to the genre 
as “the literature of different military conflicts” (2018, 2) in the introduction to their book on 
sacrifice in modern war literature, the essays collected in it only look at literature based on 
extra-textual military conflicts. However, this narrow focus leaves out any speculative fiction, 
fantasy and science-fiction (unless it was written by a veteran); genres in which war often 
plays a prominent role. 
The issue with defining war literature as a genre is not limited to “adult” fiction, 
however. The importance of war as a genre remains acknowledged, yet the slipperiness of 
what constitutes genre membership stays problematic. For example, the Continuum 
Encyclopedia of Young Adult Literature states about war that:  
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The topic of [war] is covered in multiple ways. Specific [wars] may be referred 
to, from the Trojan [war] to current world upheavals […]. The themes of good 
versus evil is fairly consistent in [war] novels, although whether [war] is evil in 
and of itself is also examined (Cullinan, Kunzel, Wooten 2005, 732).  
Although this does acknowledge the prevalence and importance of war in children’s literature, 
it does not provide a definition of war literature. The Cambridge Guide to Children’s Books in 
English defines “war stories” as “[t]ales featuring armed conflict, usually from an anti-war 
perspective […]. War stories are inherently didactic: they inculcate patriotic moral values or, 
more often, question the morality of war” (Watson 2001, 737). However, if this is true, any 
and every story containing armed conflict, such as J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series (1997-
2007), J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan and Wendy (1911), or J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit (1937), 
could be considered a war story. Although I do agree that the war aspect of these narratives is 
not to be ignored, it would be difficult to put Peter Pan and Wendy in the same category as 
Ian Serraillier’s The Silver Sword (1960). Therefore, it is important to consider the difference 
between war as a theme and as a genre. 
Living in a Box 
Genre theory itself is grounds for quite the lively debate, and my purpose here is not to 
“solve” genre theory nor to produce a brief summary of the field. However, within genre 
theory there are many different conceptions of genre, and although I am only working with 
prose text, I do need to address how I classify the texts I have selected and why. There is no 
single, agreed upon definition of genre. Yet, although it seems incredibly difficult to grasp 
what genres are, especially because of their fluidity, it is even more impossible to imagine a 
text, or any media, outside of any genre (Derrida 1981, 61): we always mentally categorise 
every text we consume. The task then is to see how we categorise them. Wolfgang Iser keeps 
his definition quite simple, stating that genre is form (1974, 59) and that form is a means of 
communication with the reader (57). In Genres in Discourse, Tzvetan Todorov likewise 
argues that “[genres] are classes of texts” (1990, 16), and “nothing other than the codification 
of discursive properties” (18). These definitions do not allow for content to play any part in 
genre classification, however. There would then be only the Platonic poetry, drama, and 
prose. This is not sufficient for my purposes, as it does not properly account for the intrinsic 
difference between Frances Hodgson Burnett’s A Little Princess (1905/2012) and Robert 
Cormier’s Heroes (1998/1999), for instance. Maria Nikolajeva stated that genres are 
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“categories into which we sort literary texts according to certain principles” (2005, 49). These 
categories and principles are fluid, however, and nearly impossible to define.  
Historical genre theorist Ralph Cohen suggests the following working definition of 
genre: 
A genre is a group (or groups) of texts historically characterised by 
components in interaction toward some general purpose containing features 
that are intertextual, the whole forming an identity that can become a subgenre 
or can be the source of new genres. Genres occur in every language and many 
cross national borders. They are procedures for organizing knowledge, and for 
communicating it. They express our thoughts, feelings, and actions with regard 
to that knowledge (Cohen 1998/2010, 184, emphasis in the original). 
The argument that it is both content and form that categorises a text as being part of a specific 
genre (as opposed to another) is also put forward by Gérard Gennette, who claims that it is, 
amongst other things, paratextuality that leads to our categorisation of genre (1997, 94). Both 
within and without the text are genre indicators, to borrow the term from Garin Dowd (2006, 
12). Indicators within a text may include point of view, plot structure, typical outcome, and so 
on. Continuing this thought, literary scholar John Frow stated that genre “is a set of 
conventional and highly organised constraints on the production and interpretation of 
meaning” (2015, 10). He taxonomises genre as having the following dimensions: “a set of 
formal features”; thematic structure drawing on “a set of highly conventional topics or topoi”; 
the “situation of address”; the required background knowledge of the reader to make sense of 
the text; rhetorical function; and the physical setting of the text (9-10, emphases in the 
original). Again, my purpose is not to offer a solution to genre theory, however, by providing 
this overview I aim to both explain why genre theory is important to my corpus, and how I 
have come to my selection. 
The difficulty with defining a genre is highlighted by Peter Stockwell, who adds that 
“Genres can be defined socially, historically, functionally, authorially, politically, stylistically, 
arbitrarily, idiosyncratically, or by a combination of any of these (Stockwell 2002, 28). 
However, he also includes the crucial, yet easily overlooked remark that besides your 
conception of genre, genre identification and definition also depends on “which common 
feature of its elements you have decided to foreground as being most salient” (ibid). Through 
this, he introduces a cognitive approach to genre definition; as a narrative device 
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foregrounding has a particular cognitive effect on our perception. The perception of genre 
perhaps most useful for my purposes of identifying the type of text I am working with relies 
on prototypicality. According to this cognitive psychological account of classification, 
categories are understood through typicality (Paltridge 1997, 53), making a prototype most 
easily identifiable with the category (Frow 2015, 59). The further we move away from the 
prototype, the less clear the category lines and identification become. Therefore, for children’s 
war literature a prototypical text may be Paul Dowswell’s Eleven Eleven (2012) because of its 
form and content. This means that categorisation then depends on likeness to this prototypical 
text, and novels such as Diana Wynne Jones’s Howl’s Moving Castle (1986/2009), although 
featuring a war subplot, are too far removed from the prototype to be considered primarily as 
a children’s war literature text.  
To deselect any story that mentions war I could argue that the novel needs to be set 
during the war and foreground combat. However, Michelle Magorian’s Goodnight Mister 
Tom (1981/2015) does not focus on the war in terms of soldiers or battles at all and instead 
tells the story of a young boy finding parental love for the first time, yet this story is entirely 
predicated on war-based evacuation and can therefore be considered a war story. A narrative 
can fit into multiple genres at once; Meg Rosoff’s How I Live Now (2004/2010) is amongst 
others a romance, a survival story, and a war story. In my definition I will follow in the 
footsteps of Laura Ashe and Ian Patterson’s broader definition, in the preface of their War and 
Literature collection, where they seem to take as a working definition of war literature 
“[w]riting about war, or in war, or because of war, or against war” (2014, xii). For my 
purposes this is still too broad, especially considering I will be leaving the actual author out of 
my research; as unless explicitly stated young readers cannot be expected to have had the 
level of education necessary to recognise a text as being written because of a war, or during a 
war. Additionally, I will filter out novels which simply feature a war. This selection is not 
objective; however, it is based on my prototypical understanding of war as a genre indicator 
as opposed to a theme.  
Therefore, for this project I consider as war stories narratives whose main plot is 
completely dependent on war, or for which the presence of a war is integral to significant 
choices made by main characters, whether they take place on the battlefield or not. That said, 
an important caveat is that I will only consider as war an extended political act of violence, 
involving multiple parties and battles; other usages of the term “war”, like Robert Cormier’s 
The Chocolate War (1974) I consider metaphoric and therefore fall outside of the scope of 
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this project. Literature about the Troubles in Northern Ireland I will include, however, as I 
consider this armed political conflict a war. Not included in this definition is Shoah literature, 
as this genre both has its own particular empathic and moral issues, and has been analysed 
extensively in previous scholarship (Kertzer 1999; Baer 2000; Kertzer 2002; Jordan 2004; 
Martin 2004; Kidd 2005; Kokkola 2013; Kerman 2014). This is not to say that Shoah 
scholarship is without value; this type of literature holds important insights and analytical 
models, and some ethical issues are similar. 
War as Child’s Play? 
Children’s war literature differs from (aeto-)“normal” literature because of one simple thing: 
the child. By this I mean both the child figure in the text, and implied child reader. Although a 
child protagonist is both not exclusive to children’s literature, nor a requirement, it is more 
common in children’s literature than it is in any other kind. Putting the child central in a war 
story changes it in many profound ways; the child character cannot be assumed to understand 
what a war is nor its implications the way an adult can, which means that their level of 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions are ambiguous as well. Additionally, the 
child’s small social world (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16), generally consisting of immediate family, a 
few friends or neighbours, and school depending on age, is both problematised by the large 
scale of war and heightens the importance of the in- and outgroups that war tears apart. It is 
precisely in the areas of empathy, ethics, and justice that the figure of the child complicates a 
war story. 
The implied child reader equally sets children’s war literature apart from its adult 
counterpart because of empathy and moral concerns. A young reader, for instance, may not be 
assumed to be able to understand the complexities of war, because of which the situation may 
be grossly oversimplified to Good versus Bad, lack historical background or the 
understanding of the difference between fact and fiction. Additionally, the young reader, 
although susceptible to narrative strategies, may misinterpret or misjudge characters 
(Nikolajeva 2002, 156), skewing their understanding of the war presented and the moral 
implications of the characters’ actions. Nota bene that this does not mean that adult readers 
are expert readers; they too may be lacking in knowledge, empathy, or cognitive 
development. The concept of novice and expert readers was proposed by Nikolajeva to 
combat the issue of a generalised view on children and adults as static objects with 
homogenous skills and development. Instead of talking about adult reader, then, Nikolajeva 
proposes to use the term expert reader, meaning “an abstract, hypothetical recipient of a 
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literary text who possesses a capability of realising to the full extent the potential afforded by 
the text” (2014a, 15). Instead of child readers, Nikolajeva refers to novice readers, who do not 
have this capability (ibid). The expert reader may be an idealised version of what we imagine 
adult readers to be rather than a realistic expectation of adult readers, and likewise child 
readers are not homogenously novices.  
The potential vulnerability of the implied young readership of children’s war literature 
also opens up debate about the ethics of reading the genre: how much violence is appropriate 
for young audiences? Questions surrounding this issue can be traced from Nicholas Tucker 
discussing fear in 1976 (116-117), to Perry Nodelman discussing fairy tales and children’s 
television in 1992 (139, 303), and Kimberley Reynolds summarising concerns surrounding 
depictions of wartime atrocities (2011, 122). As Betsy Hearne and Deborah Stevenson write 
in their guide for adults Choosing Books for Children: A Commonsense [sic] Guide; 
There is certainly a valid place for concern about the horrors to which children 
can be exposed, but many controversies seem to have nothing to do with real 
horrors […]. Most objections center around occasional profanity or mild 
sexuality, which are regular parts of a child’s real world. […] It’s what we 
ourselves have trouble dealing with, not what children have trouble dealing 
with (Hearne, Stevenson 1999, 180, emphasis in original). 
Concerns about suitability for children come hand in hand with children’s literature in general 
as highlighted above, and these concerns spring from adult conceptions of appropriateness. 
This is a difficult issue; adults want to inform, but not scar, and scholars want to be mindful 
that they do not talk down to children, yet must take into account that there are things child 
audiences should not be exposed to. The discomfort and difficulty surrounding depictions of 
violence for children, combined with the enduring prevalence of stories featuring violence, is 
in part why children’s war literature specifically is fascinating: it uses a narrative situation to 
foreground empathy, ethics, and justice which also problematises all three and is precarious in 
respect to these three concepts because of the implied readership inherent to the genre. 
As I treat war as a narrative setting in this case, for this project I do not concern myself 
with real readers or authors. Although both, and especially real readers, play an important 
ethical role in literature and reading (Booth 1988, 8; Nussbaum 1990, 3-5), my interest lies 
with the narrative structures of the text. How does the narrative situation of war construct, 
foreground, and communicate empathy, ethics, and justice to young readers? For this line of 
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enquiry real people are not strictly relevant. However, when talking about empathy and 
morality, especially with young readers, neglecting the potential impact the narrative may 
have on the reader’s cognition would mean leaving out both a fascinating and vital element of 
the reading process. Empathy is, after all, both a cognitive and an affective process (for how 
can it be possible to have empathic engagement without engaging with our emotions?). 
Therefore, I discuss only potential impact and implied readers, unless indicated explicitly, and 
when referring to particular empirical research. By approaching children’s war literature in 
this manner, I want to demonstrate the narrative strategies used to construct and communicate 
empathy, ethics, and justice specific to this genre. 
Why Even Bother? 
Researching children’s war literature from a cognitive perspective has, as hinted at so far, not 
been done before in an explicit and extensive fashion. Instead, research on children’s war 
literature, like research on (aeto-)normative war literature is, as stated above, often studied 
from a thematic or historical perspective, like in Elizabeth Galway 2016 and David Budgen 
2018. Additionally, some cognitive scholarship has already flirted with children’s war 
literature; Nikolajeva (2017) analyses Patrick Ness’ Chaos Walking trilogy (2008-2010) for 
both emotions and moral strategies, and Lisa Sainsbury (2017) analyses the potential moral 
impacts of thought experiments in, amongst non-war texts, Carrie’s War (Bawden 1974) and 
A Game of Soldiers (Needle 1985). However, none have cognitively analysed children’s war 
literature proper. 
 The cognitive approach I conduct in this research is not comprehensive; there are 
many possible methodologies and concepts which fall within cognitive poetics (such as Text 
World Theory, spatiality, and evolution-based approaches). The concepts which I focus on 
and the methodology I employ are simply specks within the wider constellation of the field. 
These specks are however, as I argued above, particularly significant in both children’s 
literature in general and war literature specifically. By analysing children’s war literature from 
a cognitive perspective for the construction of and relationship between empathy, ethics and 
justice, I am able to achieve certain specific insights with particular implications for both 
academia and the wider, “real” world. Before I continue with my taxonomy and further 
necessary groundwork before the research proper, let me demonstrate that it is not for nought 
by explaining how this research may change the world (for the better).  
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 For children’s literature scholars, this research adds a more formalist and technical 
insight into the how and why of certain topics of interest. Ethics and empathy especially have 
been analysed by influential scholars both within and outside of the field of children’s 
literature, such as Nikolajeva (2012; 2014a; 2017), Claudia Mills (2014), and Lisa Sainsbury 
(2013). However, besides the groundwork laid by Nikolajeva regarding empathy, this 
scholarship is generally not concerned with the narrative techniques behind the concepts. An 
approach which maps out how narrative strategies and layers create specific empathic and 
moral engagement strengthens other analyses of these concepts and adds further depth to the 
discussion. Understanding the ways form supports and constructs content, specifically of the 
empathic and moral kind, increases the field’s comprehension of these concepts as well as 
their implications. Similarly, for cognitive poetics an analysis of children’s war literature adds 
the still often neglected part of child and youth cognition and literature. As childhood reading 
is highly formative, a cognitive analysis of children’s war literature specifically fills in a part 
of that initial and important phase of our reading lives. Through this, this project adds to the 
wider understanding of cognitive poetics. 
There are also more political reasons behind the importance of this work, now in 
particular. Division is common in humanity; we categorise and ostracise each other often and 
based on many factors. Especially in the current political climate in most Western countries, 
we are seeing the extreme negative effects these divisions can have on society. Protests 
against racist police brutality are met with violent force across the USA and in some European 
cities; neo-Nazi, fascist and other “far-right” organisations are on the rise politically across 
Europe (and, again, the USA); extremist verbiage is normalised across not only the Internet 
but also political discourse and general media outlets; and the Covid-19 crisis has put 
increased strain on the already much maligned European Union, which because of increased 
nationalism has recently lost a member state. To divide, to create in- and outgroups is innate, 
however, a lot of who we group in or out and how we treat them accordingly is learned 
behaviour. A cognitive analysis of  children’s war literature, of literature which is so 
formative and highlights the impact of division on ethics and what is considered “just” 
behaviour, allows me to study the beginnings of what is at play in the world right now, and 
can perhaps serve as a way to find soft, slow-burning solutions to pressing cultural concerns. 
My Tripartite 
Up until this point I have referred to empathy, ethics, and justice with an assumption that it is 
clear what it is that I am talking about. However, much like the genre I am studying the 
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concepts that are central to this research are used by many and in different ways. Before I can 
proceed, I must therefore explain what it is that I mean when I refer to my concepts and 
demonstrate on what basis I got to these working definitions. 
Empathy 
The term “empathy” was introduced to the English language in 1909 by Edward Titchener as 
a translation of the German word Einfühlung (Koopman, Hakemulder 2015, 83), which if 
literally translated means “in-feeling”. As stated above empathy has become a distinctly 
popular area of research and public concern; although not a new topic of interest, cultural 
attention is currently particularly focused on empathy: 
The interest in empathy from a philosophical perspective is nothing new; Aristotle was 
highly concerned with it as an emotional and aesthetic response to art. However, 
around the 2000s it arose with a new vigour as a paradigm within the academic 
perspective, which can be explained partially by cultural/historical developments 
(multiple financial crashes, 9/11) and by the discovery of mirror neurons and other 
major developments in cognitive sciences (Breger, Breithaupt 2010, 7-10). 
Yet despite its current popularity, empathy does not enjoy a unified definition. There are 
different classifications of and different ways of looking at empathy, taking the approach of 
psychology, sociology, or literature for instance, and even within these fields scholars have 
differing understandings of what empathy is. As this research is narratology based, the 
definition of empathy I am concerned with comes from the literary approach. The first 
collection of work on specifically literary approaches to empathy actively avoids providing a 
pure definition of empathy, focusing instead on a definition of literary empathy studies, 
stating that “we hesitate to insist on a narrow definition of empathy. What we can say is that 
literary empathy studies investigates how ‘thinking with’ or ‘feeling with’ another happens 
within literary texts or because of literary texts” (Hammond, Kim 2014, 1). This definition of 
literary empathy studies does, however, provide a vague definition of empathy as “thinking 
with” or “feeling with” another. In her foundational work Empathy and the Novel, Suzanne 
Keen builds on psychological understandings of empathy to apply them to literature, and 
defines empathy as “the spontaneous, responsive sharing of an appropriate feeling”, or 
sharing of affect (2007, 5). This definition is quite similar to developmental psychologist 
Ronit Roth-Hanania et al’s conception of empathy as “a vicarious socio-emotional response 
that is induced by the perception of another individual’s affective state. It entails feeling an 
emotion that is similar to the one likely experienced by the other person” (2011, 448). 
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“Appropriate feeling”, a vague turn of phrase, appears to be bound to expectations of how 
both the other and the self are supposed to feel (2007, 5). This is a mildly problematic 
definition to adopt, as it is not particularly clear. For instance, if in a novel the protagonist’s 
parent gets shot, is it appropriate to feel sad or angry – or even happy if the parents were 
abusive, or the situation is comical? These are distinctly different feelings, and it is possible 
for the protagonist’s reaction to not be the same as the reader’s. Keen refers to “the more 
complex, differentiated feeling for another as sympathy” (ibid), an observation I take umbrage 
with especially in the case of literature considering narrative empathy is complex and may 
result in a differentiated emotion. However, although simplistic, this definition is a good point 
to start with as this work is fundamental to narrative empathy research and therefore forms the 
base of most if not all following work. 
Martha Nussbaum defines empathy as “the ability to see the world from another’s 
viewpoint” (2010, 36). However, this definition is lacking as it does not include the affective 
impact that empathy has on the empathiser, which I consider central to the process. There is a 
key difference between perceiving and feeling, and without impact empathy cannot take 
place. Recognising the importance of emotion in the experience of empathy, Patrick Colm 
Hogan argues that empathy is to feel emotion because of someone else’s emotion, where the 
source of your own emotion is that of the other person, rather than the cause of their emotion 
(2011, 64-65). Or as Blakey Vermeule simply puts it: “the capacity to feel someone else’s 
feelings” (2010, 42). This distinction between the emotion and the cause thereof is important, 
because to feel an emotion due to the cause of another’s emotion is not empathy but 
immersive identification (Nikolajeva 2014a, 85). In the case of literature, this means that 
readers absorb the role of the character (Keen 2007 75-80) and become “unable to liberate 
themselves from the subject position imposed by the text” Nikolajeva 2014a, 85). This 
identification is problematic as it is limited to the reader’s experience rather than the 
character’s, and prevents the reader from recognising anything beyond their own experience. 
Although it could be seen as a beginning form of empathy, it does not endorse it, as it blocks 
the possibility of assessment. Therefore, I subscribe to Hogan’s definition with an addendum, 
and see empathy as an emotional response to another’s emotional state, whilst recognising 
that the other’s state is not your own. 
I’m Not Crying, You’re Crying 
An underlying presupposition of cognitive narratology is that textual and extra-textual 
experiences are processed in much the same way (Stockwell 2002, 152). For empathy this 
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means that yes, readers are able to experience empathy through reading. There is considerable 
empirical research done on this, as evidenced by Eva Maria Koopman and Frank Hakemulder 
(2015, 84), and Keith Oatley (2016, 619-620). One of the main reasons which emerges from 
this reading as to why we are able to respond to reading even fiction in this fashion is the 
relatively new finding of mirror neurons. When, for instance, we see someone scratch their 
own arm, mirror neurons fire up and create an echo of the same feeling for ourselves; it is as 
if we are scratching our arm too (which may explain why seeing someone scratch themselves 
makes us feel itchy). Seeing another person emote in a certain way causes our mirror neurons 
to react as if we were doing the same ourselves (Hogan 2011, 49). These neurons are 
activated not only by seeing an action (Heath and Wolf 2012, 145), but also by reading about 
it (Speer et al 2009). This cognitive response to fiction allows the reader to interact with 
characters as if they are extra-textual beings, ascribe to these blots on paper mental states 
(Zunshine 2006, 10), personalities, motivations, and even free will (Nikolajeva 2014a, 76). As 
Maria Nikolajeva elegantly puts it: “through mirror neurons, our brains are capable of 
responding to fictional worlds as if they were actual; capable of making sense of a 
linguistically constructed world by connecting it to our empirical or mediated knowledge of 
the actual world” (2014, 23) because of which we can learn about the real world through 
literature. 
It is not just because of mirror neurons, which are a relatively new discovery (Gallese, 
Goldman 1998) and not uncontroversial, that we cognitively engage with textual worlds and 
people as we do with our extra-textual experiences. All cognitive functions required for 
making sense of extra-textual life, such as memory, attention, script building, and mind-
modelling are required for comprehending fictional events and characters. The process of 
comprehending extra-textual life requires the cognitively demanding and fatiguing work of 
constant structuring, sorting of information, and prioritising memories (Nikolajeva 2014a, 
24). Additionally, besides being able to engage with a textual world as we do with the extra-
textual world because of our cognitive makeup, this engagement is less demanding and less 
troublesome than the extra-textual equivalent. After all, a fictional world is presented pre-
structured and organised, presenting only relevant information (ibid), which makes 
engagement with the textual world easier than with the extra-textual world. 
It is not uncontroversial to state that as readers we necessarily look at fictional 
characters as if they are real people. Part of the reason why is because “literary characters do 
not necessarily have to behave the way real people do, and they do not necessarily follow the 
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prescribed behavioristic patterns or the observed course of mental disturbances” (Nikolajeva 
2002, 9). They are textual constructions put into the narrative to serve a purpose and fulfil a 
role, no matter how unlikely or contrived. They are also “always incomplete” (154); they exist 
only in the text and the reader is only privy to what the narrative reveals to them. That said, as 
argued by Lisa Zunshine (2006, 10), this does not take away from the fact that intuitively our 
minds attempt to create a full, real person out of these constructions by constructing identities 
for them, including motivations and backgrounds. Additionally, although the information 
given about fiction characters is by definition limited, we similarly also always work with 
limited information about extra-textual people, filling in the gaps for them in the same way as 
we do for their fictional counterparts. As argued by Hogan, fiction may actually provide the 
reader with a more complete and understandable picture of somebody’s identity and 
interiority than we receive in extra-textual engagements (Hogan 2011, 68). 
Empathy Controversies 
Empathy, which seems like a good thing on the surface, and for reading is fundamental, is 
interestingly not uncontroversial. Mostly this is because of the claims of empathy enthusiasts 
that empathic engagement with a narrative can potentially lead to the reader becoming a 
better, or at least more empathic person in the extra-textual world. This is the result of our 
ability to “compare, as it were stereoscopically, with aspects of our everyday world, to 
suggest insights we might not achieve by looking with the single eye of ordinary perception” 
(Oatley 2016, 618), and enhancing our understanding of others through emotional 
engagement and insight into their perspectives (618). Proponents of this view include Martha 
Nussbaum (1990, 1995, 2001), and Keith Oatley (2016), and many empirical studies have 
been conducted to prove it (Mar et al. 2009; Mar et al. 2010; Djikic et al. 2013; Bal, Veltkamp 
2013; Kidd, Castano 2013; Koopman 2015; Vezzali et al. 2015; Oatley 2016; Black, Barnes 
2015; Mumper, Gerrig 2017). These studies, however, have been criticised mainly on two 
grounds: firstly, that the empathic effects of reading are measured soon after reading, and 
secondly because the readers may have been primed (Oatley 2016, 621). Oatley maintains 
that, considering the studies use differing methods and measure different outcomes, and there 
were also longitudinal studies, we can still claim that narrative fiction specifically has a 
marked effect on reader empathy (ibid). I agree that fiction has this impact, however, I do not 
share the optimism that it makes us better people.  
 Empathy critics, such as Peter Goldie (2000) and Paul Bloom (2016, 2017) argue that 
viewing empathy as a net positive force for change in the world is wrong, and that empathy is 
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even harmful in that it biases us to care more for those close to us or like us. Empathy, Bloom 
argues, has a “spotlight value”, through which empathy could potentially entrench racist or 
other oppressional divisions (Bloom 2017, 26). Additionally, there is the general research 
focus on empathy for suffering or pain as opposed to pleasure, which may skew one’s 
perspective on empathy as a negative term. However, as a literary scholar I cannot view 
empathy in that way, as it is a base requirement for narrative emotional engagement of all 
kinds. The risks of empathy are real, and so are its pleasures. Although I cannot take the fully 
optimistic view that empathic engagement with narratives produces better people, I also 
cannot agree that empathy necessarily enhances our biases. It can. But it can also produce the 
opposite effect. Empathy is a neutral concept, a term necessary to denote the cognitive and 
affective work done by our minds to make sense of the world, both textual and extra-textual. 
Knowing Me, Knowing You, It’s the Best I Can Do 
Defining the concept of ethics poses more of a problem than even a definition of empathy 
does. Roughly, ethics deals with what we as individuals and societies have to do to live 
“well”. The question of what rules one is to abide by to live well or correctly is one of the 
fundamental questions of philosophy (Blackburn 2001, 1; Hogan 2011, 62), discussed by 
philosophers and scholars since the pre-Hellenistic era to the modern day. It is possible to 
debate ethics still because there is no one single answer to the question of what correct living 
is: although there are some generally shared beliefs, for instance that murder for pleasure is 
wrong, there are many different accounts of ethics or “goodness”. According to ethical 
philosopher Hugh LaFollette, the study of ethics entertains “theories about human nature, 
explore[s] the nature of value, discuss[es] competing accounts of the best way to live, 
ponder[s] the connections between ethics and human psychology, and discuss[es] practical 
ethical quandaries” (LaFollette 2000, 1). Following this the study of ethics can be divided up 
into three distinct forms of philosophical debate: meta-ethics, the philosophical analysis of 
morality as a concept; normative ethics, the study of the principles, rules, and guidelines by 
which to live; and practical ethics, which is a direct application of normative ethics to specific 
situations (1-2). In my approach I agree with philosopher Shelly Kagan in that the line 
between normative ethics and practical ethics is nondistinctive at best (1998, 12), and 
therefore only differentiate between metaethics and normative ethics. While there is an 
argument to be made against a clear distinction between these two modes of ethical enquiry as 
well (Darwall 1998, 12), for the sake of this work I will treat the two approaches as distinct as 
meta-philosophical musings about morality are not relevant for the study of what ethical 
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guidelines are communicated to the implied reader through children’s war texts. Therefore, 
throughout the rest of this work I operate within the realms of normative/practical ethics. 
When I use the word “ethics” further on, I refer only to this normative/p ractical ethics and not 
metaethics, as metaethics is not an ethics in its own right. Furthermore, I use the word 
“morality” as a synonym for “ethics”, as is common in ethical literary inquiry.  
To be able to assess the ethics of an extra-textual action or situation one needs more 
information than is generally available. Information regarding the actor’s background, the 
context for the situation, what the consequences are and for how many people, and why the 
actor did what they did are rarely available for situations where the actor is not the analyser. 
To learn about ethical behaviour a potential analyser needs to be able to assess ethical 
dilemmas, as well as differing approaches to right and wrong. Because the ethical lives not 
just in action and consequence but also in the internal life of those who act, the narrative form 
provides an excellent site for exploration of ethical debates. According to literary critic 
Blakey Vermeule, fictional characters function in part to let the reader “sort out basic moral 
problems” (2010, xii). Although I agree that fiction and its characters most certainly have this 
function, I do not believe that this is limited to “basic” moral problems (it is also fair to 
question what constitutes a “basic” moral problem in general). Fiction provides the 
opportunity for an in-depth dissection of life (and death), which necessarily includes a 
portrayal and discussion of ethical existence in its entirety, not just the “basics”. Fiction 
potentially allows a look into the lives of others, complete with their emotional states and 
reactions to others, and their thoughts regarding actions or characters. Especially in the case 
of an omniscient narrator, the literary character has their morality on display in ways which 
are impossible for us to ever comprehend people in reality. As Nussbaum points out:  
in the activity of literary imagining we are led to imagine and describe with 
greater precision, focusing our attention on each word, feeling each event more 
keenly – whereas much of actual life goes by without that heightened 
awareness, and is thus, in a certain sense, not fully or thoroughly lived (1990, 
47). 
Nussbaum is correct in pointing out that reading engages us in a different, more focused way 
than extra-textual life does, because as Nikolajeva phrases it, fiction “puts its characters in 
situations where ethical issues are inescapable, and moreover, in fiction these issues can be 
amplified and become more tangible” (2018, 84). This means that in fiction, the ethical is 
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inevitable, amplified, and portrayed in a holistic way which is impossible to achieve in the 
everyday extra-textual world.  
Young readers, who are still in the early stages of their moral development, may be 
aided by literature in their personal growth and understanding of the ethical. Literature 
functions as a training ground for empathy, which is intimately combined with and the reason 
for it also being a training ground for ethical issues; because we cognitively process fiction 
much like extra-textual reality. According to Nikolajeva, this is because the texts have the 
potential to offer their young readers guidance to empathic and ethical inferences (2014a, 177; 
2018, 83-84). It is because the reader can engage empathically with the text that they can also 
engage morally with it (see Sainsbury 2013, 11) and “more clearly appreciate the moral 
significance of the situations deployed in the story and the narration” (Mejía, Montoya 2017, 
383) than if there is to be no empathic engagement. In her discussion on ethics in children’s 
literature Lisa Sainsbury stresses the importance of empathic engagement by arguing against 
its opposite, indifference, claiming that: “moral education is redundant if indifference negates 
care” (2013, 11). It is clear that it takes caring about the characters of a story to have an 
interest in what makes up these characters’ moral being: their desires, motivations, and 
actions.  
War literature complicates the ethical element of narrative; as put by war literature 
scholar Adam Piette: 
War makes literature ethical in this strict sense: the spectacle and imagining of 
the death of others in state-sponsored conflicts demands writing that pays due 
witness to that suffering, accompanies that suffering with the attention due to 
extreme and lethal experience, and accomplishes representation of that 
suffering without recourse to the usual contractual conventions that govern 
polite engagement with a sophisticated and jaded readership (Piette 2012, 2) 
Piette here highlights the heightened ethical element of respectful representation of conflict; 
again, as shown above in my survey of war literature definitions, war literature is here taken 
to refer only to representations of historical wars. The ethical demands placed on the narrative 
because of this are important, but not the main focus of this project. I have included this 
argument here to demonstrate my awareness of that aspect of the narrative’s ethics, but shift 
my focus to the ethics created through the narrative specifically regarding characters. The 
reason for this is that I cannot assume that the implied reader of a children’s war narrative will 
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place the ethical demands that Piette describes on a text; I can, however, analyse what it is the 
reader is presented with in terms of moral frameworks, as the reader is always engaged with 
the text if not with its context. War has a severe impact on this narrative ethics, and although 
Piette was not necessarily referring to the same type of impact as I am his phrasing on the 
influence of war on the narrative it is in remains powerful and accurate: “War tends to alter 
the genres it inhabits, like a cuckoo in the nest. It stretches and distorts the normal obligations 
and expectations, and gives the genre a special ethical edge, as well as menace and dark 
intention” (Piette 2012, 6). War changes the narrative inherently; it changes the demands 
placed on the narrative and the reader, both empathically and morally. Summing up this 
section, in this project I will use ethics and morality interchangeably as is common practice in 
literary studies to refer to guidelines, principles or rules to follow to live a good or correct life, 
paying particular heed to the impact of war and the child.  
Oh It’s Not Fair, And It’s Really Not Okay 
When explaining my thesis to my mother she asked the challenging question “but aren’t 
justice and ethics the same thing?” Questions of justice are questions about what people are 
due, but what that means in practice depends on the situation. Depending on context, the 
formal question of what people are due is answered by principles of just desert, reciprocity, 
equality, or need. Justice, thus, is a constellation of elements that exhibit a degree of 
integration and unity (Schmidtz 2006, i). Is this not the same thing as ethics? The way I 
conceptualise ethics and justice, it is not. Rather, ethics generally deals with large, abstract 
concepts and ideas exemplified through specific examples, whereas justice is concerned with 
concrete issues. Following this, justice is a subsection of ethics, an aspect of correct living. 
Like ethics, it defies a clear definition. The consensus appears to be that justice is the concern 
of “what people are due” (Schmidtz 2006, 8; Sandel 2009, 6-9), or treating people how they 
“deserve” to be treated (Gensler 1998, 203). There are different approaches to and 
interpretations of due-ness, and what it takes for society or actions to be just. Political 
philosopher Michael J. Sandel holds a distinctly modern point of view when he argues that “a 
just society respect[s] each person’s freedom to choose his or her own conception of the good 
life”, stating that in ancient Hellenic discussions of justice the concern was virtue, whereas 
modern justice emphasises freedom (2009, 6-9). This view on justice betrays the deeply 
temporal and cultural nature of justice, and the complex relationship it has with ethics; is “the 
good life” referring to individual happiness, or to moral correctness? 
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Justice, according to psychologist Martin L. Hoffman, “pertains broadly to the moral 
rightness of a person's due, a person's treatment by others and by nonhuman forces” (2002, 
223). It includes concerns over distribution of society's goods and services, be it following 
merit or need, property ownership rights, “temporary possession of property”, and the 
allocation of punishment (ibid). Also important is the recognition of human rights (2002, 
223). Philosopher Kok-Chor Tan, in recognition of this, states that justice has to be concerned 
with personal choices (2012, 82). An example of the concern for balance in justice is 
restitutive justice, in which justice is achieved by repairing or replacing what was lost 
(Spinner-Halev 2012, 160). This is a problematic approach because it does not repair the harm 
done and side-steps the issue of justice (184), in which case recompensation may be 
considered a way to restore balance and life itself is reduced to monetary value. This approach 
therefore highlights the difficult and multi- faceted nature of justice. For this project, I do not 
aim to solve the philosophical problem of what justice is. Rather, I will look at how justice is 
constructed through narrative, and how this may impact the young reader. For this purpose, 
my working definition of justice is based on the notion of due-ness, combined with fairness. 
Therefore, when I use the word justice, I am referring to an applied ethical framework based 
on the notion of fairness in distribution of goods, duties, and rights, with a recognition of 
human rights. This comes in specific forms in the war debate, as the desire for justice is an 
inherent part of war and problematises it at the same time. 
The just war tradition is a two-thousand-year old debate (Bellamy 2006, 2), and 
generally does not aim to glorify or justify war as an action, but rather analyses how states 
and other groups should act during war in order to behave in morally just ways (Bellamy 
2006, 3; Kamm 2012, 3-7). Justice in war can be divided up into four distinct aspects, as 
neatly defined by military philosopher James L. Cook (2013). Jus ad bellum, or “how to go to 
war justly”, jus in bello, or “how to fight [and behave] justly once in war” (Banita 2012, 32; 
Cook 2013, 152), jus post bellum, “how to establish a just peace”, and jus ante bellum, “the 
need to teach those involved with the war about just war theory” (Cook 2013, 152). Here my 
working definition of justice is already slightly challenged; going to war “for the right 
reasons” and how to behave during armed conflict do not fit neatly into the package of justice 
as fairness of distribution. However, below the surface it makes more sense; going to war and 
one’s behaviour during it are demonstrations of the underlying understanding of fairness and 
human rights, with war generally presented as a reaction to a perceived unfairness of 
distribution or conduct by the Other. Justice, in this case “right” or “just” conduct, is therefore 
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crucial to warfare. It is equally crucial to war literature. The discussion of war in literature 
highlights empathy, and ethical and justice issues (Minx 2008, 338; Piette 2012, 2). This is 
because war itself emphasises these concepts in practice, combined with the foregrounding of 
empathic engagement between reader and character, and the intrinsic ethical nature of 
literature. 
My definitions of these three concepts are all working definitions; all three are still 
widely debated within a multitude of fields, and my project is not an aim at “solving” 
philosophy, or psychology. Rather, I employ all three of them both together and separately as 
a means to analyse children’s war literature. This tripartite is not uncontroversial, as empathy 
sceptics as mentioned above may disagree that ethics depends on empathy (although I have 
found none that disagree that justice depends on ethics). However, in my conceptualisation of 
empathy, ethics and justice they do rely on each other. This is one of my core arguments 
underlining the project; in order for us to be morally engaged with a narrative, we need to 
care first, which depends on empathy. Justice builds on this dependency by specialising 
further on ethical concerns. I support this in my chapters firstly by the theoretical background 
I provide, but also secondly by the analyses which support my argument. Having defined my 
fundamental concepts, I now move on to the corpus selection. 
Corpus Selection 
For my analysis of these three concepts in children’s war literature I draw from a large pool of 
primary texts. As I am interested in the narrative structure of empathy, ethics, and justice, 
focussing on the impact of us versus them grouping, rather than strictly the war portrayed, I 
use both historically based and imaginary war narratives. The grouping works in the same 
way regardless of the narrative’s relationship to extra-textual events and achieves, I argue, a 
similar enough effect. Additionally, creating a clear distinction between the two is difficult to 
justify, as authors may draw from historical events in their construction of “pure fiction” 
wars, thereby blurring the lines between reality and fiction. Joe Haldeman’s The Forever War 
(1974/2010), for example, is a science-fiction novel about an intergalactic war between a 
united humanity and many different types of aliens. Set mostly in space, the novel may read 
as purely fictional; it discusses impossible worlds, beings, and technologies. It is, however, 
also directly based on the author’s experiences as a Vietnam War veteran. Haldeman in his 
foreword even points out another issue with writing reality-based war literature for young 




Twenty-five years [after its original publication], most young readers don’t 
even see the parallels between The Forever War and the seemingly endless one 
we were involved in at the time, and that’s OK. It’s about Vietnam because 
that’s the war the author was in. But it’s mainly about war, about soldiers, and 
about the reasons we think we need them (1974/2010, x). 
For my corpus selection I follow much the same line of thinking as Haldeman describes here; 
although a novel may be “about” a specific war, depending on the novel it may be first and 
foremost about war itself. Those are the novels I am interested in; the ones that are about war 
and for a young audience, and that highlight empathy, ethics, and justice concerns. This 
includes speculative fiction; my concern is the war, not the relative realism of the text. 
 The scope of this project is limited to contemporary Anglo-American children’s 
literature. This is because both the concepts I am analysing and war itself are temporally and 
culturally bound. The same is true for conceptions of the form and function of children’s 
literature, as well as our understanding of children’s cognitive and moral development.  By 
limiting the scope of my research to Anglo-American novels, I keep the image as clear as 
possible, without inviting too many contrasting cultural backgrounds, yet still demonstrating 
the patterns within the genre of children’s war literature at a large scale. With “contemporary” 
I mean post-WWI, as the Great War was a landmark in conceptions of war, and current 
understandings of childhood are also a result of that time. Additionally, as explained by 
Reynolds in A Very Short Introduction to Children’s Literature,  
While in the past, war stories tended to offer clear-cut and jingoistic versions of 
events as typified in the novels of G. A. Henty (1832–1902), this is a genre that 
has produced many of the most powerful and ethically challenging works for 
children in recent decades. Since the 1970s, war stories have been less likely to 
be told from the victor's position than they were for most of the history of 
children's literature, and often the boundary between friend and foe is difficult 
to recognize (Reynolds 2011, 121). 
The narrative, ethical, and empathic complexity of modern children’s war literature Reynolds 
describes here is what makes this genre so interesting. Some of the novels I will discuss are 
from before the 1970s however, yet they are still excellent examples of the narrative strategies 
I am studying here.  
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Children’s literature I use as an umbrella term, including young adult (YA) literature. 
This is partially because the distinction between children’s and YA literature is a fairly recent 
one, and undergoing many shifts in trends and tropes (Cart 2016, 1-80). It is also because 
although a novel may be marketed for a specific age group it is not restricted to that group and 
may be read across the board (just as children may read “adult” literature and adults may read 
children’s). However, I am not addressing the challenge that comes from the multi-modality 
of picturebooks or illustrated novels, nor in non-fiction, poetry, or drama. Although 
interesting and definitely in need of study, the scope of this project is merely to lay the 
foundation of such research through focussing on prose fiction. I therefore only analyse 
contemporary, Anglo-American children’s war fiction prose. I compiled these sources 
through different means: blogs specifically on children’s war literature, consulting librarians 
from different libraries, shop recommendations, EmpathyLab recommendations, and word of 
mouth. From this pool, which is available in the appendix, I have selected novels which I 
consider to be excellent examples of the narrative strategies I want to foreground in my 
research. The selection was not based on literariness or quality of the prose, as these are 
aspects which are not directly relevant for the in- and outgroup based empathy which forms 
the basis of my approach. Through my selection I want to demonstrate the breadth of the 
genre and the patterns in the strategies used. This project is thus comprised of many novels, 
coming together in cognitive constellations of children’s war literature’s narrative strategies. 
Outline 
Part I of this work is concerned with empathy. This is because I consider empathy as a 
prerequisite for ethics and justice. Without caring about the people, or characters, involved, it 
is surely nigh impossible to care about the outcome of a situation or action. In this belief I am 
following in the footsteps of Martin Hoffman (2000), Patrick Colm Hogan (2011), Lisa 
Sainsbury (2013), and Maria Nikolajeva (2014a). This relationship between empathy and 
ethics is emphasised in reading; if there is no extra-diegetic empathy the ethical ramifications 
of a character’s behaviour most probably leave the reader cold, as the character itself is a mere 
instrument of the narrative. In my treatment of empathy, ethics, and justice I employ a 
bottom-up approach, where empathy is the foundation and I work my way “up” to justice. 
However, in my analysis of narrative strategies concurrent with this line of reasoning I 
employ a top-down approach; in the analysis of empathy the most crucial narrative strategies I 
focus on are narration and focalisation. Thus, Part I is comprised of two chapters that guide 
through to ethical concerns: chapter one explains narrative empathy focusing on narration, the 
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cognitive aspect of reading, and emotional theory and philosophy, and chapter two analyses 
the impact of focalisation on narrative empathy.  
Ethics, being born from empathy, is central in Part II of this dissertation. Of particular 
concern here is characterisation; why is the implied reader supposed to empathise with certain 
traits and what does this say about the ideology of the narrative? How are the characters’ 
actions and their consequences portrayed and what does this communicate to the implied 
reader? All narratives have ideological leanings, yet these are not necessarily consistent 
throughout. The tension between different ethical frameworks held by different characters, or 
a difference between the ethics held by the characters and the narrator, can create a lively 
ethical debate within a narrative (Hollindale 1988, 14; Stephens 1992, 43; Bal 1997, 31). With 
my substantial focus on character in this second part of the thesis I continue my combination 
of bottom-up and top-down approaches. In chapter four I explore the ethical ramifications of 
characterisation. Chapter five is dedicated specifically to actions and consequences. 
Especially in the case of war literature, any discussion on actions and consequences 
leads to a study of justice. Both ethics and justice are concerned with right and wrong, and 
may be confused with one another. Similarly to how empathy is required for ethical 
understanding and behaviour, it is not possible to consider the distribution of punishment, 
goods, or services without having a moral framework dictating the justice process. Justice is 
an ethical action, but mores are larger than that and do not necessarily have to show through 
action, whereas justice does. War is particularly useful in having (mostly) clear distinctions 
between the broader concept of ethics and the more applied sense of justice, in that there are 
specific codes and rules at play. Additionally, the heightened stakes of a war scenario in 
literature creates an increased desire for justice distribution. Justice is the peak of this thesis’ 
concept pyramid, and is the focus of Part III of the project. Delving deeper into the narrative 
strategies employed, beyond narration, focalisation, characterisation, and actions and 
consequences, this part deals with the underlying cognitive strategies explored through script 
theory. First, in chapter six, I analyse the main justice scripts of children’s war literature. In 
chapter seven I narrow down to include the roles of jus ante bellum, jus ad bellum, jus in 
bello, and jus post bellum; the preparation and education of those who will be involved with 
the war; the concern of what makes a just decision to wage war, the just way to conduct war 
and the ethical issue of post-war peace processes (Cook 2013, 152). Now, having slogged 





















Reading is an emotional experience. The whole spectrum of emotion is touched by the 
cognitive engagement that is reading; joy, disgust, boredom, and fear are all possible reactions 
to written texts. Regarding this, Patrick Colm Hogan claims that: “narrative is intimately 
bound up with emotion. Literary stories, especially the stories we most admire and appreciate, 
are structured and animated by emotions” (2003b, 5). Although I agree I do feel the need to 
point out that it is not just literary stories that are closely linked to emotions, and that our 
appreciation of the stories has very little to do with it. Storytelling through other arts, such as 
visual arts, music, dance, film, but also modern advertisements rely heavily on emotional 
engagement and reaction. Emotions are central to the human experience, and the arts, 
including literature, reflect and build on this. As Nussbaum states: “[e]motions shape the 
landscape of our mental and social lives” (2001, 1). Why am I talking about emotions all of a 
sudden when this part is on empathy? Because empathy is based on emotions, the ability to 
recognise and experience them. Therefore, I will first acknowledge what emotions are and 
how they work in a narrative before moving on to the more complex issue of empathy. 
What is This I’m Feeling? 
The discussion regarding emotions and their definition is a lively and, as is the case with the 
other concepts I am juggling in this thesis, an as yet unresolved debate. For a comprehensive 
outline of modern emotion theories, I recommend Michael Burke’s 2011 Literary Reading, 
Cognition and Emotion: An Exploration of the Oceanic Mind chapters one and two. For my 
project, a brief overview will suffice. When we think about emotions it may, initially, seem 
quite simple. After all, we all know what it means to feel sad or happy. However, when we 
consider the nature of what an emotion is it rather quickly becomes more complicated. Why 
do we feel the way we do? What triggers our emotions? How do we process and experience 
them? As argued by Joseph LeDoux, emotion “is not merely a collection of thoughts about 
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situations. It is not simply reasoning. It cannot be understood by just asking people what went 
on in their minds when they had an emotion” (LeDoux 1998, 71). As pointed out by Antonio 
Damasio, before modern emotion theory the general consensus was that emotions are not a 
cognitive activity and get in the way of reason (1994/2006, xxv). Empirical research in the 
past century has demonstrated, however, that emotions are both affective and cognitive 
responses to situations and/or people. This is because: 
emotion is the combination of a mental evaluative process, simple or complex, 
with dispositional responses to that process, mostly toward the body proper, 
resulting in an emotional body state, but also toward the brain itself 
(neurotransmitter nuclei in brain stem), resulting in additional mental changes 
(Damasio 1994/2006, 139, emphasis in original). 
To experience an emotion, then, is a complex cognitive affair, based on our embodied 
experience of the world and ourselves and involving different belief systems and images. In 
the distilled words of Nussbaum, we may call this experience “cognitively laden, or dense” 
(Nussbaum 2001, 65). 
 But when, or rather why, do we experience these cognitive and affective responses we 
call emotions? According to Nico Frijda emotions “result from the interaction of an event’s 
actual or anticipated consequences and the subject’s concerns” (1986, 6), meaning roughly 
that emotions occur when something happens which impacts something we have beliefs 
about. This is further supported by the philosophical perspective that “emotions embody not 
simply ways of seeing an object, but beliefs – often very complex – about the object” 
(Nussbaum 2001, 28). In his 1992 landmark study Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of 
Emotions Keith Oatley builds on this when he posits that emotions occur at “significant 
junctures in plans” (Oatley 1992, 25), plans which can even be thought of as scripts (33). 
Each goal and plan has a monitoring mechanism that evaluates events relevant 
to it. When a substantial change of probability occurs of achieving an 
important goal or subgoal, the monitoring mechanism broadcasts to the whole 
cognitive system a signal that can set it into readiness to respond to this 
change. Humans experience these signals and the states of readiness they 
induce as emotions (Oatley 1992, 50, emphasis in original). 
These goals mentioned by Oatley can refer to obvious examples like say, finishing a PhD 
thesis, becoming a millionaire author, or slaying a dragon. They also refer, however, to more 
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abstract goals such as survival, or being with loved ones. If for example I am walking through 
town and hear a not so distant shriek of something otherworldly, this impacts my goals and 
plans of staying alive and sane. It will elicit some cluster of emotions, fear being the most 
obvious. In a similar vein however, if I were to be served a pancake which I saw was dropped 
on the floor earlier, this also threatens my goal of survival, or at least health goals.  
The fear response in particular conjures up the chicken and egg debate regarding 
emotions and our bodily response to them: do we experience fear because we are running 
away from danger, our hearts pounding and hairs raised as argued by William James (1884, 
189-190)? Or is our physical response the result of our emotion? Viewing emotions as 
disturbances of plans and goals, as is now common in emotion theory, demands that we both 
accept and reject James’ theory. We reject it because emotions are not a result of just 
immediate physical reflexes; those bodily responses occur only after a rapid assessment of the 
occurrence and its impact on our beliefs and goals. For example, if I were to discover a bomb 
the fear I experience is not the result of the physical image of the mine only; that image is 
linked to my belief that bombs explode and will kill you, making them highly dangerous. As 
Oatley says, “[e]motions occur in distinctive circumstances, but the events that elicit them are 
not purely physical. Rather, they are psychological” (Oatley 1992, 19). We cannot, however, 
reject James’ perspective completely as some emotions (which James himself called coarse) 
are indeed “associated with bodily disturbances” (Oatley 1992, 7), which can be so strong that 
they cause an emotional response. It is an early hint at one of the fundamentals of cognitive 
theory; we are embodied beings, and our cognition and affect are both the result of and impact 
our embodiment. 
What are Basic Emotions? 
In the taxonomy of emotions, it is possible to distinguish two categories: basic and social 
emotions. The most debated of these two is basic emotions, as the definition thereof is 
generally based on the notion of universality. “For many, basic emotions are defined by 
universal facial expressions that are similar across many different cultures” (LeDoux 1998, 
112). This universality refers to both the emotions and experience of them, as well as facial 
expressions (ibid). Happiness or joy generally result in upraised corners of our mouths and 
slight squinting of the eyes, disgust in recoil and a scrunching up of the nose, mouth, and 
brows. Another presumed universal is, according to Oatley, the language we use to describe 
our emotions (1992, 59-61). Because of this universality many scholars use the term basic 
emotions to refer to those emotions that are innate or hard-wired into all humans. Or as Oatley 
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says it, a basic emotion “is physiologically and expressively distinctive and that it has a 
biological basis” (55). However, amongst scholars who adhere to the concept of basic 
emotions the exact taxonomy is not agreed upon. The eight emotions most often referred to 
within this category are anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, contempt, and possibly “interest” 
and “surprise”. However, I have to agree with Oatley (1992, 59-60) in that I am not convinced 
by the conceptualisation of “interest”, “surprised, nor “contempt” as emotions. Therefore, for 
my project I will adopt Oatley’s proposed taxonomy of the five basic emotions constituting 
anger, fear, joy, sadness, and disgust. 
Accepting the existence of basic emotions is, however, not uncontroversial. Basic 
emotions are problematic according to Hogan, because although “some emotion terms are 
basic within certain limited domains” it does not make sense which is basic and which is 
derivative (2003b, 79). This appears to be an issue of terminology and semantics, however, 
rather than an issue of cognition. That said, LeDoux’s summation of the conflict surrounding 
basic emotion theory adds a needed note of nuance to this view: 
[Basic emotion theorists] simply say that some emotions and their expressions 
are fairly constant in all people. The social constructivists can then counter 
with the fact that a given individual may express a basic emotion, like anger, 
differently in different situations – overt anger is more likely to be displayed at 
those below than those above one in a social hierarchy (LeDoux 1998, 117). 
Here LeDoux adds to the relatively simple issue of language and translation the complicating 
factor of social context. Stating that there is such a thing as a basic emotion thus appears to 
deny social, temporal, and cultural contexts to emotions, reducing all complexities of human 
existence to our bodily makeup – which is equally not universal. This is why scholars such as 
J. Keith Vincent take issue with “universalizing claims about the way the human mind works” 
(2015, 199), or claim “a distrust […] in human universals” (2015, 348). Although I 
acknowledge the importance of context and individuality to emotional experience and 
expression, I agree with Oatley (and most emotion scholars post-Oatley 1992) that emotions 
come from a disjuncture in our plans and goals, an inevitable facet of all life. 
As proposed by Michael Burke, a significant number of psychological scholars focus 
on the division between basic and social emotions (2011, 44-45), hotly debating what basic 
emotions are and their very existence. Much of this questioning is based on the specific brain 
functions that are concerned with emotions. However, although the brain’s processing of and 
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reaction to emotions is important to cognitive poetics, it is equally important to consider when 
these emotions occur. Basic emotions occur as a reaction to situations or things, not 
necessarily people. This to me adds another important layer to their status as basic; they stand 
outside of the complexity of the human context mentioned above which informs and shapes 
social emotions. As stated by Nikolajeva: “[s]ocial emotions involve two or more agents 
whose separate emotional needs have to be negotiated” (2014a, 82), which makes social 
emotions more cognitively demanding. Social emotions such as love and hatred, contempt, 
envy, jealousy, guilt, pride, and pity are not hard-wired, which means that they are learned 
and can be trained. Because of this they can also be called higher-cognitive emotions. 
Emotion theory remains a vibrant field of study (see for instance Oatley 2017; Freudenberg et 
al 2019; Zysberg, Raz 2019; Lambie 2020; Xu et al 2020), and without extensive empirical 
research it is difficult to propose new approaches to emotion. However, the aim of my 
research is not to put forward a definitive theory on emotions; it is to analyse children’s war 
literature from a cognitive perspective. Therefore, although I acknowledge that my decision to 
do so is not uncontroversial, I will continue from here with a separated approach to emotions 
in children’s war literature, distinguishing between emotions prompted by events and things, 
and those prompted by other people. These two different categories, in my approach, 
correspond to basic and social emotions respectively. 
Read All About It 
Emotions are part and parcel to both literature and our reading experience. In some ways, as 
stated by Blakey Vermeule empirical research has shown “in spectacular fashion that humans 
cannot reason or even think without emotion—indeed, without narratives” (2010, 23). This is 
because emotions “are not on the periphery but at the centre of human cognition” (Oatley 
1992, 3), and they are at the centre of literature as well. Different scholars have analysed what 
our emotional response to literature is based on, most notably Burke and Hogan. Emphasising 
the importance and complexity of the elements of a narrative which can cause our emotional 
responses, Hogan claims that “[i]nsofar as an emotion operates as an outcome emotion in a 
narrative, its eliciting conditions are most crucial for the generation and reception of that 
narrative” (2003b, 92), and that our emotional response to these narratives “is a matter of 
trigger perception, concrete imagination, and emotional memory” (185). In another 
publication he goes further to emphasise the importance of memory specifically, claiming that 
“personal memories are crucial to our emotional response to literature” (2003a, 158). This 
focus on memory specifically is reflected in both cognitive empirical research (Levine 1997; 
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Levine, Pizarro 2004; Van Boven, Robinson 2012) and Burke’s theories (2011, 13). What 
Joseph LeDoux dubbed “emotional memory” or the low road to emotion Burke dubs 
“affective cognition” (2011, 44), which he describes as a cognitive process “where emotion 
plays a dominant role” (ibid). Burke goes on to argue that this affective cognition is 
particularly important when we engage with the arts, including literature (ibid; 156). Hogan 
however states that this is only in the visual arts and not literature (2003, 176). I disagree with 
Hogan here, as Burke argues quite convincingly that:  
Because an engaged act of literary reading is a largely non-conscious activity, 
and given that literary reading crucially involves emotion and the body, we 
must conclude that much of the memory active during such episodes of reading 
is implicit, and much of the emotion has an affective cognitive nature (Burke 
2011, 156). 
However, as both are focused on general adult literature neither explores the interesting 
difficulty this raises for children’s literature; if emotional memory is indeed central to our 
reading experience, and the implied child reader does not yet have much emotional memory 
or experience, how is their reading experience problematised? How is emotion communicated 
to such an audience? 
 One of the central fundaments of cognitive theory is that of embodiment, that “reason 
(as well as perception, emotion, belief and intuition) are literally embodied – inextricably 
founded in our bodily interaction and experience with the world” (Stockwell 2002, 27, 
emphasis in original). As Ellen Spolsky states, “[t]he recognition that in order to function 
cognition requires the resources of not only the brain, but also the rest of the body in 
continuous interaction with its various environments, is the foundation of cognitive literary 
scholarship” (2015, 2). This notion of embodied cognition underlines all cognitive poetics, 
and in cognitive understandings of emotions rejects Cartesian dualism, “i.e. the strict 
separation of (material) body and (immaterial) mind” (Grosz 1994; Pirlet, Wirag 2017, 47; 
Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 2-3). The notion of embodied cognition is informed by “the role 
of perception, emotion and affect in ‘intellectual’ cognition” (Benedi 2014, p. 132). For 
narrative emotion the notion of cognitive embodiment has the particular impact that, through 
referencing the body in expressions of emotion our mirror neurons are activated, causing us to 
echo the same body expressions. So, if a character for example “shivers, the hairs on his arm 
raise, his eyes widen, his heart pounds, he trembles”, we as readers feel that without 
experiencing it ourselves. Because our mind, including our emotions, and body are 
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interlinked, this translates to us also experiencing an echo of the emotion expressed. In this 
embodied representation, the emotion would be fear. 
 There are other ways through which children’s literature narratives attempt to 
negotiate these issues and communicate emotion to their audiences. Unlike with general 
literature, where the narrative may rely on the readers’ emotional memory, children’s 
literature relies on telling rather than showing, because of which it “tends to have a strong 
narrative agency, possibly because authors do not trust their audiences to make inference from 
showing” (Nikolajeva 2014a, 88). Because children’s literature by definition has to take the 
implied reader’s cognitive development into account, the narrative cannot rely on its intended 
audience fully comprehending the emotions portrayed. Therefore, there may be a heavy 
reliance on overt emotion portrayals; a taking by the hand of the child audience. Here the 
importance of the narrator is foregrounded, as the narrator is the first narrative-shaping 
strategy the reader encounters.  
Since the events and characters are conveyed through the filter of the narrator, 
it is the narrator's way of telling (or showing) that will influence the story 
which unfolds. In constructing the story world, the reader has to take the teller 
of the tale into account in order to interpret events and characters (Golden 
1990, 72). 
Everything the reader encounters in the text is purposefully put there by the narrator, 
colouring and guiding the narrative along. Using the narrator to state the character’s thoughts 
and feelings rather than leaving it to the readers to decode is a basic and unsophisticated way 
to communicate emotion, much like character statements (“I am so happy!” said Hermoine), a 
form of metarepresentation (Zunshine 2006, 32) where no risks are taken regarding potential 
misinterpretation. One of the reasons potentially for the prevalence of narratorial statements 
regarding emotions is because “conventional children’s literature, with its openly didactic 
tone, tends to have a clear narrative voice, moreover, an authoritarian adult voice which can 
manipulate young readers toward a correct understanding of the depicted events and 
characters” (Nikolajeva 2005, 180). Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the narrator will be 
assumed to be an adult. As argued by Paul Harris, children believe what adult authorities 
communicate to them to be true (2012, 136). This works both implicitly and explicitly; the 
key factor, as Harris demonstrates, being that what an adult through language expresses as an 
assumed truth, the child will unquestioningly adopt as truth also (2012, 180). Therefore, if the 
assumed adult narrator states that “Smaug was angry”, the (child) reader will most likely 
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accept this as true. This tendency is especially prevalent in narratives focused on interiority 
(Nikolajeva 2014a, 88).  
 The faith put in a narrator’s description of a character’s emotions is problematised by 
unreliable narration. The most obvious examples of unreliable narrators in children’s 
literature are first person narrators, necessarily limited to their own subjective perspective on 
the story (Nikolajeva 2014, 253). Young narrators are particularly unreliable, as they lack 
experience (ibid), world knowledge, “stable views and opinions, the capacity for self-
evaluation and self-reflection, and so on” (2000, 5), and are therefore “naturally unable to 
evaluate events and people around him and instead relates them from his naïve, inexperienced 
perspective” (2005, 179). What this means for emotions is that the child narrator is by 
definition unreliable in their portrayal of emotions, as the narrator themselves (if the 
perspective is taken successfully) does not yet have significant emotional experience, 
knowledge, vocabulary or memory. Therefore, the child narrator may not report on their own 
emotions clearly or successfully, and they are inaccurate in ascribing and recognising 
emotions in other characters as well. Unreliable non-omniscient adult narrators have the 
slightly different problem where they can be assumed to have this knowledge and experience, 
but they are not omniscient and are therefore flawed in their interpretation and depiction of 
the characters’ emotions and mental states, as we are in extra-textual life. Unreliable 
omniscient adult narrators on the other hand do know the characters’ inner life but cannot be 
trusted in their report about them. It is also possible to have an ironic narrator; a narrator who 
knows more than the characters and/or the reader. A narrative can have further instances of 
irony if the readers (are supposed to) know more than either the characters or the narrator. An 
ironic narrator has a complicated relationship to reliability and is a different issue, as child 
readers may not be able to understand it as being such (Nikolajeva 2005, 178). Verbal irony 
recognition generally develops between the ages of five and six, when children become able 
to pass second-order false belief tests (Wilson 2013, 44). However, accuracy in recognising 
the presence of and true meaning behind irony continues to develop during adolescence 
(Glenwright et al. 2017). It thus remains a tricky technique in children’s literature narration; 
although young children from the age of five onwards may be able to recognise and 
understand irony, an ironic narrator may remain elusive to child readers until (late) 
adolescence. 
 Both Zunshine and Nikolajeva highlight that for cognitive and affective purposes, 
unreliability can be quite the effective tool. This is because unreliable narrators enhance the 
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cognitive demand of a narrative, as they require active searching for source tags if the 
unreliability is caught (Zunshine 2006, 79-80). Incomplete or contradictory information 
triggers the readers’ curiosity, causing them to apply high-order mind-modelling (Nikolajeva 
2014a, 93). Although or rather because the emotions reported by the narrator cannot 
necessarily be trusted, the reader is stimulated to analyse the character’s mindset, motivation, 
embodiment and more so they can arrive at their own conclusion about the character’s 
emotions. Whether or not this is the same as the narrator’s testimony is irrelevant; the reader 
is cognitively challenged and engaged, and through that potentially gains valuable emotional 
knowledge and experience. 
How Are You Feeling, Child? 
As with most everything else, children’s literature complicates emotion theory. This is 
because the implied child reader does not yet have enough life experience to be well versed in 
recognising their own emotions, others’ emotions, and may not even have experienced many 
emotions yet (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16-17). Although young children are able to recognise basic 
emotions (Harris 2008, 320-323), more complex social emotions may be harder to interpret or 
recognise, and contradictory information further complicates emotion representation 
(Nikolajeva 2014a, 90). Childhood emotion is not an apolitical concept; it is during childhood 
that we are taught “how to manage their feelings and how to express emotion. Children are 
taught what they should feel and when, where, and for whom particular feelings are 
appropriate” (Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 5). This may sound particularly grim and 
undermining to the validity of childhood emotional experiences, however, the argument here 
is not that children do not experience authentic, intense, and individual emotions ; to say so 
would fly in the face of copious amounts of both anecdotal and empirical evidence. Rather, 
emotions are a realm in which children are socialised and conditioned by the adults in their 
lives. “In contrast to adult readers and their texts, child and young adult readers occupy—
although do not necessarily conform to—a developmental and experiential spectrum, an 
assumption reflected in the implied audience and pedagogical dimensions of texts produced 
for them” (Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 7). Children’s literature reflects the developmental 
and experiential stage that the implied audience is assumed to be in, necessarily complicating 
representations of emotions. 
As young readers’ ability for slow, rational and structured cognitive processing (the 
“high path”) is not as well developed as their less accurate but quicker processing (“low 
path”) (Blakemore, Frith 2005; Byrne 2003) they are more likely to process external sensory 
37 
 
information through the low path. Because of this, the child readers’ emotional response to 
fiction may be both quicker (by fractions of seconds) and stronger than their cognitive 
response (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16). The strong emotions and deep attachment relationships of 
childhood may also entrench evaluative beliefs about ourselves and the world around us, 
further colouring our emotional lives (Nussbaum 2001, 36). Acquiring emotional knowledge 
and vocabulary is not dependent solely on emotion experience; we also require “an awareness 
of what caused it and a knowledge of its accompaniments and consequences” (Oatley 1992, 
79). Through this, rather than knowing “I cried and my fingers and cheeks tingled”, we enrich 
our knowledge by adding “when my dog died I cried and my fingers and cheeks tingled; I was 
sad”. The additional information, awareness and experiences necessary to gain true emotion 
knowledge are provided expertly by literature, where, unlike extra-textual life, the cause, 
denotation and consequences are generally presented with equal attention. The strength of 
children’s emotional responses is even further emphasised by the extreme scenario of war. 
Battling Emotions 
The genre of the narrative colours our view of the emotions that occur in it; it “often 
‘prefocuses’ our attention, understanding, and response – including the priming of memories 
and correlated generation of rasa” (Hogan 2003b, 65). That said, it cannot be assumed that the 
implied child reader has read enough war stories to have formed a comprehensive expectation 
of what the genre is (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16), let alone what emotions are common for it. This 
does not mean that the prevalence of or emphasis on particular emotions in the genre is 
devalued; rather, it means that the implied child reader could approach each war story as a 
standalone, as it were, without contextual knowledge about the genre. As a result, the extreme 
situation and emotions depicted may be analysed as a new or original encounter. So what 
emotions are most common in children’s war literature? As the genre has, up until this 
project, not yet been defined it is no surprise that there is also no list anywhere of the most 
common emotions within it. The same holds true of general or “adult” war literature; it is 
therefore more fruitful to start by looking at what emotions are most often discussed in 
scholarship.  
For adult war literature, commonly researched emotions include loss and sadness 
(Bogdańska 2014); disenchantment (Frayn 2018); fear (Ashe, Patterson 2014, xi-xii); and the 
difficult tangled emotions that come with trauma (Houen, Schramm 2018, 13-14) such as 
anger and guilt, as well as the seeming lack of emotion causing a sensation of numbness. 
Disenchantment and trauma are less common in writing for children than they are for adults, 
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although they do exist. Perhaps as a result, children’s literature scholarship unfortunately 
appears to be focused not on particular emotional and traumatic experiences by characters in 
war scenarios. Although that research is definitely out there, it does not appear to be 
significant in scope nor presence. Instead, reflecting the didactic nature of children’s 
literature, most research is concerned with how the genre could or has been employed as a 
means of instruction (Goodenough, Immel 2008; Subrtová 2009; Reynolds 2013; Galway 
2016). I will therefore turn to my corpus, acknowledging its temporal and cultural biases, to 
find out which emotions are most common in the genre. Within my corpus, I recognise five 
emotions as generally predominant: guilt, anger, fear, sadness or grief, and love. This may be 
because children’s war literature is a rare occasion where child characters can have profound 
and lasting impacts on people they may not even know, potentially leading to guilt, and war 
threatens the small social world of the child, which is based on love and when threatened 
causes any range of emotions from anger to fear or grief. These emotions are not exclusive to 
children’s war literature; they occur in general children’s literature, adult literature, and adult 
war literature as well. However, within my corpus they appear to be predominant, and are 
complicated and emphasised by both the war scenario and the young implied readership. 
I will next put my theories on emotion in children’s war literature to practice by 
exemplifying through three analyses. The first focus lies on the basis of emotion theory; 
embodiment. As such, I analyse Robert Cormier’s Heroes (1998/1999) to see how the text 
encourages embodied cognition and represents emotions through the body. Next, I move on to 
two prevalent basic emotions of the genre: fear and anger, which through the enhanced lens of 
war become terror and hatred. I demonstrate how these two emotions are represented in 
narrative through an analysis of Jan Needles’ A Game of Soldiers (1985). The final analysis of 
this chapter is of Kate Saunders’ Five Children on the Western Front (2014), and in this 
section I move up to the last type of emotion which can be portrayed; social emotions, 
particularly grief and love. 
I Feel It in My Bones 
Robert Cormier’s Heroes (1998/1999) is an excellent and graphic example of the embodied 
reading experience and its impact on empathy. It tells the story of Francis Cassavant, a WWI 
veteran who has returned to his hometown after throwing himself on a grenade and sustaining 
major injuries and disfigurements as a result. His aim, as is revealed slowly in the novella, is 
to find and murder Larry Lasalle, the man who raped Francis’ girlfriend at the time, Nicole; 
the act which caused Francis to enlist at age 15 because he wanted to die but could not 
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commit suicide. Much of the narrative is dedicated to Francis’ disfigurement, with the novella 
opening with the following introduction to his character: 
My name is Francis Joseph Cassavant and I have just returned to Frenchtown 
in Monument and the war is over and I have no face. 
Oh, I have eyes because I can see and ear-drums because I can hear but no ears 
to speak of, just bits of dangling flesh. 
[…] If anything bothers me, it’s my nose. Or, rather, the absence of my nose. 
My nostrils are like two small caves and they sometimes get blocked and I 
have to breathe through my mouth. This dries up my throat and makes it hard 
to swallow. I also become hoarse and cough a lot (1). 
This description is both lengthy and gory, and through this places a specific demand on the 
reader. The explicit references to Francis’ body are separated from him as a person, as he 
talks about his eyes, ears and nose as if they were separate entities to himself. This description 
does not portray any emotion; Francis the narrator is mechanically showing his face to the 
reader before he opens up about his emotions. The extract also makes clear that this is not a 
text for particularly young readers; for many people, this graphic and gory a description would 
be wholly unthinkable for child readers. Although I am using this novella as an example for 
how embodied emotional representation works in children’s literature as a whole, I do need to 
point out that the implied reader here is an adolescent. Throughout this analysis, I will point 
out when it is relevant that this text is for an older reader than some other texts I will analyse 
for this work, and support my overall arguments with scholarship (both empirical and 
theoretical) about the relevant age group. However, I will also include scholarship which 
demonstrates that although this novella has an older implied readership, the narrative 
strategies and functions of embodied emotional representation are not limited to this 
readership only. 
Emotional Representation Through the Body 
Francis, the narrator, uses few words to state how he feels; instead he refers to experiences his 
body goes through. Two prime examples occur when Francis confronts Larry, and when he 
seeks out his ex-girlfriend for the last time. The conversation with Larry, the driving force of 
the plot, ought to be highly emotional. Yet, as is common in the novella, emotive words are 
limited, instead left for inference through dialogue and embodiment. When Francis meets 
Larry, he says that his “heart quickens at the possibility” that Larry is afraid of him (78); 
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during the conversation Francis’ “lips tremble” (81). The context and topic of the 
conversation steer the reader towards a certain expectation regarding the emotional experience 
of the scene; Francis finally confronts Larry after three years of anger and guilt, fulfilling his 
purpose within the narrative, meaning the quickening heart is most likely an expression of joy 
rather than fear. Additionally, Francis’ trembling lips, a motion which may cause one to get 
teary eyed even if there is no other context for that emotion, is most likely to infer sadness. 
The narrative attempts to make sure the reader infers sadness by also expressing it with one of 
the most explicit emotive sentences, stating “a deep sadness settles on me, as if winter has 
invaded my bones” (79). Double representation of the same emotion like this, first through 
embodiment only and then again through narratorial interjection, is a technique which is 
particularly common in children’s literature across the ages as many narratives do not trust 
their young reader to fully understand embodied emotions. Even this narratorial interjection 
refers back to the body through a metaphor. 
Francis, although he desires nothing more than to murder Larry, falters and is unable 
to shoot and kill him. However, as Larry points out to him, Francis was successful in his 
mission of destroying him because he has driven Larry to suicide. Knowing that he both failed 
and succeeded in causing Larry’s death, Francis does not explicitly state what he feels as a 
result of it but instead provides a bodily description:  
I close the door, my face hot and flushed under the scarf and the bandage. The 
coldness of the hallway hits the warmth of my flesh and I shiver. It seems that I 
have done nothing but shiver since I returned to Frenchtown (84). 
Does the “hot and flustered” betray a rush of excitement, anger, or intense shame? The 
shivering could be simply because of temperature changes, or emotions such as sadness, 
disgust, or even joy. The addition of “It seems that I have done nothing but shiver since I 
returned” implies that it is an emotional bodily experience rather than just an environmental 
one. By adding this sentence, the narrative pushes the reader to interpreting the entire bodily 
description in an emotional fashion, without adding any emotive words. This ambiguity 
places a high cognitive demand on the reader, as it strains their mind-modelling skills. 
Because of this demand, as Patrick Colm Hogan states, the narrative may potentially direct 
the readers’ attention “to particular ‘nuances of emotional expression’ and thus train our 
empathic and ToM abilities” (Hogan 2011, 68). By placing an increased demand on our 
cognitive abilities, ambiguity and narrative gaps thus train our mind-modelling abilities 
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(Koopman, Hakemulder 2015, 79). This is exacerbated by the heavy focus on faces as they 
are the primary way through which we decode others’ emotions.  
However, a higher cognitive demand also imply an older readership, as cognitive 
challenges are only pleasurable to a certain extent, after which readers may “switch off” from 
the text they are reading because they cannot understand it. Empirical research has indicated 
that children start to become more adapt at recognising embodied, facially expressed emotion 
at the ages of seven to ten (Garcia, Tully 2020). However, there is a distinct positivity bias, 
with young children identifying happiness or joy more easily than negative emotions and 
struggling to recognise sadness much at all (14). Additionally, the more “intense” the 
emotional expression, the more likely the child is able to accurately interpret the emotion 
(ibid). The ability to recognise facial emotion expression develops rapidly in early 
adolescence (11-15), after which it becomes much more accurate during adolescence 
(Meinhardt-Injac et al. 2020, 9). Full adult accuracy, which nota bene does not mean full 
accuracy but simply the same amount of accuracy we would expect from an adult at peak yet 
median cognitive performance, is reached at 20-25 (ibid). 
Level One: Reader’s Emotions about Francis’ Body 
Francis’ disfigurement is significantly foregrounded by the novella; it is the first thing we are 
introduced to, and Francis himself keeps referring back to it as a central element of his being. 
Especially because of how extreme his disfigurement is, it will cause an emotional reaction 
from the reader, as it deviates significantly from our expectations of protagonists who are 
generally able-bodied. As argued by Susan Wendell, able-bodied readers (which most implied 
readership is) struggle intensely with disabled characters because of their cultural associations 
being full of fear, pity, and disgust (1997, 248). The emotions evoked by the descriptions of 
Francis’ disfigurement may thus range from disgust or fear to pity or sadness. Simply by 
reading descriptions what his body looks like without any explicit internality, the reader is 
emotionally responding to and engaged with the narrative. These emotions are culturally 
programmed based on a binary distinction between able-bodied and visibly disabled. 
However, because they are cultural, scholars can not necessarily assume that an inexperienced 
child (or, in this case, young adult) reader has these associations; they could potentially 
respond very differently to Francis’ disfigurement.  
That said, the words used to describe his wounds, especially the focus on snot and the 
leaking open wound of his nose, are highly likely to inspire disgust in the reader. This is 
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because of a combination of its strong diversion from the reader’s expectations of 
protagonists, who are able-bodied and do not leak mucus from holes in their faces throughout 
the narrative, and the breakage of the reader’s own well-being or survival plans. As Oatley 
argued, emotions occur as a result of obstructions in our plans, with disgust occurring when 
our survival or health “plan” is threatened. Francis’ nose has no direct link to our extra-textual 
health at all; its presence or lack is always just a combination of blots of ink. However, 
because of the way we process this written lack of nose, with our mirror neurons activating 
and making us experience Francis’ descriptions as if it were our own nose, it does cognitively 
feel as if it is an obstruction of our own plans. Our minds make us feel the emotions we would 
for this major disruption of our health goals because we imagine, or simulate, what it is like to 
have Francis’ disfigurement. 
Level Two: Narrator’s Emotions about Francis’ Body 
Francis the narrator talks about his body in ways almost entirely devoid of emotion; in the 
fragment above the only clue that Francis has any feelings at all about his body is the clause 
“if anything bothers me”. Francis the narrator stylistically attempts to replicate an omniscient, 
non-intrusive third person narrator. Yet it is extremely unlikely that Francis the character has 
no feelings about the state of his body, and as he is a first-person narrator his silence 
regarding his emotional experience is both purposeful and unreliable. Triggered by the 
narrator’s unreliability regarding his emotional experience, the reader is encouraged to 
question what he does and does not state, and therefore to figure out what Francis’ emotions 
are. The reader is thus required to employ their mind-modelling skills to fill in this narrative 
gap and infer how Francis may feel about his disfigurement. The emotional gaps to be filled 
in by the reader may be both basic and social; the basic emotions the reader may mind-model 
on Francis could be fear, sadness, disgust or even anger (it is unlikely that the reader infers 
joy). Socially, Francis spends a significant amount of energy and effort in hiding his face from 
others by continuously covering his face and lurking in the shadows. Especially before the 
reader is told Francis is home specifically to murder Larry, they may mind-model Francis the 
character to be ashamed of his new features, scared to spark disgust or fear in those around 
him. Yet this emotion is left ambiguous by the narration because of Francis’ Remarque-esque 
matter-of-fact narration.  
An important clue can be found in the scene where Francis is in a bar with fellow 
veterans, all of whom have and voice insecurities about their futures, and bitterness about 
their lot. These men accept Francis into the fold and purposefully do not ask him about his 
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experiences, yet Francis does not show his face or join in with conversation. Even though they 
accept him as one of their own, he does not consider himself in that way. Francis’ social 
withdrawal indicates strong emotions, both basic and social, which are unvoiced. The 
narrative requires the reader to infer by engaging with their mind-modelling skills. Near the 
end of the novella, Francis the narrator reveals that he only joined the army to die, and his 
disfigurement is the result of him throwing himself on a grenade as an attempted suicide. He 
survived, however, and was seen as a hero who performed the act to save his fellow soldiers. 
Even then, he does not voice his emotion, and it is up to the reader to infer what he feels about 
being mistaken for a hero; considering he disputes the title hero preferring to remain 
incognito, he may be ashamed, or bitter because he is still alive. Nevertheless, the reader may 
also infer that he experiences conflicting emotions of pride for being considered a hero, and 
shame because of how he earned the title. This inference all depends on the reader’s mind-
model of Francis, in which they receive little guidance. Because of this heavy demand on the 
reader, the narrative stimulates high cognitive engagement with the reader, most probably 
leading to enhanced mind-modelling skills. 
Level 3: Empathy 
The lack of emotion portrayed combined with the heavy focus on embodiment results in both 
a push and pull of empathy; the reader requires emotion for empathy and it is not there, yet 
the embodied nature of the description declares a “just like you (except much worse), dear 
reader”-ness which potentially creates a bond between the reader and Francis. This is possible 
because of mirror neurons, which fire up when we either perceive or even simply imagine 
someone experiencing something, be it movement or interaction (Burke 2011, 45); or seeing 
someone express an emotion and feeling an echo of when we experience it ourselves (Hogan 
2011, 49). By referring to eyes, ears, and noses which the reader is assumed to have, as well 
as issues which the reader may have experienced in their lives as well (hoarseness, coughing, 
a blocked nose, and difficulty swallowing are common enough every winter), the narrative 
may activate the readers’ mirror neurons as they both imagine and remember experiences with 
their own body. Through this, a cognitive affective link with the reader is established (Pirlet, 
Wirag 2017, 38). Additionally, the horrific nature of Francis’ injuries may spark pity in the 
reader. Pity is not empathy, as the emotions of the other reacted to are in a way irrelevant. It 
is, however, a strong emotional reaction to a character. 
Francis’ body may complicate extra-diegetic empathy to the point of impossibility. 
Again, this is in part due to the difficulty the general implied reader has empathising with 
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disabled protagonists (Wendell 1997, 248). Francis’ wounds may Other him too much for the 
reader to be able to transcend. Additionally, an ugly or sick character, invoking fear or 
disgust, alienates the reader (Nikolajeva 2014a, 87). For expert readers this should prevent 
identification whilst still allowing empathy, however, for the implied novice reader this is not 
the case (ibid) as they may be turned off completely by Francis’ body. Although they have a 
strong emotional response to the narrative, these responses are alienating and cognitively and 
emotionally problematic. 
 Although Cormier’s Heroes is a great example of embodied emotion representation, it 
is not singular in its usage of this technique. Especially for the intense basic emotions of fear, 
anger, love and joy common in children’s war literature, emotion may be portrayed through 
embodied descriptions. Yet as Cormier exemplifies, social emotions too can be portrayed in 
this fashion. Children’s war literature is not the only genre to have either embodied emotions 
nor to display these particular emotions; however, the dangerous reality of the situation makes 
the emotions more visceral than in other genres. For young readers, embodied emotions may 
be hard to decode as they have limited experience with their own bodies and of emotions, and 
how bodies can express emotions. Additionally, as novice readers they may struggle with 
understanding subtle narrative clues and are still rapidly developing their limited mind-
modelling skills. Embodied portrayals of emotions equally do not automatically translate to 
extradiegetic empathy, although the explicit referencing of the body and its functions 
potentially engages the readers’ mirror neurons, causing embodied cognition, through which 
the likelihood of shared emotions is greatly enhanced. 
Terror and Hatred 
As demonstrated with the analysis above, embodiment is a powerful way to show emotions. 
However, it is a subtle narrative technique and as such a narrative that relies mostly on 
embodied emotion portrayals may be overly difficult to understand for novice readers. When 
readers cannot recognise the emotions of text, it is unlikely that they have any emotional 
engagement with it, let alone empathic. Therefore, most (children’s) texts employ a 
combination of techniques to portray emotion. In the following analysis I demonstrate how a 
narrative can deploy a combination of narratorial statements, embodied emotions, and 
character statements to portray emotion. The emotions I focus on here are both basic and 
social, and both are amplified by the extreme narrative situation of war. Fear and anger are, as 
stated above, standard emotions in children’s war literature. Yet they do not necessarily 
appear in their most basic form. Terror is a magnified form of fear, and due to the position of 
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relative powerlessness of the child in a war situation is a common emotion to occur in 
children’s war literature. Hatred is more complex, as it is a social emotion. Hatred cannot 
occur without a second party to feel hatred for, although some may say and genuinely feel that 
they hate themselves, this is a massively complex issue outside the scope of this research. 
Hatred combines multiple basic emotions; anger, disgust, perhaps even fear. Hatred is an 
exceptionally intense emotion, due to which it is always noticeable when present in children’s 
fiction. The extreme nature of war allows for enhanced portrayals of such an intense emotion 
as hatred.  
Although Jan Needles’ A Game of Soldiers (1985) is a short and relatively simple 
story, it has some striking portrayals of intense war-based emotions. It tells the story of 
Michael, Sarah, and Thomas, three children living through the Falklands war. While playing 
on the moors, they stumble across a wounded Argentinian soldier slowly dying of exposure. 
After the children discover the soldier, they swear to murder him; however, when confronted 
with him they instead attempt to nurse him back to health. Both Michael and Thomas suffer a 
form of domestic abuse; Michael is neglected, and Thomas is actively beaten and terrorised 
by his alcoholic father. Additionally, the novel opens with an attack on the children’s 
hometown, an experience which shakes all three of them. These experiences underline their 
emotional reactions to finding the Argentinian soldier. This narrative, unlike Cormier’s 
Heroes, has an implied young, child reader of around nine or ten. This is made evident by the 
ages of the protagonists, who are all young children (although only one of them has his age 
made explicit), the relative simplicity of both the plot and the language used, and the way 
through which the emotions are depicted. 
The most significant instances of terror originate in Thomas, who aged eight is the 
youngest of the three children. As an abused child put in danger both in a domestic sense and 
because of the war, Thomas spends most of the novel in a near constant state of terror. The 
reader is first introduced to this in the first chapter of the book, when the village the children 
live in is under bombardment. Thomas had fallen asleep outside of his parents’ door, longing 
for parental comfort. His terror is portrayed through a combination of dialogue, embodiment, 
and narratorial statements: 
  Before he could stop himself he had shouted. 
  ‘Mum! Mum!’ 
  Panic stricken, he scrambled to his feet. From inside the bedroom he heard the 
  squeak of springs. Gripping Red Bear by the leg, he scurried quietly back 
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  towards his own door. 
  His father’s voice came; loud, angry. 
  ‘Thomas! If you’re outside here!’ 
  As he scuttled into his room, he heard his parents’ door jerked open. He stood 
  against the cold bedroom wall, trying to pant without a sound. It was half a 
  minute before the other door was closed and he could burrow back in between 
  the blankets (14). 
Initially Thomas starts this excerpt experiencing fear. His fear is not labelled explicitly for the 
reader but left implied, requiring the reader to fill in the blank. The main indicators that 
Thomas is experiencing fear are that he shouts out for his mother, and that he does so 
involuntary. Calling for his mother signposts that Thomas needs to be comforted or protected 
from something; doing so “before he can stop himself” betrays a multitude of factors. Firstly, 
that Thomas’ need for comfort and protection appeared suddenly, meaning that the instigating 
event was unexpected. Secondly, it shows that Thomas is reluctant to call out for his mother; 
it is something that he knows he should not do. Yet his immediate response to the danger of 
the bombs overrides his control over his voice. The unexpected bombing suddenly presents an 
obstruction for Thomas’ basic “biological goal”, as Oatley would say it, of survival (1992, 
191). In the reader’s mind-model of Thomas, the combination of the danger and Thomas’ 
uninhibited cry for his mother most likely include fear as well as an attachment for his 
mother, a potential or desired source of safety.  
The next line opens with a narratorial statement that Thomas is “panic stricken”. Panic 
is not a basic nor a social emotion; it is a response to an unexpected and undesired emotion or 
action. The panic as stated by the narrator is further elaborated upon through embodied 
emotions; Thomas “scrambles to his feet”, and “scurries” and “scuttles” quietly back to his 
room. Scrambling is an inelegant, messy motion, betraying a sense of sudden urgency to 
move, whereas scurrying and scuttling are small, rapid steps connoted to fleeing crustaceans, 
rodents, or small children. Particularly the addition of “quietly” to the scurry adds to the sense 
of urgency first planted by the words “scramble”; Thomas is fleeing his parents’ bedroom 
door and he feels the need to do so without detection, upping the sense of danger in this scene 
but shifting it from the bombs to the domestic sphere. This shift is further emphasised by 
Thomas’ gripping of his bear plushie; whereas he started the scene calling for his mother’s 
comfort as a direct and involuntary response to his fear of the bombs, a different fear causes 
him to seek comfort from a toy. The focus shifts from something outside of the home to 
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something inside, namely Thomas’ abusive father, adds another layer of danger to the 
situation, enhancing the emotion displayed. Thomas’ initial fear for the bombing is left 
unaddressed and uncomforted, and his panic and further fear of his father are added to it, 
creating a sense of terror. 
The scene is rounded off by an embodied portrayal of emotion, as Thomas attempts to 
“pant without a sound”. Again, much like the quiet scurry, the need for silence combines with 
Thomas’ rapid movement to create a sense of urgency and danger. It stands in stark contrast 
with his loud father, who both speaks loudly and moves loudly, jerking the door open. This 
contrast of loud versus quiet demonstrates a power imbalance; the father feels no need to 
control his volume and even weaponizes it against his son, who in contrast constantly 
attempts to make himself small, unheard and unseen. The father’s anger is indicated by, again, 
a narratorial statement (“loud, angry”) but it also requires higher-order mind-modelling; 
Thomas is modelling his father’s emotion, as indicated by his own immediate physical and 
emotional response. The contrast between the father and the son again enhances the sense of 
danger, this time coming from the father. His domineering presence is foregrounded by the 
son’s docility. Thomas’ terror and powerlessness are further enhanced by the animal 
connotations of the verbs used to describe his motions; scuttling, scurrying and burrowing are 
all linked to notions of both smallness and animals searching safety. This first passage of 
terror is particularly effective because of its combination of techniques. Fear is exacerbated in 
the face of anger because it originates from a sense of powerlessness; a situation that can only 
worsen in the face of an angry adult that the child is scared of. The contrast between Thomas 
and his father serves to further enhance the terror in the narrative, both because it foregrounds 
the powerlessness of Thomas’ situation, and because it adds another element to be afraid of. 
 When the children discover the soldier in the moors, Thomas is once again terrified. 
They first notice the soldier’s presence because he fired a warning shot at them from behind 
them, before he realised they were children.  
  Before they turned, at last, Michael and Sarah looked at each other, with wide 
  eyes. Thomas’ were closed, screwed tightly, as were his fists. But as the others 
  turned, so did he. As he opened his eyes, he began to make a sound. 
  It was a high, whining noise, a jerky squeaking, and it was quite nerve-racking. 
  Sarah and Michael, wound up like wire strings, could hardly bear it, it was so 
  unhuman. Whatever little courage they had left was being drained by it (46). 
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Whereas the older children stare at each other as if in acknowledgement of what just 
happened to them, Thomas’ closed eyes and fists betray an extreme form of fear resulting in 
terror. His eyes are not merely closed, which would indicate an unwillingness to see and 
therefore face reality, they are screwed shut. Thomas does not want to face reality, yet he is 
painfully aware of it, and it scares him. His fists are clenched as an automatic fight or flight 
reaction. His scream is unhuman, primal. This display of terror relies more on embodiment 
than the previous one, however, it is easy for interpretation because it is not the first portrayal 
of terror, allowing the reader to build from their previous mind-model of Thomas’ emotions. 
His scream is “nerve-racking” and drains the other two of their courage; much like the spread 
of panic amongst soldiers on the battlefield, terror saps and spreads. The impact of Thomas’ 
terror on the other children again requires higher-order mind-modelling; the reader is 
responding to Sarah and Michael’s response to Thomas’ emotion. The impact of Thomas’ 
emotion validates its narrative presence and highlights just how extreme his terror is. Higher-
order engagement with literary portrayals of emotions like this enhances cognitive 
engagement with the text as it is more demanding, and through that may enhance emotional 
engagement as well, as long as the level of embeddedness is manageable for the reader.  
For most neuro-typical adults the manageable orders lie at around five or six 
(Zunshine 2006, 563). This higher order cognition is terribly complex, for example; I think 
that character B believes that character A is sad because character C is angry at character A 
for loving character B. Even written in a sentence this trail is hard to follow; in narratives the 
orders are less directly presented, enhancing to the level of complication. This type of 
embeddedness is cognitively straining “on both writer and reader alike” (Vermeule 2010, 69). 
Most narratives will not be this complex, however, multiple layers of embeddedness are 
standard in any form of literature. According to Zunshine (2006, 563) and Vermeule (2010, 
37) an average adult reader can automatically keep track of three or four orders of 
embeddedness. For children, the manageable orders can be presumed to be much less; 
Nikolajeva even hypothesises that for most children the limit lies at the second order of 
embedment (2014a, 91); I think that the character is sad, for example. However, childhood is 
a very broad period of intense cognitive development, and although very young children may 
be limited to second order embedment, “tweens” for instance may not be. I can therefore not 
agree that most children are limited at the second order of embedment; however, I must 
emphasise that because of the reader’s state of development manageability of those levels of 
embedment is of prime concern of any children’s narrative. 
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A final way through which the narrative merges emotion portrayals is a combination 
of embodiment and interpretation by another character. Sarah, while rushing with Thomas to 
the shed where they had left the soldier to fetch supplies, turns back when Thomas falls 
behind. There she sees that “he was lying on a grassy knoll, his head covered by his arms 
[…]. He looked terror-stricken” (77). Again, Thomas’ body language expresses fear to the 
extent of incapability to face the situation; lying on the ground and covering one’s head are 
yet another flight or fight response to his own emotional experience. Sarah’s assessment that 
Thomas “looked terror-stricken” requires higher-order mind-modelling, and finally puts the 
word “terror” together with Thomas’ emotional reactions. Telling the reader the term for how 
Thomas is feeling is unsubtle, and an overreliance on this technique runs the risk of 
potentially limiting emotional and empathic engagement. However, it being combined with 
lengthy descriptions of the same emotion relying on anything but narratorial statements lead it 
to have a different effect; instead of leaving a shallow emotion, the narrative introduces the 
reader to its form of terror. The implied reader will not have experienced true terror; besides 
bad dreams, they will not have been in physical danger. By allowing lengthy descriptions of 
terror and readerly engagement therewith, and then following that up by putting a name to it, 
the narrative both successfully creates terror and communicates it to the reader.  
Hatred, being a social emotion, is more nuanced than terror. Whereas terror is, in 
essence, an extreme form of fear, hatred is a combination of emotions, particularly anger and 
disgust. The most exemplifying character for this emotion is Michael. Michael particularly 
hates the Argentinian soldier; this emotion is built up to slowly. When the children stumble 
across the soldier and discover that he is injured, Michael immediately wishes to murder him: 
“Michael, staring at him fascinated, whispered to Sarah: ‘He’s useless! We could rush him! 
We could get that gun and kill him! I–’” (48). Through this reaction, Michael dehumanises the 
soldier. He stares at the soldier as if he is something else, Other than him. The adverb 
“fascinated” further adds to this dehumanisation as Michael objectifies the soldier. Here 
Michael does not display hatred; he is simply fascinated. His excitement about having the 
opportunity to kill this man is more likely to be mind-modelled as rooted in the basic emotion 
of joy. This emotion is portrayed through both the narrator’s statement of “fascinated”, and 
Michael’s own dialogue. The short sentences marked by exclamation points read as a boy 
overwhelmed by excitement. 




‘They’ve ruined everything, and we didn’t ask them in, did we? They’ve 
invaded us and mucked the place up. They’ve smashed the radios, and the 
phones, and they’ve stole stuff and killed sheep and messed up lots of houses. 
And there’s mines all over, and the beaches are ruined, and the lot. They’ve 
wrecked the place’ (55). 
Michael’s language use here is notable because it enhances engagement with the character. 
The grammatical error of “stole” instead of stolen; the overuse of the word “and”; as well as 
the use of “the lot” indicating that Michael could not think of any other words all combine to 
create dialogue indicative of how a child at the time may have spoken. As a result, the reader, 
also implied to be a child, may be moved closer to Michael. The emotion of this speech is 
ambiguous, however; Michael is still joyful at the prospect of potentially murdering the 
soldier and is using this speech to manipulate the other children to go along with his plan. 
This desire to manipulate is made explicit through narratorial statements. To do so, he is 
trying to appeal to their sense of anger towards the enemy, placing the blame for the war on 
this particular soldier. The words “ruined”, “mucked up”, “smashed”, “killed”, and “wrecked” 
are all negative, and may indicate that Michael is angry himself. However, in the mind-model 
of the character the reader has already had to take into account his long-standing sense of joy, 
as well as his using this speech to attempt at manipulation. The reader is therefore not 
supposed to trust Michael here, resisting his anger-rousing speech. The resistance is further 
enhanced by Sarah’s rejection of Michael’s manipulation, as she sees what his real intent is, 
as well as Thomas’ immediate acceptance of its face-value. Sarah being older than Thomas is 
portrayed as being wiser, whereas Thomas’ neediness and naivety make it so that the reader is 
unlikely to follow along with Michael’s manipulation. The reliance on narratorial statements 
in portraying Michael’s emotions betrays an insecurity on the part of the narrative that the 
reader would be able to recognise the complexity of Michael’s emotions. 
 The emotion of hatred is invoked after Michael attempts to kill the soldier. He 
approaches him with determination, but upon making eye contact with the wounded man is 
unable to pull through. This breaks up his “kill the enemy” goal. As a direct result “[r]age and 
shame filled Michael. He had failed. He turned away racked with anger and self-disgust. He 
hated the soldier, lying there, grey-faced and despairing, he hated him enough to …” (76). 
The emotions portrayed here are mostly expressed through direct narratorial statements, 
explaining to the reader that Michael is experiencing “rage” (an extreme form of anger); 
“shame” (a social emotion); “anger”; “self-disgust”; and “hate”. Yet these statements are 
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supplemented by embodiment and metaphor; rage and shame fill him up, as he turns away 
from the soldier in disgust. Describing Michael as being filled by rage and shame both 
invokes an image of him as initially void of emotion, and as taut with negativity. Turning 
away from something which disrupts our plans can be because of fear or disgust, however, the 
narrative emphasises that it is self-disgust Michael is feeling. He cannot turn away from 
himself, yet because he is experiencing a form of disgust as a direct result of the soldier 
disrupting Michael’s plans, he turns away from him as the source of the disgust. The heavy 
use of emotion words combines into hatred, at the same time explaining that it is a 
combination of anger, disgust, and perhaps shame. The portrayal of shame here is quite 
didactic; the authoritative nature of the narratorial statements explains both what hatred is and 
that it is an extremely negative emotion. 
Love Hurts 
Besides terror and hatred, two emotions take centre stage in children’s war literature; the 
social emotions of love and grief. An excellent definition of grief is provided by Hogan, who 
states that “grief is marked by moments of panic, when one wishes more than anything to take 
some action to change things, but cannot” (2011, 113). Grief is therefore extreme sadness, 
combined with panic and powerlessness. Grief is connected to love, as it is the loss of a loved 
one which causes grief. Love is a complicated emotion which occurs when multiple goals are 
achieved; our goal of happiness, and our goal of belonging and comradery. Its basic emotion 
foundation is joy, but because it is a social emotion it is more complex than that. Both grief 
and love are prominent in children’s war literature and form the basis of the novel I discuss 
next. Kate Saunders’ Five Children on the Western Front (2014) is a sequel to Edith Nesbit’s 
children’s classic Five Children and It (1902). In this modern version, the Psammead returns 
as the world of the children plummets into the chaos of WWI. In keeping with Nesbit’s style, 
Saunders introduces the eldest four children with a summary of their character: 
Cyril was a handsome, adventurous boy of twelve. Anthea, aged eleven, was 
kind, and liked looking after people. Robert, aged nine, was serious but with 
flashes of silliness, and seven-year-old Jane was a thoughtful, sharp-eyed little 
girl who worked hard at keeping up with the others (2-3). 
The other two children are Hilary “the Lamb”, a baby member of the original Five Children, 
and this novel’s addition of Edie. These two are the main characters after the first chapter, as 
the story fast-forwards nine years to the start of WWI, when the four older children are 
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twenty-one, twenty, nineteen, and seventeen. The Lamb is antagonistic to the Psammead, 
unwilling to indulge its selfish and callous worldview and selfishly desiring fulfilment of 
fanciful wishes. Edie is adoringly devoted to the Psammead and self-sacrificingly loyal. 
Again, the ages of the protagonists and the narration’s style indicate a young implied 
readership, whom the narrative considers in need of explicit characterisation and emotion 
representation. 
 The story starts when Cyril is about to set off to the Front for the first time, creating a 
tension that the rest of the narrative is built on. The Psammead returns at the same time, 
indicating that the children are, or will be, in great need. “Everyone was wondering if the sand 
fairy had returned because Cyril was going away to where the fighting was” (33). This need is 
emotional and caused by the war; eventually, both Cyril and Robert leave for the front, and 
both Anthea and Jane redefine themselves and their aspirations because of the war. Robert’s 
war effort is hugely unsuccessful; he leaves his Cambridge scholarly career to go to the Front, 
and is reported dead, only to be revealed to be blinded and maimed. His family grieves not 
once, but twice; first because of the false belief that he is dead, but then because he is disabled 
through the War. Surprised and joyful that he is alive, the children initially are “almost scared 
to look at him, in case he’d changed too much” (270). They are happy to be reunited; one of 
their main goals (that of being together) is achieved. Yet although introduced through 
Robert’s storyline, the main source of grief, and the emotional centre of the story, is Cyril’s 
War plot. Although the focus throughout largely is on the Lamb, Edie, and the Psammead, 
Cyril maintains an underlying presence through written correspondence and occasional leave. 
His story is a constant backdrop against which the main story is set, which comes to the 
foreground at the end of the narrative. The underlying, unspoken fear that the whole family 
experience throughout the novel become reality when both Cyril and the Psammead die, 
plunging the remaining characters into grief. 
The six children spend most of their time together throughout the novel, engaging 
emotionally with each other over long stretches of time, thus enhancing their attachment to 
each other. By attachment here I mean a sense of belonging, security and joy through an 
emotional connection; the “goal” then is to be together with this person. High levels of 
attachment lead to increased trust (De Rosnay 2009, 759) and empathy “arising out of 
relational security” (Stern, Cassidy 2018, 7), starting in infancy. Attachment therefore is a 
requirement for both love and grief. Even the Psammead has an attachment to Cyril, as one of 
the original five-children-entity. The defining moment of initial attachment with Cyril for 
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both the children and the Psammead, as well as the reader, lies in the White House where all 
three parties are introduced to each other. As Patrick Hogan argues, “we often define our 
present emotional place by its distance from the beginning” (2011, 112). This distance is 
highlighted, in Five Children on the Western Front, by use of temporal distance. The 
Psammead and all children besides Cyril are suddenly transported from their home (where, 
importantly, their collective ties with Cyril are established and based) to the Front, where they 
witness Cyril writing his goodbye letters before heading into battle. In his letter to his 
girlfriend, Mabel, he writes that “If it’s possible to be a ghost, I’ll come and visit you in your 
garden in Oswestry, among those prize-winning pink roses of yours; you’ll feel a slight breeze 
on the spot below your left ear where I like to kiss you, and that will be me” (301). Here 
Cyril, and the narrative through him, highlight the attachment that is so central to grief. The 
children seeing him write this knowing that he is about to go into battle are unable to read on 
and face what is about to happen, their voices “choked” (301) in reluctant admission of the 
foreshadowing. The “choking” is an embodied portrayal of sadness. Combined with the love 
felt for Cyril, however, this sadness transforms into grief. 
After witnessing this, the Psammead warns them that instead of going home they will 
be transported again, this time to Mabel’s house which neither the characters nor the reader 
have visited before, further stretching the distance between the current temporal, geographic 
and emotional place of the characters, and the House where they set off from. This increase in 
distance fills all five children with “a strange, heavy feeling of dread”, immediately followed 
by a scene where they see Mabel in her garden “stopped in the middle of cutting roses and 
glanced up sharply, letting out a little gasp as her hand touched the spot just below her left 
ear” (304). Her strong attachment to Cyril is foregrounded here, foreshadowing her soon-to-
be grief. No reflection is allowed to the children before this scene is rapidly followed by 
another temporal transportation to the hospital where they witness their brother dying as a 
result of shell wounding. However, the reader does have the freedom that the characters do 
not have and may take a moment to process the scene that just occurred, experiencing the 
emotional reaction to Cyril’s implied death when the characters’ reactions are not available. 
Immediately after Cyril and the Psammead pass away, the children are transported back to the 
House. Returning to the original anchor of attachment further serves to highlight the distance 




The children are fundamentally unable to change Cyril’s situation for two main 
reasons. Firstly, they are only witnesses to his death through metalepsis, and cannot change 
the past. This is because, secondly, they do not have any magical abilities themselves and the 
Psammead’s magic is reversed at sunset, making Cyril’s death therefore irrevocable. 
Although the children are able to notify Cyril of their presence and to ask him, simply, what 
happened, they are not able to say goodbye to him or to engage with him further. The 
realisation both of what is happening and that they cannot change it leaves the children “pale 
and dumb with dread”, unable to comfort Cyril, and “staring at each other in breathless 
silence” (305-307). They are, as Hogan would phrase it, experiencing action paralysis in the 
face of imminent grief (2011, 117). The “breathlessness” and paleness are embodied 
portrayals of both fear and potentially sadness. The reader is in even less of a position to 
change Cyril’s fate, as they are merely presented with the text. Although they can close the 
book and refuse to read what happens to him, they will not be presented with any other option 
for Cyril. The helplessness both the children and the reader experience when faced with 
Cyril’s deathbed, a situation they presumably would want to change, further serves to enhance 
the feeling of grief both parties may experience. However, the reader may also resist this and 
not have an emotional reaction to Cyril’s death at all. 
Cyril’s death marks the end of the story. Between it and the epilogue, which details 
what the children’s adult lives are like, the reader is presented with two brief snippets from 
diegetic newspapers. The first details that two desert rocks nicknamed “the lovers” collapsed 
and came together as rubble. Earlier in the narrative, it is revealed that these were actual 
people and lovers whom the Psammead turned to stone as a punishment, never to be joined 
again. The Psammead’s moral lessons, culminating in his death, freed these lovers from his 
curse. The second snippet tells us that Anthea married a soldier named Ernie, these two being 
modern stand-ins for the ancient lovers for the Psammead’s lessons. The narrative swiftly 
moving from the intense grief of the loss of Cyril onto the joining of two sets of lovers is a 
form of mood shift, a strategy of coping with intense negative emotion. Both love and grief 
have attachment at their core, and moving from grief to love can serve to both provide 
comfort to the reader to prevent them from wallowing in grief and the powerlessness (and 
hopelessness) that comes with it, as well as highlighting both the negative and positive sides 
to such strong attachment. The dead are dead, but there is hope in the living, who still have a 
lot of love to give. The love hinted at from these newspaper snippets, however, is presented 
not in emotive language and descriptions, but in the neutral style of reporting. Through this, 
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the emotion of love that the narrative is trying to confer is left as a narrative gap for the reader 
to fill in. Switching straight from an elaborate, sixteen-page scene of grief to a one-page 
report of love and joy allows the reader a potential small reprieve from the grief without 
undermining its lasting impact. 
The sudden shift to love and joy is also symptomatic of the almost compulsive 
emphasis on happy endings in children’s literature. It is even identified as one of the main 
characteristic features of a children’s text by Perry Nodelman (1996, 190). The presence of a 
happy ending is often seen as one of the hallmarks of a children’s text. How to wrap up a 
story is an ethically charged choice, and as such the seemingly common decision to end it on 
a happy note is not ethically neutral. There is a moral case to be made for providing the 
cognitively immature reader with a happy ending, as in the study of ethics the emotion of 
happiness is the goal of all actions, be it for the individual or for the group. The Nikolajevean 
novice reader (2014a, 15-16) may be exceedingly distressed from negative endings, or be left 
with a sense of hopelessness and despair. Approaching the issue of the happy ending in this 
manner Nikolajeva argues that this type of ending may be considered ethical “not merely 
because it makes the reader happy, which is beneficial as such, but also because it presents 
happiness itself as a virtue” (193) whereas tragic endings which are less usual in children’s 
literature “are unethical or at least ethically ambiguous, because, apart from condemning a 
character for wrong choices, they leave the novice reader with a sense of frustration” and 
without hope (ibid). Viewed from this angle, closing a story on a happy note is the right thing 
to do when addressing a cognitively sensitive readership. However, happy endings are also a 
culturally determined; whereas a child’s death would have been a happy ending in 19 th 
century literature, it would now be either ambiguous or sad. Here, in Five Children, it is 
considered sad enough to warrant an emotion shift back to happiness in order to provide that 
ever desired happy ending. 
It is possible too to see happy or at least modestly hopeful endings as an inescapable 
part of the nature of children’s literature, which Nikolajeva calls “one of the great paradoxes 
of children’s literature” (2014a, 194; 2018, 94). Even in cases where the characters die, the 
reader presumably lives on. The hope lies then not in the characters, but in the message of the 
novel, like in Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front for example; the death 
of the protagonist Paul reaffirms the futility of the War and its deaths. Hopefully the young 
reader then, ruminating on the narrative, takes the messages of the narrative with them into 
extra-textual life. In this way, hope lives on. If this reader is part of the assumed demographic 
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of young people, they themselves probably still have a lot of time to recuperate from the 
narrative and to potentially heed the warnings of the text and apply the empathic and ethical 
skills they trained through reading in real life. This is another way through which any ending 
of a children’s text can be framed as not devoid of all hope: the text continues through the 
impression it has left on the reader. Children’s literature by definition targets young people, 
and it usually features young protagonists too. The youth of the reader and possibly of the 
character as well is crucial here, because as they still have more life to live and to apply the 
experiences they’ve had in the story to there is time for them to recuperate from the tragedy of 
the narrative (Nikolajeva 2018, 94). The inherent futurity of the young reader (those who 
mature beyond childhood) is both an aspect of hope and of power (Beauvais 2015, 3; 49). The 
young reader (or “mighty child”) is empowered by the amount of life yet unlived (18). This 
empowerment and hope, both based on futurity, inherently add a possibility for positivity to 
the any type of ending of a children’s text: even the closed ending continues in the reader. The 
continued impact of the narrative ending also holds true in the case of open endings, which 
are philosophical thought experiments as the reader is left with an eternal gap and is thus to 
speculate about what happened after the supplied “ending” (Nikolajeva 2014a, 194). Such 
philosophical activity enhances the ethical development of the reader and thus impacts the 
ethical implications of the text. 
 Scenes of grief are common in both war literature and in children’s literature. In the 
former loss is a regular feature of the plot, and attachment between either family, friends or 
fellow soldiers is often a highlighted element. In children’s literature grief may occur when 
the narrative touches on the death of either grandparents, friends, pets, siblings, or even 
parents. This grief is then often the main subject of the story, as the child has to learn how to 
deal with this emotion and those peripheral to it. However, in children’s war literature, grief 
takes a slightly different form, both because the higher chances of death in the violence of the 
setting, and because of the enhanced feeling of powerlessness in the entire situation. In the 
face of death, most literary characters are completely powerless, opening them up to the same 
frustrations as we experience in extra-textual life. In the case of death caused by war, the child 
character experiences an extra layer of powerlessness as they generally have no control over 
nor input in the situation; although a child may fight in the war, they usually do not have the 
power to either start it, end it, or change its circumstances. A common soldier does not have 
this power either, yet as an adult they may experience at least the illusion of control that a 
child cannot. The five children’s witnessing of Cyril’s death demonstrates this powerless 
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grief; they have no control over where or when they are, they cannot stop the War (an option 
they discussed), and they cannot save Cyril’s life. However, although it is a sad situation, 
grief is not without hope.  
The epilogue reveals that although they miss their brother, the remaining five 
children’s lives after his passing are happy and fruitful, as, importantly, the tales of the 
Psammead and the War are told on to Anthea’s daughter. Thus, the story ends with a child, its 
promise of a potentially better future, and the reaffirmation of the positive side of strong 
attachment – this time, the attachment between a mother and her daughter. The focus on the 
promise of the child at the ending demonstrates Beauvais’ claims regarding endings in 
children’s literature; because the narrative cannot know what a child will do there is inherent 
hope in what they might do (2015, 46-47). Even in the case of death, there is still might in the 
child reader; the way they respond to the narrative and take it with them into adulthood places 
hope in them as well (48). Additionally, the reader is shown that one can move on from active 
grief, and that this is not a bad thing. Although the novel could have ended after Cyril’s death, 
leaving a strong emotional impact on the reader, instead the narrative attempts to mood shift 
away from grief, having the final impression be one of love and hope. 
Is All Fair in Love and War? 
Emotions underline both the stories we tell and consume and our empathic engagement with 
them. In children’s war literature the emotions depicted are intensified by the clear and 
present danger of the war scenario; the ongoing threat to both the individual’s wellbeing and 
their larger social network acts as an amplifier for the emotions common to children’s 
literature. Jan Needle’s Thomas does not simply experience fear, he displays terror. Michael 
is not just angry at the soldier; his anger is mixed with disgust, culminating in true hatred. The 
intensity of their emotions forms a solid basis for empathic engagement; they are easier to 
identify for a novice reader than subtle and nuanced emotions, and strong emotional prompts 
cause strong emotional responses. For this, children’s war literature is particularly good at 
creating emotional engagement with the reader. Stories of war are stories of bodies, and the 
emphasised role of the body enhances the chance of empathic engagement. The extreme 
situation of a war scenario further enhances this possibility because of the intensity of the 
emotions at play.  
In this chapter I did not discuss any of the extra-textual factors which may impact the 
reader’s emotional reading experience, such as their surroundings, their mood going into the 
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reading, or their personal beliefs or memories. This is because, as stated in the introduction, I 
am looking purely into narrative techniques and not talking about real readers in this project. I 
must acknowledge, however, that these factors all play a role in any readers’ reading of a text, 
and therefore also with their empathic engagement with the narrative. Nevertheless, while 
analysing the purely narrative construction of emotion in children’s war literature I have 
discovered that the main emotions common to children’s war literature of grief, love, terror 
and hatred can be demonstrated through a variety of strategies. Underlining all is the 
fundamental notion of embodiment; although it is possible to talk about emotion without 
involving the body in some way, this makes emotional engagement difficult to the point of 
nigh impossibility. 
Discussing emotion is fundamental to discussing empathy; without the one, you 
cannot have the other. In literature, however, the emotion presented to the reader is mediated 
through multiple narrative techniques and voices. Each has a particular impact on the reader, 
which in children’s war literature is filtered by the extraordinariness of the dangerous setting 
of the story. Therefore, having explored the range, implications, and portrayal of emotions in 
children’s war literature, the question that follows is why certain emotions take precedence 
over others? In this chapter I delved into the first of the narrative strategies that construct and 
underline the novels we read. This first “voice” presented to the reader is that of the narrator, 
the one that determines, as Gérard Genette stated, who speaks in the story (1983, 65). The 
mediation of emotion through a narrator adds particular elements to interpretation and 
determine what the story presented is. Who is this “person” telling us this story? And what if 
we cannot trust them? A further lens through which our conception of a story is filtered is that 
of focalisation, the level of the narrative which most strongly influences the grouping so 














One of the main reasons why emotion stands at the centre of both literary experiences and 
cognitive narratology is because without it, we could not experience empathy. As stated in the 
Introduction, my working definition of empathy is: the ability to attribute emotional states to 
another whilst differentiating between the self and the other, and having an emotional 
reaction in response, thus avoiding immersive identification. This means that empathy 
requires Theory of Mind or mind-modelling skills, emotions, and emotional knowledge. 
There are different kinds of empathy, most notably in the case of literature diegetic and extra-
diegetic empathy. Diegetic empathy concerns empathy within the text; empathy between 
characters. Extra-diegetic empathy is the empathy that occurs outside of the text, between the 
reader and the characters in the text. Establishing these forms of empathy requires particular 
techniques, which may nor may not be concurrent with each other. The form of empathy on 
which I focus in this project covers both diegesis and extra-diegesis and is particularly 
important for war literature: in- and outgroup empathy. 
 The exact moment at which empathy in general becomes possible is difficult to 
pinpoint, as there are many factors which determine this cognitive emotional development. 
Parenting and education, for instance, are particular cultural elements of a child’s life which 
are highly influential in the development of emotion expression and regulation, and empathic 
response specifically as well (Geangu 2015, 552). In addition, even within a culture each child 
develops in its individual way. However, research has indicated that although infants are 
already able to resonate emotionally to the emotions of those around them (551) and indicate 
sympathetic concern during their first three years of life (ibid), empathy itself does not 
manifest in a way which adults recognise until around the age of four (Tully, Donohue, Garcia 
2015, 126). Four is also the age when Theory of Mind, a necessity for empathy to exist, 
develops rapidly (Nikolajeva 2017, 83). As the child develops this empathy becomes more 
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sophisticated and complex; adolescence in particular is a crucial moment for empathy 
development (Doherty 2009). However, the foundations become visible in infancy and 
recognisable at four. 
You’ve Got Your People, and I’ve Got Mine 
The basic foundation of in- and outgroup empathy theory is that we as humans (nota bene that 
I am not speaking for animal empathy theory) as a form of reflex group others as either like 
us, or unlike us. Empirical research has shown that humans have a clear preference for those 
they consider as more or less like themselves (Prinz 2011, 226), their in- and outgroup 
respectively. This preference starts showing obviously at around four (Tousignant et al 2017, 
8), however, even before then babies demonstrate a preference to their caregivers over those 
they may consider strangers (Stern, Cassidy 2018, 9). The membership of these groups can be 
decided in a manner we may consider quite arbitrary; some research projects create group 
membership simply by dividing children up into two named groups, like group A and group B 
(Dunham et al 2011). This happens often in schools where there may be two classes of the 
same year group, for instance (for example, in my last year of primary I was in group 8b and I 
would never consider anyone from 8a even close to a friend). In a less artificial manner, 
people may base their group membership on elements like skin colour, hair colour, sexual 
orientation, dietary preferences or requirements, nationality, religion, age, and so on. There 
are nigh infinite ways to divide ourselves up into in- and outgroups, which is a thing we all do 
almost instantly. 
 However arbitrary the division may be, the impact it has on human thinking and 
behaviour can be tremendous and quite horrifying. A great example of this is Dennis Gansel’s 
film Die Welle [The Wave] (2008), based on schoolteacher Ron Jone’s social-psychological 
experiment from 1967. In this film, the teacher attempts to explain how the Holocaust could 
happen to a group of people who believe it to be impossible any innocent, normal people 
would go along with extremist ideology. To demonstrate how the Nazis were able to 
successfully demonise those they considered lesser, the teacher separates the class into blue-
eyed and brown-eyed students, giving preferential treatment and higher status and authority to 
those who with blue eyes. This experiment gets completely out of hand, as the students slowly 
lose themselves in a harrowing echo of Nazi behaviourisms. Because of many reasons, not 
least ethical rules and stipulations, this type of experiment cannot be replicated at this point. 
However, the empirical work done so far does explain several facets of human thought and 
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behaviour which are impacted heavily by our reflexive grouping of people as either in- our 
outgroup members. 
 One of the key elements of in- and outgroup empathy is that we empathise more with 
our ingroup members. The preference which babies demonstrate for people they know over 
strangers mentioned above is not only manifested early, but also stays with us throughout our 
life. Research has demonstrated that not only do we prefer people we identify as ingroup 
(Decety 2015, 4), we are more likely to interpret their emotions in a positive way (Bennet et 
al. 2004, 135). Our interpretation of these emotions is also heavily skewed based on group 
membership; empirical research has demonstrated that emotion recognition is higher for those 
who are from our ingroup (especially culturally and racially) than those who are not 
(Elfenbein, Ambady 2002). Children also demonstrate this ingroup bias (Segal et al. 2019). 
This has direct implications for people’s lives and safety, as research has also demonstrated 
that when viewing a video of a white man pushing a black man, and a black man pushing a 
white man, the black man is considered aggressive and dangerous, whereas the white man is 
considered playful and harmless (Kunda 1999, 347). Similarly, in experiments people are 
more likely to harm those they consider outgroup members and aid ingroup members (Kteily 
et al. 2014).  
Why does this grouping influence the way through which we view other people? 
Patrick Colm Hogan hypothesises that it is because in the case of responding to a salient 
ingroup member, we “are likely to use a combination of simulation and inference in our 
theory of mind responses regarding that person, with simulation as the default” (2013, 37), 
which then tends to lead to empathy. With outgroup members, however, he claims it may be 
more likely for us to “shift to inference even if we spontaneously begin with simulation. 
Specifically, the outgrouping itself may create enough of a processing contradiction to inhibit 
simulation” (ibid). Essentially, then, in Hogan’s perception of the empathic impact on ingroup 
and outgroup membership, we are more likely to empathise with our ingroup because we view 
them as human and well-rounded as characters, whereas the outgroup is rigidly Other, 
“flatter” characters (2013, 37). In the case of war, all Orcs, Germans, or Catholics are the 
same, whereas the people in the ingroup are individuals we are more likely to care about. 
 These claims are supported by cognitive psychology. As neuroscientist Jean Decety 
argues, this formation of empathy-binding groups in society may be a fundamental aspect of 
human social life: 
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The roots of empathy are subsumed in the evolution of parental care and group 
living, which explains why empathy is influenced by social context, especially 
group membership. The value humans place on group membership is 
exemplified by the ease with which humans form groups and favor ingroup 
members, across cultures and from a very early age (Decety 2015, 4). 
Not only, then, is grouping fundamental to human life; it is also rooted in childhood. 
Although this discussion may make it seem that group membership is a permanent fixture, it 
is flexible. Some memberships are quite fixed, like skin colour (although characters like 
Rachel Dolezal attempt to be flexible in that aspect of their identity, and changing skin colour 
may be possible in fantasy and science-fiction narratives). Others, however, are by their very 
nature less defined; sexual orientation changes throughout one’s lifetime, as do identifiers like 
age, profession or vocation, and size. However, the main important flexibility of group 
membership identification lies more in the fact that it is impossible for others to be completely 
like or unlike us. Additionally, no two people hold the precise same understandings of what 
their identity concepts mean, although there may be an overlap (Hogan 2004, 11).  
According to Hogan it is our act of extending our own definitions to include others 
which creates the in- and outgroup categories (2004, 8-9). Especially religion is a good 
example for this, as it is a highly individual experience with personal conceptions, yet is often 
extended to include others regardless of individual differences of potentially even 
fundamental issues. This notion is taken to its logical extreme in an infamous Northern-Irish 
joke about an American tourist travelling to Belfast, where he is stopped and asked, “are you 
a Protestant or a Catholic?” Replying that he is a Jew, he is then asked “aye, but are you a 
Protestant Jew or a Catholic Jew?” So, the label of Protestant or Catholic has lost all 
connotations to religion and refers instead to presumed shared ideals and values of a 
community in conflict. The Northern-Irish joke also exemplifies that in- and outgroup 
categorisation is nonsensical because it relies on a “single axis framework” (Crenshaw 1989, 
140). This means that it does not take intersectionality into account. Individuals have multiple 
potential group identities which compete depending on context. If, for example, I am a 
Protestant woman living in Derry in 1986, but I identify with the nationalists calling for a 
united Ireland, this would go against the assumed connection of Protestant equals nationalist, 
and Catholic equals unionist. 
Context is therefore key to creating our in- and outgroups (Hogan 2011, 71). If I am 
meeting with new colleagues at work, my grouping of being a children’s literature scholar 
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may be most important to the way I approach new people. Similarly, if I am walking home 
alone in the dark and I spot a group of people further along the street, my identity as a woman 
becomes most important to me. My identity as a Protestant has never been relevant to me; 
however, in Northern Ireland it would be one of the main bases of group membership. 
Although it is nonsensical, grouping ourselves and others based on assumed identities is a 
fundamental element of human society as well as our reading experience.  
Lines in the Sand 
Empathy grouping does not only impact our extra-textual life; it also impacts the way we read 
fiction. Because we treat fictional characters as if they are real people (Vermeule 2010, x-xi), 
we group them into in- and outgroup members like we do with people in our extra-textual 
lives. As we read, our brain responses adapt to the new “normal” of the text world (Gerrig, 
Mumper 2017, 244). Therefore, our judgements of the characters are adapted to this text 
world normality and impact our perception of similarity (254). As is the case with extra-
textual groupings, however, textual characters are unlikely to be completely in- or outgroup to 
the reader. Especially when a character becomes individualised by the narrative, this “almost 
inevitably leads an author away from simple outgroup reduction and toward elaborated 
individualization” (Hogan 2011, 71). Individuating outgroup characters may therefore be a 
particularly useful strategy for a narrative attempting to demonstrate that outgroup members 
are not purely outgroup and may be empathised with. 
 When we read our engagement with textual characters is greatly affected by the group 
categorisations we use for extra-textual life; we use more empathy for the ingroup than the 
outgroup and consider the outgroup as more homogenous than the ingroup. The main 
difference between textual and extra-textual grouping, however, is that the narrative creates 
the context which determines what identity groupings become foregrounded. This 
foregrounding is entirely flexible; some categorisations take priority in certain scenes whilst 
being only in the background for others. By this I mean that a narrative, through different 
techniques, can encourage the reader to focus on particular elements of identity and base their 
membership on those strategies. For example, as recently argued by Anna Savoie in her 
doctoral thesis (2019), young adult literature featuring minorities can use the identity of the 
implied reader as being a teenager to manipulate them into empathising with the (generally) 
teenaged protagonist/focaliser. Through shifting the focus of membership to the particular 
element of age rather than, for instance, race or ability, it may be possible for a text to enable 
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the reader to (strongly) empathise with characters they would otherwise class as outgroup 
members. 
 It is also possible for a narrative not to have shifting foci of membership, in which 
case the narrative employs what Suzanne Keen calls “broadcast strategic empathy,” which 
means that it “calls upon every reader to feel with members of a group by emphasizing 
common vulnerabilities and hopes through universalizing representations” (2007, xiv). This 
type of group empathy is simple and unchallenging and leads to “easy empathy”. Easy 
empathy is when there is a readerly desire to empathise with a likeable character (Leake 2014, 
177). More complex narratives which do challenge the reader, however, are cognitively much 
more demanding. The reader will have to swap their empathic focus and re-evaluate the 
priorities of the identity categories of both the textual characters and themselves. “Characters 
that challenge readers’ identification or affection, or those that challenge affection or 
identification with other characters within the novel, can expose the jagged edges of reductive 
approaches to understanding human empathy” (Mitchell 2014, 132). Challenging the 
empathic status quo can push us towards questioning the boundaries we previously set on our 
empathy. Narrative strategies can therefore manipulate group characterisations and the 
cognitive challenge placed on the reader. The more challenging the empathy, the more the 
reader will have to actively engage their empathy, and the more they are training their 
empathy and mind-modelling skills.  
Pitting Children 
In children’s war literature there are two main identity markers which are by the genre’s 
definition always on the foreground; age, and which side of the conflict they are on. Of 
course, when discussing empathy and children’s literature, there are added complications to 
the already intricate system of narrative in- and outgroup empathy. These complications come 
down to the simple facts that children’s empathic ability is fluid and developing, that their 
literature is often written with expressly didactic and socialising purposes in mind, and that 
the concepts of “child” and “children’s literature” are not only central to the debate; they are 
also highly historically and culturally bound. The idea of the child, who can be one and what 
this means qua rights and duties, has changed significantly over time and is constantly in flux 
– as a result the texts that are created to “train” these people for life as adults are equally 
different over time and across cultures. It is therefore important to clearly delineate exactly 
what implied audience and which literatures one is analysing and for what purpose. Especially 
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in the case of cognitive criticism, there is a strong risk of universalist assumptions leading to 
overgeneralisation. 
In his brief discussion on the impact of children’s literature on empathic development 
of young readers, Hogan argues that the attachment schemas picked up in early childhood are 
relatively permanent (2011b, 50), meaning that our in- and outgroup understandings are set 
early on. This does not necessarily mean, though, that our in- and outgroups themselves are 
set; these are social above all else, and as our social lives and worlds change over time, the 
groups we identify with do too. Stories do help with our construction of prototypes (301), 
which determine the way we conceptualise and understand the world. The stories we read as 
children, Hogan claims, “are more likely to affect emotion systems that undergo critical 
developments in adolescence or later” (301). Early reading, or children’s literature, is 
particularly influential in the development of a person’s emotional and empathic capabilities. 
This is in no small part because (early) childhood is the stage on which our earliest 
impressions of what the social world does and should look like are set (Stern, Cassidy 2018, 
9). The analysis of children’s literature, then, reveals who we are encouraged to empathise 
with, what emotions are deemed appropriate, and also shows how these concepts are 
communicated to young audiences confronted with this socialising material. 
 Especially in children’s war literature the ingroup versus outgroup empathic divide is 
of vital importance; children’s in- and outgroups become increasingly selective over the 
course of their lives, and the rigidity of these groups determines the constraints on their 
empathic ability. War stories necessitate the grouping of us versus them, the creation of 
radically divided and violently engaged in- and outgroups, and the way through which the 
narrative handles this divide can gravely impact the implied child reader’s desire and ability 
to empathise across group borders. Additionally, antagonistic in- and outgroup categorisations 
(as are by definition the case in war literature) increase in significance and importance 
(Laszlo, Somogyvari 2008, 123). Literature has the potential to cultivate empathy for both the 
in- and outgroup, and to challenge the original divides and the ideologies behind them (Hogan 
2011b, 75). Therein lies both the promise and danger of literature, and specifically war 
literature: not only can they “foster an openness to empathy; they may also foster an inhibition 
of empathy through identity categorization” (Hogan 2011b, 70). The implied child reader’s 
assumed low resistance in the face of narrative strategies means that the depictions of the 
goodies and the baddies of a war story may be assimilated with no or little questioning. It is 
thus crucial to consider what a story does regarding in- and outgroup empathy, and what 
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strategies it employs to achieve its desired effect. War stories, because of the overt grouping 
necessary for the plot, highlight these strategies like no other genre.  
Getting It in Perspective 
Of all narrative strategies it is the focaliser which most filters how the story is communicated 
to the reader; which events and characters are depicted and how. It is the lens through which 
we see the narrative; often through the perspective of the protagonist (Abbott 2002, 64-65). 
There are different types of focalisation: nonfocalised, external focalisation, and internal 
focalisation (Genette 1972/1980, 189-190). A nonfocalised narrative would traditionally be 
called the omniscient perspective, in which the narrator can present the story through the 
perspective of all characters at any time and switch between them (Nikolajeva 2002, 61-62). 
The narrator knows more than the characters (Golden 1990, 60). External focalisation would 
traditionally be labelled as objective perspective, where the reader is presented with the 
character’s “literal, perceptional point of view, but not their thoughts and feelings” 
(Nikolajeva 2002, 62). The narrator presents less than what the character knows (Golden 
1990, 60). Internal focalisation, or an introspective narrator, is focalised by the narrator 
themselves (Nikolajeva 2002, 62). A narrative can, however, have multiple internal focalisers 
as long as it has multiple narrators (Golden 1990, 59). Focalisation pushes the reader towards 
a certain grounding point for projection and empathy (Stockwell 2002, 172). If, for instance, 
inside views of characters other than the protagonist are minimal or not present in the 
narrative, potential empathy for the protagonist is enhanced because of fixed focalisation 
(Booth 1961, 249; Chatman 1986, 191-194) and empathy for other characters is minimised 
(Bal 1997, 146-8). Manipulating the focalisation is a powerful way of manipulating extra-
diegetic empathy. Switching focalisers can potentially lead to empathy because it foregrounds 
certain aspects of the plot (Kümmerling-Meibauer 2012, 131). Additionally, fixed focalisation 
provides less overt opportunities for cross-boundary empathy, whereas focalisation from the 
Other’s perspective foregrounds their experience and enhances the chance of empathy.  
The reader, including inexperienced readers, may however resist focalisation. 
Although there is a trend to assume that children are at the mercy of a narrative this is both 
silly and quite ill informed. On the other hand, it is equally silly to assume that an adult reader 
is entirely resistant to narrative techniques; most adults are not the expert readers we all hope 
them to be. Lydia Kokkola and Eva Fjällström (2014) have demonstrated the child reader’s 
ability to resist narrative techniques through an empirical research project analysing 
focalisation resistance in Swedish teenagers. The sixteen-year old participants were presented 
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a text in English, their second language in which they had limited proficiency. However, 
although the participants struggled with certain cultural knowledge gaps (399), they were still 
able to resist the narrative focalisation at points (408-407). A sixteen-year old’s cognitive and 
reading abilities are significantly different from a ten-year old’s, however, because these 
participants were reading in a language in which they have limited abilities they were more 
prone to manipulation than they would have been in their mother tongue. We may therefore 
draw from this study to tentatively state that focalisation is not binding to a child reader in 
what perspective they take. Therefore, it is equally possible for a reader to reject a narrative’s 
manipulation towards empathy with certain groups.  
Out Of the (Horse)Box 
Michael Morpurgo’s War Horse (1982) is perhaps one of the most famous children’s war 
novels in the Western Anglophone world; it was even adapted to the stage, a Broadway 
musical, a film, and was featured at the London Olympics. This narrative, aimed at a young 
audience of nine and up, tells the story of Joey, the titular war horse, who gets sold by the 
farmer who owns him to the British army. From there he is sent to the Western Front of WWI, 
as part of an archaic approach to modern warfare. The cavalry quickly defeated, Joey and his 
horse comrade Topthorn are taken by the German army and placed in an occupied French 
farm. Soon, Joey and Topthorn are taken to the Front again, where Topthorn dies from heart 
failure. Now alone again, Joey experiences a terrifying episode of shelling and feeling chased 
by gunfire and tanks. Running injured and afraid, Joey stumbles into no-man’s land. There a 
significant episode occurs, where a German and a Welsh officer meet in the middle to contest 
who gets to take Joey with them. Joey is won in a coin toss by the Welsh officer, and taken to 
a British veterinary hospital, where he is reunited with Albert, the son of Joey’s owner before 
the war. After the war the horses are auctioned off, and Joey is sold to the French farmer he 
stayed with during his German stint. The farmer “sells” Joey back to Albert for a penny and a 
promise, and Albert and Joey arrive back home victorious war heroes. 
Joey is both the protagonist and the focaliser, which is unusual in children’s literature 
where most focalisers are human children (although there are many famous examples of 
exceptions to this rule, like Anna Sewell’s Black Beauty from 1877). He is not a magical 
horse in the sense that he is unable to speak to the people around him and is in servitude to 
whoever claims him. He can, however, understand all languages spoken to him. He lives with 
and serves English, German, and French people in WWI, which allows these characters to be 
represented in the text, provides an insight into their interests and concerns, and facilitates 
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empathy for all of them. It also places Joey outside of the in- and outgroups of the war; 
although he does form attachments for specific characters, it is with them as individuals, 
unrelated to what side of the combat they are on. Through this the narrative theoretically 
places the reader in a position where they can observe the grouping without necessarily 
feeling aligned with a specific one – if this were not a WWI novel written for an English 
audience. Although the level of knowledge of the reader cannot be assumed, the implied 
English child reader is more likely to identify with the English characters more than the 
Germans or the French, and therefore consider the English their ingroup. This initial 
ingrouping is pushed further by the narrative’s opening; the first chapter details Joey’s pre-
war life in England, establishing his deep friendship with Albert, his first owner’s son. 
Additionally, Joey’s initial war experiences are with the English army – as is the ending. 
Through this the narrative grounds Joey in England first and foremost, establishing the 
English as the original ingroup. It does this on purpose however, as the rest of the novel then 
focuses on breaking down the divides between the ingroup and the outgroups. 
Placing focalisation with a horse lets the human characters speak freely (in direct 
speech), as the horse is a silent observer and is assumed not to understand. Direct speech is 
also a narrative technique which marks the text as intended for a young audience, as it 
indicates a lack of trust in the reader to understand implied meanings and sentiments. In this 
direct speech many of his owners, from all sides of the conflict, openly contemplate the 
irrationality of the war and of hating the Other just because they are on the other side of the 
War. The following was said by a German officer directly to Joey: 
‘How can one man kill another and not really know the reason why he does it, 
except that the other man wears a different colour uniform and speaks a 
different language? And it’s me they call mad! You two [horses] are the only 
rational creatures I’ve met in this benighted war, and like me the only reason 
you’re here is because you were brought here’ (Morpurgo 2007, 108-109). 
The soldier, notably an adult, acts like a mouthpiece figure for the narrator. As argued by 
Nikolajeva, young readers are supposed to empathise and learn lessons with young 
protagonists, meaning that the protagonist cannot be a mouthpiece for the author’s beliefs and 
opinions “but rather wisdom must necessarily come from a secondary character, whether an 
adult or a child” firmly guiding the reader to what they are supposed to take away from the 
lessons (Nikolajeva 2002, 36). Adult characters hold more authority than child characters, 
betraying the didactic nature of children’s literature and the age of the intended audience. War 
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Horse is a perfect example for this, as Joey’s muteness by definition necessitates others to 
speak for the narrative.  
Crossing the us versus them divides is the main focus of the novel, foregrounded by 
both the mouthpiece characters and Joey as an ostensibly neutral focaliser (Nilson 2019, 44). 
One of the most significant and didactic scenes occurs when Joey runs into no-man’s land in a 
blind panic, at which point the German and British forces have a peaceful meeting to discuss 
who gets to take the horse. Both the German and the Welsh officer come out of their trenches 
to, symbolically, meet in the middle by the horse. There, luckily, they are able to converse in 
English. The officers decide on a coin toss to see who gets the horse, and reflecting on the 
civility of this solution the Welshman comments that ‘[w]e could have settled all this peaceful 
like, Jerry – the war I mean – and I’d be back in my valley and you’d be back in yours. Still, 
not your fault I don’t suppose. Nor mine, neither come to that’ (131). This statement 
foregrounds two things to the reader; the mention of their respective valleys foregrounds the 
similarities between the enemies, and the narrator’s message that none of the soldiers were to 
blame for the devastation of the War. The propagation of these messages, the blamelessness 
of the soldiers and the crossing of us versus them grouping is further foregrounded after the 
horse is won by the Welshman, and the German respectfully says goodbye: 
‘The horse is yours. Take good care of him, my friend,’ and he picked up the 
rope again and handed it to the Welshman. As he did so he held out his other 
hand in a gesture of friendship and reconciliation, a smile lighting his worn 
face. ‘In an hour, maybe, or two,’ he said. ‘We will be trying our best again 
each other to kill. God only knows why we do it, and I think he has maybe 
forgotten why. Goodbye, Welshman. We have shown them, haven’t we? We 
have shown them that any problem can be solved between people if only they 
can trust each other. That is all it needs, no?’ (133). 
This overly didactic mouthpiecing is typical both of Morpurgo’s work in general, and of 
modern children’s war literature which is generally anti-war (Budgen 2018, 145-146) and 
most often is focused on the futility of the War and its destructive effects on all sides. This is 
again emphasised by the ending, when Joey and Albert return to England. “Both of us were 
received like conquering heroes, but we both knew that the real heroes had not come home, 
that they were lying out in France alongside Captain Nicholls, Topthorn, Friedrich, David and 
little Emilie” (182). Joey here “speaks” for both himself and Albert in a statement which 
equates all the victims of the War as having equal weight to them; the English, the horses, the 
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Germans, the youths, and the French. This is only possible because Joey is allowed to bond 
with all parties without affronting the reader as a traitor. Through this bonding the narrative 
encourages the reader to engage empathically with all the victims of the War, regardless of 
which side they were on. 
 In most cases, focalisers in children’s war novels are human children, because of 
which Joey’s horseness is foregrounding by definition. Although Joey has allegiances to the 
people he serves and horses he befriends, because he is a horse, humans around him assume 
he cannot (and in fact, he does not) have loyalties to either side of the conflict. Because of this 
it is possible for both the English and the Germans to befriend him and use him in combat. 
Additionally, Joey cannot speak, which leaves him a mute Other on which the human 
characters project their emotions as they monologue at him. All languages spoken at him, 
however, are recorded in the text. Both these factors, Joey serving and befriending multiple 
sides and characters revealing their feelings to him, allow for the narrative to lay bare the 
humanity of both sides of the conflict; something which would have been difficult if Joey 
were human. Because Joey is an animal he is placed outside of the political responsibilities of 
the war, and his muteness in the face of the other characters equally places him outside of the 
in- and outgroup divisions which form the basis of the war and the narrative itself. Through 
animal focalisation War Horse can demonstrate and comment on war based in- and 
outgrouping from the perspective of an outsider; an outsider perceived as inherently innocent 
above all. Through this the narrative can override us versus them binaries set up by war and 
promote extra-diegetic empathy with all sides involved. It is a particularly effective strategy; 
however, it is not the only one. Another way to attempt to override grouping is through 
multiple focalisation, which I will analyse with the next text.  
So Many Sides 
Ruta Sepetys’ Salt to the Sea (2016) is another novel based on an historical event. It features 
four protagonists on their way to escape from the Baltics to Eastern Germany on the ship the 
Wilhelm Gustloff. Emilia is a pregnant Polish fifteen-year-old, attempting to escape ethnic 
cleansing. Joana is a young nurse fleeing from the rise of the Red Army in Lithuania, who 
blames herself for accidentally setting the NKVD on her cousin and her family, potentially 
causing their deaths. Florian is a Prussian art restorer smuggling a valuable statue he stole 
from the Nazis. Alfred is a Nazi officer who works on the Wilhelm Gustloff. The four 
protagonists are also the focalisers for the novel, which is unusual for children’s literature as, 
as John Stephens says, “the majority of children’s fictions employ only one focalizing 
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character” (2010, 56). The implied reader of Salt to the Sea is, however, not a young child but 
an adolescent, as indicated by the ages of the protagonists, the complexity of having multiple 
focalisers, and the themes of sex, rape, pregnancy, abortion, genocide and other war crimes. 
Therefore, although multiple focalisation is uncommon in children’s fiction as a whole, it is 
not too exceptional here in a YA novel. 
The novel’s four protagonist-focalisers’ narratives are divided up and clearly 
represented in short chapters titled only by their names. One of the potential results of 
divvying up focalisation in war literature, and often a clear aim of the narrative, is to represent 
a conflict from contrasting perspectives. Nodelman writes that multiple focalisation 
complicates empathy (he uses the term “identification” but based on how he uses it, it is clear 
he means empathy, so that is the term I will use) because attention is pulled away from the 
emotional experience towards the aesthetic experience (2017, 7). By shifting away from a 
clear emotional experience and the expected fostering of emotional engagement, the 
polyphony of this type of narrative forces the reader to an awareness of difference and self-
reflection (ibid). Nodelman argues that because multiple focalisation inherently results in 
dyssynchronous information, the reader is pulled away from empathy through irony (10). 
However, when discussing novice readers this is not something we should assume, as irony is 
not necessarily something novice readers understand (Nikolajeva 2005, 178). In children’s 
war literature, I argue, the purpose of multiple focalisation is not necessarily to pull away 
from empathy, but instead to promote empathic engagement with all sides represented. 
Through this, multiple focalisation can be a tool through which the narrative can criticise the 
focaliser’s limited worldview and engage the reader in a more sophisticated ethical discourse 
(Cadden 2000, 146-147). 
Multiple focalisation can also cause asymmetrical information, where some characters 
have more knowledge about a situation than others, or even the reader. Moving away from 
their point of focalisation may increase a sense of tension and suspense. Also, as stated by 
Nodelman, providing four different, equally authoritative versions of the same events pushes 
the reader to mistrust of all focalisers (2017, 99). This appears to be the main purpose of 
multifocalisation in Salt to the Sea; each chapter is very brief, often only a few pages, and 
usually ends on a cliff hanger. Additionally, the sections focalised through Joana, Florian and 
Emilia foreground their untrustworthiness; they often mention keeping secrets from the other 
characters, and express fear of being found out. Their secrets are also kept from the reader 
until the characters confide in each other, offering only breadcrumbs to their true meaning; 
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“‘I’m a murderer’” (42), whispers Joana to Florian at the end of one of her chapters. The 
reader is not provided with any further information other than the emotion of guilt Joanna 
feels about her murder(s) until she explains that she feels responsible for accidentally 
providing information to the secret police regarding her family, potentially leading to their 
deaths. Florian often states that he is dangerous to be around; “She had no idea. It wasn’t 
‘safer’ for anyone to be with me” (80), and that he has some form of secret in his bag with 
him. His untrustworthiness is again foregrounded by his performing of the Hitler salute 
(although he does eventually express a distaste for it) and possessing a German uniform and 
papers – yet he is not in the army and does not clarify his role for the majority of the novel. 
Through this foregrounding both in form and content the reader is primed to mistrust the 
focalisers and thus spend more attention to the narrative, which enhances cognitive 
engagement and could potentially lead to more emotional engagement as well. 
There is an effort to establish similarities between the four characters; all four are 
described as “young” in some way or another, for instance. Emilia is the only one whose age 
is clearly stated, as fifteen. Florian is secretive about his identity and a forger, so the only clue 
as to his age the reader is provided with is when Joana, his love interest, and another evacuee 
estimate him to be either nineteen or twenty, which is younger than herself. Alfred is simply 
described as “the young sailor” (175). Additionally, when the characters are first introduced in 
their respective chapters their driving forces are made clear this is done in simple sentences of 
the same structure; Joana is driven by the emotions of guilt: “Guilt is a hunter” (Sepetys 2016, 
1). Florian is the hero: “Fate is a hunter” (3). Emilia’s defining emotion is shame: “Shame is a 
hunter” (5). Alfred’s is fear: “Fear is a hunter” (7). For Joana, Emilia and Florian the form is 
even the same; all their chapters are in first person present tense, and of the same lengths. In a 
most obvious way, the characters are also all bound through the plot; Joana, Emilia and 
Florian are all three unhomed by the war and are seeking escape through the Wilhelm Gustoff, 
which is the ship Alfred works on. By creating these links between four characters 
representing different sides of a conflict, the narrative seems to set up equal weight to these 
sides, allowing for enhanced understanding regarding the impact of the conflict on society at 
large. However, the three voices of Joana, Emilia and Florian are emotionally and stylistically 
homogeneous; and Joana and Florian’s are cognitively similar as well. Although Emilia is 
fifteen her style reads significantly younger than the others’, placing her on at least the outer 
circle of their ingroup. Homogeneity reduces the potential effect of multi- focalisation 
(Nikolajeva 2014b, 262); instead of providing four different perspectives and consciousnesses 
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there are only three. Even more limiting is that there are in effect only two sides of the 
conflict represented. 
The differences between the four are most important to the narrative, however, and 
shape the empathic impact of the narrative. Although all four characters are from different 
backgrounds, with Joana a Lithuanian woman who looks to Germany for refuge, Emilia a 
Polish girl raped by Russian soldiers, Florian a Prussian forger and Alfred a young Nazi 
sailor, they are not created equal. Joana, Emilia and Florian are set up in opposition to Alfred, 
in effect reducing four sides to two. In relation to the war, Joana, Emilia and Florian look to 
escape it and express distaste for it, whereas Alfred adores it and is a true believer of Nazi 
ideology. Whereas Alfred is isolated from the other three characters, they are brought together 
within the first few chapters and act as a team throughout the rest of the novel. The result of 
this is that understanding of the complexity of the conflict is reduced, even though there are 
still nuances in the differences in their respective backgrounds. The mistrus t placed in the 
focalisers and the focus laid on difference rather than similarity which is foregrounded mostly 
regarding Alfred sets up a clear Good versus Bad dichotomy and tension between the two 
parties. The three characters only come into contact with Alfred midway through the novel, at 
which point their unity is semi-solidified, and the reader has had insight into Alfred’s 
dangerous mind for several chapters. Instead of complicating the image by adding an equally 
attractive, other side to the story, Alfred serves simply as a clear antagonist. 
 Alfred is made as repulsive to the reader as possible. He is a coward, not respected by 
his colleagues, and prone to violence. The majority of his chapters are epistolary; letters 
written to Hannelore, the woman he loves, aggrandising his role in the smooth operation of 
the ship he works on. Alfred’s is an epistolary account, the only one in the novel, up until the 
point where he encounters the other characters. Through this he is isolated from the other 
three focalisers in both form and content. The events Alfred mentions in the letters which 
would make him potentially seem heroic or likeable to the reader are generally framed in an 
ironic fashion; immediately counteracted: 
  Imagine, my darling, your Alfred is saving two thousand lives. 
   
  “Have you cleaned the toilets yet, Frick?” 
  “Not yet,” I replied (Sepetys 2016, 85, italics in original). 
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The difference between Alfred’s epistolary version of himself and his reality is made clear 
through visual differentiation of levels, as is common in YA literature (Nikolajeva 2014a, 
251). His letters are also mental fabrications not just in content but also in essence. 
 Alfred’s intense unlikability is cemented when it is revealed that Alfred is not only a 
true believer in Hitler’s beliefs; he also reported Hannelore’s Jewish father to the Hitler 
Jugend, believing that because her mother was a gentile Hannelore would side with him and 
be saved. Instead, she denounced him at the end as she was arrested and transported to the 
concentration camps. Alfred’s delusional reports on himself, combined with his repulsive 
ideology and betrayal of the woman he loved, make him an extremely unlikely source of 
empathy. Whereas multi- focalisation in children’s war literature often serves the purpose of 
promoting difficult empathy with the enemy, humanising the Other, in this novel it does the 
opposite. The focus lies not on the characters but the action; Alfred’s focalisation cements the 
view of the Nazis as inherently and unrepentantly evil, and functions to enhance the suspense 
and drama of the action. The resistance to empathising with the Other is, ironically, made 
explicit through one of Alfred’s letters: “It confounds me when people don’t assist or even 
welcome those on their own team. But it troubles me more when people welcome those from 
an opposing team” (305, italics in original). Alfred’s usage of the word “team” is a clear 
metaphor for “race”, as he directly links it to Hannelore’s gentile mother’s “perfection” being 
“chipped away” because she married Hannelore’s father. Through its depiction of Alfred, the 
novel practices exactly this approach to in- and outgroups put forward by Alfred. This also 
supports Robyn McCallum’s criticism that multifocalised narratives often contain a 
privileged, dominant focaliser which prohibits the reader from engaging with all equally 
(1999, 56). In this case it is not one singular dominant focaliser, but one dominant side of the 
conflict; that of Joana, Emilia and Florian. Because the majority of the focalisers are in stark 
opposition to Alfred both in ideology and power, and Alfred is made as repulsive as possible 
to the reader, his focalisation fails to provide a valid opportunity for the reader to engage with 
the situation from his perspective. 
 Multifocalisation is a powerful tool to show insight into the different sides of a story, 
and potentially even allow empathy with them through engagement with their emotions. In 
the case of war literature, this provides an opportunity to humanise the Other and complicate 
the perception of war as Us versus Them, Good versus Bad which is damaging to society and 
also limits empathic skills. “Generally speaking, novels for young people with alternating 
narratives tend to characterize cultural registers of difference, and especially class and race, as 
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barriers to be ignored or transcended” (Nodelman 2017, 188). The purpose of 
multifocalisation, then, is to clearly demonstrate in- and outgroups in order to potentially defy 
them. In Salt to the Sea, however, this effect is muddled; although the narrative demonstrates 
similarities between the Lituanian, Polish, and Prussian characters who are from very 
different backgrounds, in the context of the war the groupings of Us (victims) versus Them 
(the Nazis) is foregrounded and reaffirmed. The novel employs multifocalisation not as a tool 
to allow for challenging empathy with the Nazi as well, but instead uses it to enhance tension 
and a sense of danger for the other characters. Through this, it limits its empathic potential for 
the Other, betraying an anxiety for empathy with a Nazi believer. So far, I have analysed 
novels with focalisers aimed at providing the enemy with a platform. These types of focalisers 
are not the only ones present in children’s war literature; there is also the more restrictive 
focaliser, only focused on one side of the conflict. This is the type of narrative to which I turn 
next. 
How I Live Now 
Meg Rosoff’s How I Live Now (2004) is a YA novel about and focalised through a fifteen-
year-old anorexic girl, Daisy, who is sent by her American father to stay with her cousins in 
England. While she is there, a war breaks out. Although this starts out as a realist novel, the 
identity of the enemy is unclear as they are never described in detail; when the enemy 
interacts with the protagonist (which is very rare) they do speak her language, and their 
appearance or any possible accents are not commented on. Lourdes López-Romero argues 
that the novel’s generic ambivalence means that it is not often discussed in critical debate 
(2018); however, it has been analysed mostly thematically, particularly for its dystopian 
elements (Hanssen 2017), interiority (Franzak 2009; Lockney 2013), and anorexia (Tsai 
2014). Yet How I Live Now is an interesting novel for analysis of focalisation, because the 
protagonist/narrator/focaliser’s unreliability of her account influences her narrative to the 
point where it reads as stream of consciousness. This overtly complex narration style already 
marks the novel as intended for an adolescent audience, as does the age of the protagonist, the 
generic ambivalence, and the ambiguous emotional representations and ending; it is most 
likely cognitively too taxing for young children to either grasp or find pleasurable (and 
therefore “worth reading”). 
Additionally, Daisy tells her story in retrospect, six years after the war takes place, 
with a synchronising transition into present tense at the very end. This distance between the 
events taking place and her report on them heightens her unreliability as her report is filtered 
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by memory and time. However, it also provides a presumably more knowledgeable and wiser 
narrator who can reflect on their young experiences (Nikolajeva 2014b, 253). The novel is 
written in first person past tense, a testament of what happened to her in the war. The title 
implies the significance of a gap between the narrative and the narration (Nikolajeva 2014b, 
255). Immediately a question arises: who is this account for? During the novel she points out 
that this is her story, and occasionally acknowledges that she leaves out parts that are 
uninteresting, foregrounding her unreliability.  
  But the summer I went to England to stay with my cousins everything changed. 
  Part of that was because of the war, which supposedly changed lots of things, 
  but I can’t remember much about life before the war anyway so it doesn’t 
  count in my book, which this is. 
  Mostly everything changed because of Edmond. 
  And so here’s what happened (Rosoff 2004, 3). 
Here the artificiality of the narrative is foregrounded (“in my book”), and Daisy’s heavy hand 
in editing the story is made clear. Hers is a claustrophobic focalisation; the reader is never 
allowed access beyond what Daisy deems interesting as she is evidently in control of the 
narrative presented, both in form and content. The form adds to the feeling of claustrophobia, 
as Daisy’s stream of consciousness results in sentences that can run for over a page long, 
trapping the reader in their meandering ways. This attention demanding syntax is 
foregrounded particularly when traumatic events happen. After England is occupied, Daisy 
and her young cousin Piper “were driving home through the usual checkpoints” (112) when a 
fellow teenager, Joe, decided to “get show-offy” and “started shouting obscenities at one of 
the checkpoint guards” (ibid). Then, the guard shoots Joe in the face. The description of the 
consequences of this mostly takes place in a sentence which spans 29 lines. Because Daisy 
foregrounds that she chooses to tell her story her way, this syntax is an active representation 
of Daisy forcing the reader to stay painfully close to her. This closeness is further emphasised 
through the narration, as it is in first person past tense. First person narration, focalising 
through the protagonist is a common way through which especially YA narratives attempt to 
get the reader to engage empathically with the character – although generally in present tense 
(Nikolajeva 2014b, 251). This is because the first-person perspective is a narrative tool “used 
to emulate self-knowledge and self-reflection” (Nikolajeva, 2014b, 253). As adolescence is a 
period of life during which we are suddenly and intensely concerned with our conceptions of 
self, the predominance of first-person perspective narratives reflects a perceived need in the 
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audience. According to Nikolajeva, the shifts in the narrative (temporal as well as stylistically 
from realist to unrecognisable), which are caused by the war, serve to defamiliarize the reader 
from Daisy to encourage thought experiments and an exploration of emotions, memory and 
empathy (2014b, 255). 
This closeness and defamiliarisation may be necessary to enable empathic engagement 
with Daisy, as she is set up as an unlikeable character. She is entirely solipsistic, disregarding 
anybody’s emotions that do not deal directly with herself. Her father has sent her away from 
America because he cannot handle her selfish emotions anymore, and she at least pretends to 
not care about him or anybody else. The way she presents herself in the narrative is focussed 
solely on herself. The war foregrounds this even further, as she makes her apathy about it 
exceedingly clear: 
I didn’t spend much time thinking about the war because I was bored with 
everyone jabbering on for about the last five years about Would There Be One 
Or Wouldn’t There and I happen to know there wasn’t anything we could do 
about it anyway so why even bring the subject up (19). 
Interesting here is the tense shift as well; the narrative is in past tense, yet she writes that she 
knows they were powerless in present tense. This implies that her present, narrator self is 
aware of her past, narrated self’s limited and narcissistic worldview and is potentially trying 
to justify it in post. Although the reader is primed to like and empathically engage with 
protagonists (Nikolajeva 2013, 102), it is possible that Daisy’s initial flippant attitude to the 
war is off-putting to the reader. Additionally, her unlikability and eating disorder alienate the 
reader (Nikolajeva 2014a, 87), further complicating extra-diegetic empathy. However, as 
Lourdes López-Ropero argues, it is because of the war and its extreme impact on Daisy’s life 
that Daisy has to change, and her growing capabilities and strength in the face of extremity 
make her a more admirable character (2018). 
 The narrative attempts to address the difficulty of empathising with Daisy by tackling 
her anorexia as well. As her eating disorder is potentially alienating, and earlier on in the 
novel is glamorised by Daisy, forced starvation because of the war cures her of her disordered 
thinking: “somewhere along the line I’d lost the will not to eat” (159). This redress of Daisy’s 
alienating disorder both acknowledges her anorexia for the first time, but it also removes the 
obstruction to empathy which her disease previously posed. Additionally, Daisy and Piper’s 
struggles to survive echo Daisy’s earlier anorexia when she first starts to indicate empathy: 
79 
 
[…] and for the first time I noticed how skinny Piper was which once upon a 
time I would have thought was a good thing and now I thought was just what 
happens when you’re nine years old and don’t have enough food to grow 
properly (141). 
Because Piper’s emaciated state is the trigger for Daisy’s mental change, the narrative 
indicates that Daisy’s selfishness may also be changing. Although she has been travelling 
with Piper, taking care of her throughout the novel, she never took her physical wellbeing 
truly into account – as is indicated by the “for the first time”. Daisy slowly opening up to 
empathy puts her in a different light for the reader; it makes her more likeable. By chipping 
away at her unlikability the narrative makes Daisy a more suitable character for extra-diegetic 
empathy.  
The novel expands on this by literally asking the reader to put themselves in Daisy’s 
shoes, in seemingly a direct plea for empathy: 
Put yourselves in our shoes for a minute, walking into this deserted place on a 
glowering grey autumn day when it should be filled with animals and people 
and life but what you find is nothing, no sign of people, just the eeriest lack of 
noise possible and nothing moving except the big black birds in the air and 
legions of crows standing absolutely still, watching us (Rosoff 2004, 151). 
Although this appears to be a call for empathy for Daisy, especially following her slow 
change of character enhancing the potential for empathy, or Piper, it does not have to be. 
There is no overt emotion represented in this excerpt; the only emotive word is “eeriest” 
linking to the emotion of fear. The focus of the excerpt is not the characters; their bodies are 
not representing emotion, and Daisy does not insert any judgements other than eerie on the 
scene described. Instead of asking for empathic engagement with the characters, the narrative 
pushes for empathy with the civilians in war in general. Daisy’s alienating personality and 
narration stand aside here, and the purpose of the story is made clear for the first time; the 
reader does not have to care about Daisy. Instead they are provided an insight into the horrors 
of war. Empathy for Daisy is not necessary, the focus point is the war. 
 However, although empathy for Daisy may be complicated, she is ultimately still 
ingroup to the reader. This is mostly because of the war context; because the enemy Other is 
not identified or given any platform whatsoever, the focus lies solely on Daisy. As a victim of 
the war, she is put in stark opposition to the enemy, who commits several war crimes during 
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the novel. Through this opposition, her position of ingroup is solidified. The suffering Daisy 
and her cousins go through because of the war lead her to develop her empathic skills, 
increasing her likeability and the potential of extra-diegetic empathy. Daisy being a white 
teenage girl potentially further places the reader in her ingroup, as most readers of YA fiction 
are cis-gendered, white teenage girls (Epstein 2012, 291). By not allowing any humanising of 
the Other at all and firmly placing Daisy in the implied reader’s ingroup, and holding the 
reader claustrophobically close to Daisy’s perspective, the focus is not on potentially crossing 
the boundaries between in- and outgroup. Instead, it demonstrates how the extreme situation 
of war can lead to enhanced ingroup identification, and through that allow for difficult 
empathy with challenging characters. 
We’re All in This Together 
This chapter has demonstrated several issues. Firstly, although empathy may be considered a 
force for inevitable good by some (Nussbaum 1990, 1995, 2001; Oatley 2016), or an 
inevitable evil due to its preferential nature by others (Goldie 2000; Bloom 2016, 2017), it is a 
neutral force. It could potentially lead to empathy with the Other, or it could entrench the 
boundaries between in- and outgroups. Because of the way we cognitively process literature, 
this works the same in both extra-textual life and through reading. In children’s war literature, 
groups are necessitated by the nature of the conflict; there will always be an us versus them 
based on the political situation. Similarly, because the genre is children’s war literature and 
therefore (at least aiming or claiming to be) from the child’s perspective, there is also always 
a division based on age. Therefore, the effects of in- and outgroup empathy are particularly 
foregrounded within this genre, making it both crucial to the way the narratives function and  a 
potentially fruitful ground of learning and personal growth. Fiction provides a valuable 
chance for readers to train their empathic and mind-modelling skills, an opportunity which is 
of particular importance to young readers. This is because during adolescence, the brain is in a 
use-it-or-lose-it setting, meaning that abilities which are not used or trained are lost, greatly 
reducing the potential empathic abilities of these individuals after puberty (Blakemore, 
Choudhury 2006, 307). Therefore, reading war literature which challenges previously 
established groupings may enhance the extra-textual ability of the reader to transgress them 
later in life, as promoted by war narratives such as Morpurgo’s Friend or Foe; Needles’ A 
Game of Soldiers; Westall’s Machine Gunners and many more. In a similar vein, however, 
narratives which do not promote this transgression and instead reaffirm the us versus them 
mentality inherent in war literature may stunt this development. A text like How I Live Now is 
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complicated in this regard, as it does allow for empathy with a character previously presented 
as unlikeable and through that trains difficult empathy, yet it does not provide opportunities 
for in- and outgroup transgression. Because of this it both enables and inhibits empathic 
growth. 
 The most important narrative strategy for establishing and potentially challenging 
these groups is focalisation. The choice of focaliser(s) establishes what side of the conflict the 
reader is presented with, which characters are in- and which are outgroup members to the 
protagonist(s), and whether or not this grouping is challenged in the narrative. 
Multifocalisation is a popular technique used to encourage empathy for the other by quite 
literally showing the other side of the story; however, it can also be employed to reaffirm the 
Otherness and evil of the other side, thus hindering further possibilities of empathy. In 
Sepetys’ Salt to the Sea, for example, there are four protagonist- focalisers. Set during WWII, 
one of the three is a German soldier, which could potentially lead to a humanised image of the 
German individual during the War. However, this character is made as repulsive as possible 
to the reader; he is a cowardly psychopath, misogynistic, antisemitic and racist, and suffers 
from unnamed mental illnesses. The chapters focalised through him serve two purposes; to 
enhance the sense of tension and danger for the other characters, as they do not know his 
violent desires, and to further cement any notions of the German soldiers as evil. Whether or 
not this strategy has this effect cannot be said definitively, however, this is the most likely 
outcome. 
 Manipulating the reader to empathise or not with specific groups is, in itself, a strategy 
with wide ethical implications and impacts. Without access to someone’s emotions, our 
assessment of their actions may be wildly different. We may, for example, gazing as outsiders 
consider a woman delivering supplies to the resistance acting in a morally just way, assuming 
she is acting for the greater good of her country. If, however, focalised through her we know 
that she is doing this because she is acting out of spite towards a family member and she does 
not care about the resistance’s objectives or perspective, our moral assessment of her is 
changed. Additionally, a narrative may lead to empathy for a member of a terrorist 
organisation. Empathy, emotion, narration and focalisation feed into the narrative ethics. 
Narration and focalisation have great impact on how emotions are displayed in the narrative, 
and whose we are privy to. Delving deeper into the individual level of the text, analysing 




















Literature, like all human action and creation, is inextricably ethical. There is an ethics of 
creation (why do we write this text, what is its purpose, how do we write it), an ethics in the 
creation, and an ethics of reading (see Booth 1992; Nikolajeva 2014a, 177-224). These issues 
are highly emphasised in children’s literature because of the power inequity inherent in its 
nature. Although all literature is inherently ideological, the debate surrounding the ethics of 
children’s literature differs from similar analyses in normative “adult” literature. The reason 
for this is the special status which the child holds in modern Western culture; as people 
children are not seen as existing in a state of being, but rather in a state of becoming 
(Hollindale 2011, 12). As an unfinished project of socialisation and subject of education, the 
child will, if they get to live a full life, inevitably grow up into adulthood and join the adult 
society which raised them. Children’s literature plays a key role in the socialisation and 
education process, and particularly in the case of moral development this raises the issue of 
responsibility. As Clémentine Beauvais states, “ethical instruction has always formed part of 
children’s literature” (2015, 108), and literature plays a strong role “as a facilitator of ethical 
life, as a companion in ethical choices, and more generally as a participant in the ethical 
climate of a given society” (109). The socialisation project of children’s literature implies a 
certain perceived moral malleability of the child, or at least the adult’s desire to impart moral 
lessons on the child reader to shape the potential future adult. At least one goal of children’s 
literature is to instruct the implied child reader. It does this, in part, through its narrative 
structures. The morals it communicates and how are important particularly because of its 
readership. 
Every narrative element plays a role in the construction of the narrative’s ethics and 
the way it is communicated to the implied reader; the narrator determines what story is told, 
the focaliser decides what side of the story is shown, and the characters are the ethical actors 
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in the tale. In analysing this narrative ethics, it is important to follow the advice put forward 
by Peter Hollindale in his analysis of ideology in children’s literature (2011, 28-51), which 
was later echoed by Claudia Mills when she said that ideology in literature can be deliberate 
and overt; undermine an interpretive community’s reading, or be undermined by the work 
itself (2014, 5-6). “Moreover, that a book contains a main character, or even a narrator, who 
expresses certain values is not enough for us to say that these are the values expressed by the 
work as a whole” (ibid). Thus, the morals put forward by a narrative are not always clear-cut 
and may be undermined by other narrative elements. Joe Haldeman’s The Forever War 
(1974), for instance, suffers from moral ambiguity because of this. In this novel the narrator-
protagonist claims to support sexual liberalism, yet he recoils in horror when his own mother 
comes out to him as queer. The implied readership of children’s literature is cognitively still 
developing and may not yet have the mind-modelling skills necessary to correctly ascribe 
character’s intentions, emotions, and therefore moral frameworks (Nikolajeva 2018, 83). They 
may therefore struggle with these clashes of morality, but also gain much cognitive training 
and progress from them.  
Good Little Children 
The ethics of literature has been of crucial importance to children’s literature since its 
beginnings. According to Claudia Nelson (2014) this is because “[f]or many adults, children’s 
preeminent ‘unadultlike’ quality, their ‘need’ is the lack of a sufficiently rich, complex, and 
nuanced moral code, an ethical compass that can be relied upon to help them navigate the 
difficult world of maturity” (24). The way for adults to resolve that need is through character 
education, for which children’s literature has classically been instrumental. The origins of 
children’s literature lie in overt moral didacticism (Sainsbury 2013, 6-7; Mills 2014, 1; 181), 
as texts written for children were done so with the sole purpose of instructing social norms 
and mores, and other educational lessons. Instead of teaching children how to think, the goal 
was to tell them what to think (Sainsbury 2013, 6-7). In her exploration of the history of moral 
didacticism in children’s literature, Lani Barker argues that the aim for children’s literature in 
this period was moral perfection, taking the form of lack of transgression (Barker 2014, 102). 
She states that “[v]irtue was rewarded, vice punished with suitable poetic justice, and moral 
virtue seldom overlapped with transgressive behavior [sic]” (102). In early children’s 
literature, characters were presented as models of behaviour; not fully rounded and 
conceptualised characters for the reader to empathise with. Examples include Thomas Day’s 
The History of Sandford and Merton (1783), Mary Martha Sherwood’s History of the 
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Fairchild Family (1818), and Maria Charlesworth’s Ministering Children (1854). Barker goes 
on to state that in this early form of children’s literature the moralising adult narrator judges 
the characters’ behaviours morally while their minds and emotions are largely closed off and 
flat, a narrative strategy which highlights the particular virtues and vices the text aims to teach 
(102). Claudia Nelson suggests that this type of overt moral didacticism became less popular 
in children’s literature during the mid-nineteenth century when the turn towards entertainment 
began (2014, 15). The development away from pedantic moralising has continued, as 
according to Lisa Sainsbury post-WWII children’s literature has started to allow the child 
reader to philosophise about what they consider right and wrong, and why they think that is so 
(2013, 6-7). However, following Sainsbury’s argument, due to the nature of children’s 
literature moral didacticism will always be an element of texts written for children.  
The adult authority is important to an analysis of ethics in children’s literature because 
of the didactic nature of the interaction with the implied child reader. As cognitively 
inexperienced readers are more vulnerable to adult narrative authority, the implied child 
reader may be less likely to resist the narrator when they deliver a certain ethical stance or 
viewpoint, which can be done either through the didactic narrative voice or an adult character 
(Nikolajeva 2014a, 90). Therein lies the ethical danger of children’s literature: whatever 
ideology or moral viewpoints the adult authority puts forward, the implied child reader may 
(be supposed to) accept without questioning. Moral debates in children’s texts are particularly 
pronounced in genres like war literature, as war inherently entails many ethical problems 
which defy easy solutions, and children’s attitudes towards war are not yet fully formed, 
especially if they have not experienced it first-hand. These attitudes, which are still under 
formation during adolescence, are, as Susan Rahn suggests, influenced by accounts of both 
imagined and historical wars (2014, 163). Fictional accounts of war for children can have 
their particular impact on the child because they can be “cast in terms that a four-year-old can 
understand” (2014, 163), and thus make the moral stakes comprehensible for the implied 
reader. However, because of this the ethical danger of children’s literature is more 
pronounced in this genre as well, since war is an inescapable element of human existence and 
a narrative may shape child readers’ moral attitudes towards war in a form that they cannot 
easily resist through the authority of the hidden adult, a term coined by Perry Nodelman 
(2008) to account for the adult authority underlining all children’s literature.  
However, although it may be assumed that the hidden adult authority is merely 
presenting pre-packaged moral questions with their respective answers in children’s texts, and 
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in a large number of cases this is true, it may also invite the implied child reader to explore 
conceptions of morality through thought experiments. Such texts purposefully leave ethical 
issues unresolved and without hints for the readers as to how they should interpret them to be 
morally correct, allowing the implied reader to develop their own moral reasoning through 
experimentation. Writing about children’s texts which are also philosophical thought 
experiments, or have those embedded within them, Lisa Sainsbury states that they commonly 
have:  
the functional opening of a philosophical theatre in which antecedent adult 
knowledge (the authoritative structure building the experiment) is presented to 
mighty [cf Beauvais] children. Confronted with a thought experiment, the child 
is invited to think and experiment – these are not adult tasks – and to move 
beyond the book in the direction of subsequence (Sainsbury 2017, 160).  
Following Sainsbury’s argument regarding thought experiments in children’s literature would 
then mean that literature of this kind is purposefully empowering the implied child reader 
through liberation from overt moral didacticism. This is, of course, a didactic act in and of 
itself. However, I agree with Sainsbury in the sense that morally open-ended literature has 
different aims and potentially different impacts on the implied child reader. As stated above, 
early children’s literature did not have the goal to make children morally autonomous beings. 
Modern literature does tend to shy away from overt moralism, yet however it is presented the 
entire structure as well as content of a children’s text is presented through the filter of 
aetonormativity. 
It Only Hurts Because You Care 
Narrative ethics is not a dry element of a narrative; it is an inherent aspect of literature closely 
linked to engagement. As Maria Nikolajeva states, the notion that the emotions and ethics are 
separate has been debunked and their close relation made explicit (2017, 82). Literary 
scholars such as Suzanne Keen (2007), Blakey Vermeule (2010), Patrick Colm Hogan (2011), 
and Maria Nikolajeva (2014a; 2017), as well as, before them, literary philosophers like 
Wayne C. Booth (1992) and Martha Nussbaum (1990; 2001) all theorise about the importance 
of emotions in ethical decision-making and the role this plays in literature and readership. 
Interesting specifically for cognitive (ethical) narratologists is the link between ethics and 
empathy. A developed sense of empathy may allow one to understand the other and their 
ethical standpoints better, which can, in certain scenarios, create feelings of individual 
88 
 
responsibility and call for ethical action (see Sainsbury 2013, 92-93). This is not just true for 
extra-textual empathy, as textual empathy also has this potential effect on its readership 
(Hogan 2011, 62). This may be why Patrick Colm Hogan states that empathy is “the origins 
and groundings of ethics” (2011, 62). Additionally, empathy makes the reader a participant to 
the events and the narrative, which makes it an excellent avenue for ethical analysis 
(Nussbaum 1990, 46).  
In talking about readers and engagement in this fashion, we are talking about 
consciousness. Considering the connection between ethics and empathy, Nikolajeva states 
that “[e]thical values are an essential part of any consciousness and thus motivate people’s 
behaviour and relationships with other people, as well as with the physical and social 
environment. Understanding other people’s ethical beliefs is therefore a vital constituent in 
theory of mind and empathy” (2017, 84). However, as Nikolajeva points out, when talking 
about children’s literature we are talking about a group of readers who are both inexperienced 
readers and still cognitively developing (2014a, 15-16). Nuance may thus be missing in the 
inexperienced reader’s understanding of ethics, which is why a significant amount of a 
narrative’s ethics takes place in action and dialogue. Additionally, it is specifically regarding 
ethics that the risk of identification is important, as when a reader identifies and engages too 
closely with a character (a higher risk for novice readers) it may become difficult for them to 
distance themselves enough not to adopt ethically problematic aspects of that character. 
What Even Are You?  
To be able to assess the ethics of an action or situation one needs more information than is 
generally available. Factors like the actor’s background, the context for the situation, what the 
impact is and for how many people, and why the actor did what they did are very rarely 
available for situations where the actor is not the analyser. To learn about ethical behaviour a 
potential analyser needs to be able to assess ethical dilemmas, as well as differing approaches 
to right and wrong. Because the ethical lives not just in action and consequence but also in the 
internal life of those who act, the narrative form provides an excellent exploration of ethical 
debates. According to Blakey Vermeule, fictional characters function in part to let the reader 
“sort out basic moral problems” (2010, xii). Although I agree that fiction and its characters 
most certainly have this function, I do not believe that this is limited to “basic” moral 
problems (it is also fair to question what constitutes a “basic” moral problem in general). 
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Fiction provides the opportunity for an in-depth dissection of life (and death), which 
necessarily includes a portrayal and discussion of ethical existence in its entirety, not just the 
“basics”. Fiction potentially allows a look into the lives of others, complete with their 
emotional states and reactions to others, and their thoughts regarding actions or characters. 
Especially in the case of an omniscient narrator, the literary character has their morality on 
display in ways which are impossible for us to ever comprehend people in reality. As 
Nussbaum points out: “in the activity of literary imagining we are led to imagine and describe 
with greater precision, focusing our attention on each word, feeling each event more keenly – 
whereas much of actual life goes by without that heightened awareness, and is thus, in a 
certain sense, not fully or thoroughly lived” (1990, 47). This supports an argument on the 
premise of literature, which as Maria Nikolajeva phrases it, “puts its characters in situations 
where ethical issues are inescapable, and moreover, in fiction these issues can be amplified 
and become more tangible” (2017, 84). This means that in fiction, the ethical is inevitable, 
amplified, and portrayed in a holistic way which is impossible to achieve in the everyday 
world.  
Child readers, who are still in the early stages of their moral development, may be 
aided by literature in their personal growth and understanding of the ethical. Literature’s 
position as being a training ground for empathy is combined with and the reason for it also 
being a training ground for ethical issues. According to Nikolajeva, this is because children’s 
narratives have the potential to offer their young readers guidance to empathic and ethical 
inferences (2014a, 177; 2017, 83-84). It is because the reader can engage empathically with 
the text that they can also engage morally with it (Sainsbury 2013, 11) and “more clearly 
appreciate the moral significance of the situations deployed in the story and the narration” 
(Majía, Montoya 2017, 383) than if there is to be no empathic engagement. In her discussion 
on ethics in children’s literature Lisa Sainsbury stresses the importance of empathic 
engagement by arguing against its opposite, indifference, claiming that: “moral education is 
redundant if indifference negates care” (2013, 11). It is clear that it takes caring about the 
characters of a story to have an interest in what makes up these characters’ moral being: their 
desires, motivations, and actions.  
An important and oft discussed characteristic of adult agency in children’s literature is 
the transmission of ideological messages through the text. The presence of a specific ideology 
in the narrative need not be overt or even intentional; much of the hidden adult’s presence or 
influence within a text lies in assumptions and unspoken understandings. The reinforcement 
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of the dominant culture’s ideology through literature is not exclusive to children’s texts; it is 
an aspect of all literature. As is the case with narrative ethics, ideology is an aspect of every 
story in both an overt and covert fashion (Hollindale 2011, 9). Peter Hollindale argues that 
ideology is present in children’s literature in three ways: in the explicit(ly stated) beliefs of the 
author (36), in the author’s unexamined assumptions (39), and in the “shared understanding” 
of the world, a matter of zeitgeist. Hollindale names this “organic ideology” (42), organic 
because they are underlying for the functioning of the world and are unquestioned by both the 
narrator and the characters, and therefore assumed to be shared beliefs between the narrative 
and the reader.  
On the discourse level this implicit ideology is the easiest to pin down in the analysis 
of setting, characterisation, and narrative gaps. The way through which the implied reader is 
supposed to or does fill in the narrative gaps suggests an internalisation of implicit ideologies 
(Stephens 1992, 10). The presence of such an ideology is inevitable, as every narrative’s 
construction must have gaps, and these gaps must be filled by the implied reader. Filling in 
these gaps takes cognitive activity, which allows space and time for growth. However, the 
implied form of ideology is particularly effective in children’s literature because novice 
readers are unlikely to be able to identify it as they consume it and are therefore unable to 
critically engage with it. Ethics in literature is not an innocent, passive phenomenon; it 
actively communicates itself to the implied reader through the narrative’s structure, language, 
and plot. “Above all, as an ethics, narrative is performance or act” (Newton 1995, 7). The 
study of such underlying ideological messages, in combination with more overt expressions of 
particular norms and values, attempts to reveal the ideological intentions and/or possible 
impacts of such texts on the implied child reader.  
The idea that implicit ideology is particularly impactful on children is further 
supported by developmental psychologists and empirical research. Child psychologist Jean 
Piaget argued that children develop their moral understanding in two phases: the 
heteronomous stage, which he argues lasts until roughly the ages of seven or eight and in 
which the child’s morality is based on adult authority, which is followed by the autonomous 
stage, in which morality is based on mutual decisions made between peers (1965, 135-137; 
408). Although stage-based developmental theories put forward by Piaget and further 
developed by Lawrence Kohlberg are at this point old-fashioned and put into question, Hing 
Keung Ma showed in his 2013 empirical study that although there are multiple factors at play 
in the child’s moral reasoning and decision making, adult authority does indeed play a major 
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factor in it (Ma 2013). Piaget and Kohlberg, and others who built on their stage-based models 
of development, should not be discarded fully. Combining the above with Paul Harris’s 
argument that children assume implied language to reflect truth (2012, 136), this approach of 
children’s moral development then provides support for Stephens’ and Hollindale’s theories 
regarding implicit ideologies in children’s literature. 
Empirical research on the development of morality in children has shown that 
although moral decision making is considerably complex, children and adolescents “weigh 
and coordinate moral and nonmoral features of situations when making judgments” like adults 
do (Killen, Smetana 2007, 242). Moral behaviour is demonstrated by children as young as two 
years old (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 243), and develops throughout an individual’s life. 
Multiple research studies employ characters in realistic fictional stories as a way to gauge 
children’s “cognitive perspective taking” and moral judgement, finding that children as young 
as four can successfully link intentionality to moral judgement of the actions of fictional 
characters performing similar activities with differing motives, coded by the researchers as 
either morally “good” or “bad” (Lane et al. 2010, 873). The process of fine-tuning the implied 
child reader’s ability for cognitive perspective taking is of crucial importance to protecting 
this reader from the ethical dangers of straightforward identification, as opposed to empathy. 
If the implied reader cannot differentiate between the self and the character, the ability to 
identify and possibly distance oneself from the character’s shortcomings and moral failings is 
put into jeopardy (Nikolajeva 2012, 5). 
That said, there is a strong cognitive link between empathy and affiliation, and moral 
decision making. Affiliation, particularly identifying characters and people as being either in 
one’s in- or outgroup, has a strong impact on moral judgement. Young children, beginning at 
age four, are more generous towards their ingroup than their outgroup. Even infants as young 
as fourteen months demonstrate a preference for actions performed by ingroup members as 
opposed to those in the outgroup (Buttelmann et al. 2013). Children are also more likely to 
think positively of and remember the positive actions of ingroup members as opposed to 
people in the outgroup (Dunham et al. 2011), and are less likely to assign blame to ingroup 
members (Dunham, Emory 2014). Moral judgement of individuals in the outgroup is more 
negative than the ingroup in cases of ungenerosity, and higher levels of generosity are 
expected from the ingroup (Dunham et al. 2011; Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 246). Young 
children, aged thirty-two months and up, exposed to moral dilemmas experienced by fictional 
characters in stories are able to distinguish between physical, material, and psychological 
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needs of these characters – all factors which influence the child’s moral reasoning (Lane et al. 
2010, 885). What this means is that children from a very young age onwards have 
demonstrable moral reasoning and judgement which develops through their lives and can be 
both analysed and influenced through stories. This moral behaviour is strongly linked to 
empathic engagement, and both empathy and morality are subject to cognitive development as 
the child ages through adolescence to adulthood.  
Considering the role of stories in child morality, the importance of children’s literature 
is made apparent: as children are moral beings under development, the stories they read and 
engage with allow them to enhance their cognitive moral reasoning and judgement skills 
along with their empathy (Mejía, Montoya 2017, 372). Stories can offer the guidance young 
readers need to navigate complex moral dilemmas and issues (Nikolajeva 2014a, 195). 
Through analysis of the moral contents and form of the texts children consume, it is possible 
to uncover the impact certain narrative strategies have on child reader’s moral cognitive 
development. The child’s normal moral quandaries are typically presented in terms of 
“goodness” and “badness”, or “naughtiness”, in a manner of prosaic ethics (Sainsbury 2013, 
27). These general standards are far exceeded in cases of war. 
Hopefully, in the normative, implied child reader’s life, moral choices and 
consequences do not reach the importance they have in war scenarios. In this way, war 
literature adds an amplifying effect to the ethical function of fiction in general: where fiction 
can amplify ethical issues, war in turn increases this further. For although “evil is not the kind 
of thing we bump into every day” (Eagleton 2010, 128), the moral stakes are heightened in 
children’s war literature because of the ramifications of every act involved. To place the label 
of evil on war is to pass moral judgement on the act of war, through which I remove myself 
from academic objectivism. Three points here, however. Firstly, I do not believe it to be a 
controversial claim, at least in literary criticism circles, to call war an evil of humanity. 
Secondly, in my belief there is no morally neutral war, no distinct “good guys” or “bad guys”. 
I, therefore, in my literary analyses, do not favour any particular side to the conflict described. 
Thirdly, the evil element in children’s war literature goes beyond the war itself, as the extreme 
scenario of war brings out both the best and the worst of the people living through it. Evil 
lives not in war, but in the human character. 
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Putting the Pieces Together 
A character’s, or person’s, traits are what makes them who they are and inform both the way 
we view them and the way they behave. From an empathy perspective, particular traits may 
be more desirable and therefore empathy inducing for the reader, whereas others are 
repulsive. A character with minimal traits, even if those present are considered good, may be 
equally unlikely to induce empathy. In war scenarios, certain traits may be expected to be 
framed as more desirable; bravery and loyalty for example. The weight of these traits is based 
on the emotions foregrounded in the genre and narrative; because fear is one of the core 
emotions of children’s war literature, bravery, the trait indicating an overcoming of fear and 
danger for the good of others, is equally foregrounded. From an ethical perspective what 
characters we are supposed to empathise with demonstrates the narrative’s ideology; what 
traits are framed as positive and how is this performed by the narrative? Is bravery expected 
from child characters in a narrative; are they expected to put themselves at risk when they 
could avoid it? What is the result of the dominance of such traits on the moral framework of a 
narrative? How does a collection of traits come together to form a character? There are two 
main different approaches to this. The first is Seymour Chatman’s approach of seeing a 
character’s traits in a paradigm (1978, 126), which means registering every trait of a character 
and adding it up, changing our perception of that character based on the changes in the 
summation (ibid). The second approach is to see characterisation as a network of traits 
coming together to form the image of the character described (Rimmon-Kenan (2002, 59). 
Viewing a character in this manner means the traits observed are not changed by later traits 
but adds to the pattern a layer of complexity to the character which may otherwise be 
blanketed out (ibid). Additionally, the network approach allows for character development, 
whereas Seymour Chatman’s paradigm of traits implies character as being static (Rimmon-
Kenan 2002, 39; Nikolajeva 2002a, 157).  
 The main two different ways of indicating character traits are through explicit 
definition, or implicit indication (Golden 1990, 39; Scholes, Kellogg 1996, 171-176; 
Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 59-60). In explicit definition, the narrator or another character may say 
“character X is brave”. In implicit indication the trait is shown rather than told. Although 
implicit indication is more complex and potentially more stylistically desirable, explicit 
definition can be useful for quicker characterisation. Additionally, because explicit definition 
may be stated by the narrator, it can carry a lot of weight for the reader (Rimmon-Kenan 
2002, 60). This is particularly important in the case of children’s literature because of the 
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previously mentioned adult-child divide; the (implied adult) narrator’s word can be more 
powerful than the inferences made by the (implied child) reader. This is the case even with a 
first-person narration. 
 Traits are not “datable occurrences in a person’s history, but dispositions” that can be 
exhibited (Roberts 2012, 174). Traits can be indicated through any element of the text, 
including action, either one-off or habitual (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 61); speech, internal or 
external (63; 64); external appearance (65-67); the reaction to or interaction with the 
character’s environment (Chatman, 1978, 138; Golden 1990, 38; Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 65-
67; Nikolajeva 2002a, 167); and the “characters’ participation in the resolution” (Nikolajeva 
2002a, 167). The importance of these many different ways of characterisation depends on the 
level of internal opacity: the more opaque the character, the more important the other 
narrative elements become in the revelation of that character’s traits (Scholes, Kellogg 1996, 
171). The repetition, similarity, contrast, and implication of traits also enhances 
characterisation (Golden 1990, 35; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002, 39; Nikolajeva 2005, 160). Traits, 
such as worldview, speech and actions, not only construct character; the treatment of traits 
also helps build the work’s ideology (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 38). In children’s war literature, 
character traits can therefore reveal the impact of war on what behaviour is deemed 
appropriate or desirable. However, as important as our interpretation of characters is for our 
understanding of the narrative, this interpretation is culturally and temporally bound 
(Nikolajeva 2002a, 17), as is our understanding of the character’s function and style (Scholes, 
Kellog 1996, 166-167). Captain Biggles, who was an acceptable character in the 1910s and 
20s, would be questioned now for not only traits and ideology, but opacity as well. 
Understanding character, being able to construct a character based on the presentation of their 
traits, is also part of literary competence (Nikolajeva 2002a, 17) and a skill that can and must 
be learned. In children’s literature the implied reader may therefore misinterpret or misjudge 
characters (156), which could potentially reframe the narrative’s ideology entirely. Next, I 
discuss the three more covert forms of characterisation; speech, internal representation, and 
physical description. These three sources of information are all “indicators for inferences 
about [the character’s] mental and moral features” (Margolin 2007, 77), which both in their 
own way and together construct the network of traits we read as a moral agent.  
You Don’t Look Right 
The most superficial and opaque form of characterisation is through external representation. 
Through this technique, the reader is reduced to knowing as much about the character 
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described as another character would know (Nikolajeva 2002, 182). Because of this it is a 
mostly old-fashioned and authoritative way of characterisation, as it implies a lack of trust in 
young readers’ abilities to characterise through more nuanced ways (183). Descriptions of 
characters are put there for a purpose, as all of fiction is carefully structured and 
manufactured. However, a character’s physical description does not have to reveal any inner 
life at all; it may not be put there for any other purpose than to create a more complete image 
of the character (Docherty 1983, 9-42). Physical descriptions will also have different impacts 
in mimetic or nonmimetic fictions (Nikolajeva 2002, 183). In fairytales blond hair indicates 
goodness, much like white hats in Westerns; black hair, or black hats, indicate badness 
(where, as theorised by Midas Dekkers in 2011, does this leave the redheads?). In mimetic 
fictions, the character may simply wear a black hat. However, clothing, wounds or other 
deviating features do still connote a special meaning. The rise of physical descriptions as a 
means of characterisation comes from the late eighteenth-century theory of physiognomy 
which directly linked appearance to psychology (Nikolajeva 2002, 183). Although discredited 
completely, it still influences fiction (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 65). 
The body is a charged field of judgement, particularly in children’s literature. 
Descriptions of a character’s physical features and clothing are often shorthand for that 
character’s mental and moral states; from Miss Honey and the Trunchbull to Harry Potter, the 
body is a place of meaning. In children’s war literature, the war often has a direct impact on 
the character’s bodies, either because they are actively involved with combat, or because the 
war has severe influences on the character’s wealth and access to personal hygiene or 
clothing. Clothing is of particular importance to children and teenagers; certain styles or items 
of clothing are needed to “fit in” and therefore bely affluence and hip-ness, whereas a lack of 
these items may be considered to imply poverty or counter-cultural attitudes. Sharp contrasts 
between characters and their dress can then be used to foreground the differences between the 
characters’ personalities, as well as the different ways through which the war impacts them. 
They can also serve more obviously as demarcations of in- and outgroupings in the form of 
uniforms. Particularly in a war scenario in- and outgrouping based on fashion and appearance 
becomes foregrounded; race, age, sex, or military memberships are expressed through the 
body and therefore categorise a character. The intensification of grouping in war contexts 
foregrounds this form of characterisation. Descriptions in dress, age, sex, ability, race, or any 
other physical characteristic immediately place a character in a particular group. Especially 
when these descriptions are foregrounded, highlighting differences or similarities, the 
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grouping of characters within the narrative through physical features is emphasised. Physical 
grouping can have real and damaging effects on extra-textual lives; racism, sexism, ableism 
and many other means of oppression based on physical differences are borne from similar 
focussing on physical appearance. 
 Physical appearance can also be used to signal a character’s change of personality. 
One of the most famous examples of this can be drawn from Frances Hodgson Burnett’s The 
Secret Garden (1911), where both the protagonist Mary and her cousin Colin go through 
personality changes so significant that their bodies change. Mary goes from sallow, yellow-
tinged and skinny to plump, flushed and healthy; Colin’s change is so profound that he is 
“miraculously cured” from his disability. The body then acts as almost a direct metaphor for 
character development; if a character is described as looming large, this may have been that 
they are domineering, if on the other hand a character is described as small (especially if put 
in direct contrast with a large character) this may signal their status of powerlessness or 
submission to the other character. 
I Like the Way You Think 
Although in fiction physical representations may be used to hint at a character’s morality, 
most of our ethical lives are internal; the judgments we make of others, our self-analyses and 
our construction of our own ethical frameworks are all based in our minds. The same counts 
for characters; provided we are granted access to their interiority, their minds show the reader 
their reasoning, motivations, judgments and norms and values. “Narrative fiction is the only 
literary genre, as well as the only kind of narrative, in which the unspoken thoughts, feelings, 
perceptions of a person other than the speaker can be portrayed” (Cohn 1978, 7). It is also the 
most insightful way for us to consider ethical issues, as we are not normally privy to the 
other’s internal life which informs their decision making. Interiority as a means of 
characterisation is both the most complicated and cognitively demanding (Nikolajeva 2014a, 
80). Characterisation through interiority strongly invites empathy and mind-modelling 
engagement (ibid), as “it seems that the more we know about characters’ interiority, the 
stronger we engage with them emotionally” (81). However, it is not often the focus of fiction, 
which instead concentrates on action (ibid). When interiority is not represented in the 
narrative, the ethical image is opaque and dependent on authoritative narratorial interjections 
and characters’ speech and actions. The reader’s mind-model of the character, particularly 
their morality, is not entrusted to the reader but instead handheld by the narrator. When 
interiority is represented however, the reader is freed to engage with the character’s emotions, 
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opinions, judgements and beliefs, and compare those to the character’s actions, other 
characters, or even the narrator’s statements. This increases the cognitive demand on the 
reader, as they have more elements to employ their empathic and mind-modelling skills on.  
The character’s internal life functions in two ways; it can place them as either in- or 
outgroup depending on the values they hold, and it can demonstrate the narrative’s ideology. 
The first function is relatively straightforward; if the character holds values or has motivations 
that are portrayed in a negative fashion by the narrative (generally through narratorial 
interruptions) or considered negatively by the reader themselves, this character will be 
considered outgroup. Mental illnesses or other forms of disturbed interiority can also repulse 
the reader away from empathy, placing that character in the outgroup unless manipulated 
otherwise. As a result, the ethics of that character’s actions is judged significantly differently. 
We are kinder and more forgiving in our moral judgements of our ingroup than we are of our 
outgroup (Lane et al. 2010, 885). Although we do not necessarily view the outgroup as more 
negative than the ingroup, we do consider them in less positive terms (Vezzali et al. 2015, 
109). Using a character’s interiority to place them in the reader’s outgroup therefore has 
strong implications on the way the reader views the character’s morality. 
 Secondly, a character’s interiority can demonstrate the narrative’s ideology through its 
construction of a moral framework. What norms and values are considered ingroup worthy, as 
demonstrated by other means of narrative empathy manipulation, or are overtly praised by the 
narrator or other characters, belies the narrative’s underlying ideologies. In order to overcome 
the issue in children’s literature that an inexperienced reader may not pick up on the desired 
traits or agree with the narrative’s ideology, the narrative may resort to authoritative 
narratorial interruptions to emphasise the ethical point being made. Additionally, once a 
character is established as ingroup, their moral judgments of other characters or events are 
more likely to adopted by the reader. Most often, the reader is supposed to align themselves 
with the protagonist. Although the reader may be expected to resist the negative traits of a 
character, this cannot be assumed with inexperienced readers. Through aligning themselves 
with a character they may identify with them and adopt their belief system fully, warts and all. 
Through this, the ideology of the text may be reproduced in the reader as well. 
Talk Me Through It 
Dialogue can reveal character motivation and morals: truthfulness of the dialogue, what is 
disclosed and what is not, and which characters are interacted with; all reveal the ethical 
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framework in which the character operates. In this sense speech is an action and carries 
similar ethical implications as action does. Which characters are allowed to speak, are spoken 
with, and what is said to them reveals the ideology of a narrative. A thorough exploration of 
how speech can act as characterisation can be found in Nikolajeva’s The Rhetoric of 
Character in Children’s Literature (2002). My aim here is not to reinvent the wheel, nor is it 
to regurgitate her findings there. Instead, I will provide a brief overview of them and then 
move on to the ethical elements. The primary distinction to be made is between direct and 
indirect speech; the difference between “‘You can piss off, Yank’, came a voice from the 
other side of the plane” (Dowswell 2012, 27), and “someone told him to piss off”. Indirect 
speech allows for perspective ambiguity as well as ambiguity between speech and thought 
(Nikolajeva 2002, 224). The tag connected to direct speech can also add to the reader’s mind-
model of the speaking character; “‘Or she wanted a pee,’ snarled Gregson” (Westall 1989, 
190, emphasis added). Additionally, the narrator may add an adverb to the speech tag to 
further add to characterisation: “‘I believe it could replace the horse,’ said Leonard proudly” 
(Pratchett 1997, 103, emphasis added). The tags “being the narrator’s statements” may not 
(completely) reflect the character’s interiority (Nikolajeva 2002, 227). Although the narrator’s 
interjections do add to characterisation, they may clash with or present a false image of the 
character’s interiority, which creates ambiguity regarding who should be believed and thus 
heightens cognitive demands on the reader. Direct speech is simple to read, yet cognitively 
demanding “since the [relative] absence of narrative agency leaves readers without guidance” 
(231); it is left to the reader to interpret whether a character is truthful or not, and if not to 
infer why they may be lying.  
One of the most ethically charged and ambiguous speech acts is lying. Lying is 
generally not seen as an ethically desirable trait, with a lot of emphasis placed on truthfulness 
as a virtue especially for children, and having a protagonist openly be a liar may make them 
morally ambiguous and complicated. However, as demonstrated at length by Kerry Mallan in 
Secrets, Lies and Children’s Literature (2013), lying itself holds an ambiguous place in 
children’s literature and culture alike, and “to dismiss or condone lying as deception as 
‘natural’ or to condemn all lying as morally reprehensible simplifies and obscures other 
factors which account for why we often choose to lie or deceive rather than tell the truth” 
(212). Through the act of lying, children can transform themselves into active, empowered 
subjects resisting adult domination (ibid.) Additionally, as stated by Bettina Kümmerling-
Meibauer and Jörg Meibauer, lies are only potentially morally ambiguous, and if a child does 
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not learn how to lie this indicates disordered development (2011, 164). The ability to lie is 
expected from neuro- and socially typical children, sometimes even necessary for survival, 
and can therefore not be seen as inherently evil. 
As is the case with literacy and other cognitive skills, the detection of deception or lies 
with socio- and neurotypical readers is dependent on experience and cognitive development, 
and through that, age. Empirical research by Joan Peskin has shown that three-year-olds are 
able to recognise pretense and pretend-play, but unable to predict false belief (1996, 1746); as 
this is a skill relying on a sophisticated use of Theory of Mind necessary for detecting 
deception. Slightly older children, however, when presented with a truth narrative which later 
clashes with an informant’s claims, “may readily infer that the speaker has a deceptive 
communicative intent” (Kang et al. 2002, 1700). Theory of Mind, or mind-modelling in the 
case of literature, as argued extensively by scholars such as Lisa Zunshine (2012) and Maria 
Nikolajeva (2015), is a skill which can be trained both through extra-textual and textual 
engagement; it first starts at roughly four years old and develops throughout one’s lifetime, 
theoretically increasing one’s ability to detect deception. 
The contents of a character’s speech are not only important when they are not truthful, 
however. It is through speech that both characters and the implied author can espouse 
ideology. Through adult characters (including the narrator) the narrative can perform its 
didactic goal and reveal its own ideologies (Nikolajeva 2002, 234). Characterisation occurs on 
the moral plane through speech content as well; characters express their own moral 
judgements and beliefs (235), and when their reactions to situations clash with other 
characters’ comments, all parties involved are characterised through contrast (234). The style 
through which characters talk also adds to the reader’s mind-model of them (237), as they can 
sound haughty, old-fashioned, stupid or arrogant, or anything else. Dialect or slang used by 
characters also adds to our mind-model (238-239), as we can place them in age, class, or 
geographical groups (or any other groups). Through this the characters are placed in our in- or 
outgroups, either enhancing or limiting the reader’s potential empathy for them. 
 To allow for a full understanding of the mechanics of characterisation focusing on the 
three concepts of physical description, dialogue and interiority, I next analyse three novels. 
For physical description, I turn to Michelle Magorian’s Goodnight Mister Tom (1981/2015). 
Like embodied emotions, physical descriptions can function as a base for characterisation; 
they are important, and the first thing we notice about other people. In terms of fiction, 
physical descriptions are structured in to serve a particular purpose. Having established this 
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basis, I then move on to interiority in Robert Westall’s The Machine Gunners (1975). 
Interiority is slightly harder to grasp but more explicitly ethical, as it concerns motivations 
and internalised ideologies. I finish the analyses section with a discussion of speech in 
Siobhan Dowd’s Bog Child (2008). Speech, especially when combined with interiority, 
displays how we engage with the world around us based on our situation and ideology. 
Through these close readings I demonstrate both how characterisation influences the ethics of 
a narrative, and how the war scenario impacts these specific techniques as well. I round off 
the chapter by considering my findings and transitioning to the next chapter, which delves 
deeper into both characterisation and ethics by adding the explicitly ethical element of action 
(and reaction). 
I Could See It in Your Eyes 
One of the most common war stories in British literature is the evacuee story. This type of 
narrative is notable mostly because it deals directly with concerns of identity, thus inherently 
displaying a focus on characterisation. As Gillian Lathey argued, the need to establish a role 
in a new setting, both social and cultural, may result in insecurity as well as empowerment in 
a unique and forceful breaking of family ties and necessary the resulting “reappraisal of one’s 
identity” (Lathey 1999, 173). A prime example of that comes from Michelle Magorian’s 
Goodnight Mister Tom (1981/2015). This novel is an evacuee story set in 1939, when eight-
year-old Willie Beech is evacuated to Little Weirwold, where he is taken in by Tom Oakley 
(Mister Tom). Although its protagonist is quite young, the novel foregrounds the very heavy 
theme of child abuse on several levels and in a shockingly explicit fashion, culminating in a 
seemingly potential murder of the child protagonist. Therefore, although the writing style is 
fairly easily accessible and the language used is not difficult, the implied reader for this 
narrative is most likely to be 12 and up. 
The first significant descriptions of both Willie and Tom occur when they are 
introduced to each other. Their physical appearances are described from the other’s 
focalisation. In the description there is an emphasis on the act of gazing on the other: “Tom 
took a second look at the child. The boy was thin and sickly-looking, pale with limp sandy 
hair and dull grey eyes” (Magorian 2015, 3). Tom’s view of Willie is centred on health; he 
notices first his malnutrition, then his uncleanliness, followed by his plainness. Ordering the 
observation in this manner both puts forward Tom’s priorities and values and sets up the 
contrast between the two characters. For Willie’s description of Tom there is a mixture of the 
narrator’s authorial version, and Willie’s perception: “Tom was well into his sixties, a 
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healthy, robust, stockily-built man with a head of thick white hair. Although he was of 
average height, in Willie’s eyes he was a towering giant with skin like coarse, wrinkled brown 
paper and a voice like thunder” (ibid). The narrator provides the “authentic” version of Tom, 
putting him into stark contrast with Willie by equally focussing on health. Starting the second 
sentence with the author stating that “although” Tom was not exceptionally tall, he was 
imposing to Willie characterises Willie; he is intimidated by what the narrator sees as an 
average, healthy man. Thus, the reader can infer that Willie is an easily scared child. 
 The importance of physical description is further developed through the focus on 
clothing. Willie is purposefully dressed in grey, dull clothing which is inappropriate for the 
weather. His best friend, Zach, stands out in the narrative because of the way that his 
appearance is described: 
It was the boy’s appearance more than anything which attracted Willie’s 
attention. He was taller than him but at a guess about nine years old. His body 
was wiry and tanned and he had a thick crop of black curly hair which looked 
badly in need of cutting. All he wore was a baggy pair of red corduroy shorts 
held up by braces, and a pair of battered leather sandals. Several coloured 
patches were sewn neatly around the seat of his pants. Apart from these, his 
back and legs were completely bare. Willie could not take his eyes off him (57-
58). 
This description of Zach’s clothing especially is repeated shortly after through Tom’s 
authoritative adult focalisation, emphasising to the reader that Zach’s appearance is indeed 
noteworthy and different even in the story world. Zach’s appearance also stands in direct 
contrast with Willie’s; sickly and thin versus wiry and tanned, sandy limp hair versus unruly 
black curls indicate that Zach could not be further from Willie’s introduction. It 
communicates to the reader firstly that Zach’s personality is indeed significantly different 
from Willie’s, but it also characterises Zach as an outdoorsy child, physically active, unruly, 
and, perhaps based on the black curls, Jewish. The most foregrounded element of Zach’s 
appearance is his wild fashion, again emphasised because of its contrast with Willie’s 
clothing; bright and colourful, for the time indecently uncovered, and as signalled by the 
carefully sown patches, well taken care of. Throughout their friendship in the village, Willie is 
always the shy, quiet child whilst Zach is the loud extrovert.  
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The differences between Zach and Willie could serve to place Zach permanently in 
Willie’s outgroup. However, because the two of them are very close friends, they override this 
boundary between them, placing Zach in Willie’s ingroup whilst maintaining difference. A 
subtle technique, this demonstrates a moral slant in the narrative: do not judge a book (or boy) 
by its cover, and do not let seeming differences dissuade you from engaging in friendships. 
The ingrouping of Zach is further foregrounded after Zach dies. Willie slowly learns how to 
accept both Zach’s death and through that, the extroverted sides to his own personality. When 
he asks Zach’s foster mother for his bike, “[s]he was about to say that he looked and sounded 
a little like Zach. He had an extrovert air about him, and that was unusual in Will” (432). 
Willie’s personality change is represented directly in his appearance; here, his adoption of 
some of Zach’s traits lead to him starting to look like his late friend as well. Through this, the 
lines between self and Other are further blurred, showing the reader that not only can you like 
and engage with an Other who may seem outgroup at first; you are or can be like them 
yourself as well. By subtly counteracting the in- and outgrouping the narrative set up itself, it 
espouses an ideology of openness and care for others.   
 Both Willie and Tom have to re-evaluate their identities because of the war; Willie is 
freed from the clutches of his abusive mother for the first time, while Tom, who was unable to 
have children with his late wife, suddenly has to care for a young boy in need. Willie becomes 
healthier and develops his own personality, slowly building confidence. The change in Willie 
is clearest when put in contrast with other characters, as when he is called home to his mother 
and she does not recognise him anymore: 
She had been looking for a thin little boy dressed in grey. Here stood an 
upright, well-fleshed boy in sturdy ankle boots, thick woollen socks, a green 
rolled-up jersey, and a navy-blue coat and balaclava. His hair stuck out in a 
shiny mass above his forehead and his cheeks were round and pink. It was a 
great shock to her (264). 
Again, Willie’s physical description is focalised through an adult, adding authority to his 
image. The description emphasises the difference between Willie before he left and after he 
came home by firstly reminding the reader of what Willie was like before his changes; they 
were gradual after all and after 200 pages of following Willie the reader may not be able to 
remember what Willie originally looked like. After emphasising Willie’s new confidence 
(“upright”); health (“well-fleshed”, “round and pink” cheeks and shiny hair); individualism 
(his coloured clothing as opposed to dull grey); and his being well taken care of (new, good 
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quality clothing), the narrator tells the reader that all of these positive developments were a 
shock to Willie’s mother. This both characterises Willie and his mother; it foregrounds the 
changes he has gone through, and because she is shocked despite all of these changes being 
positive, her abusive nature is brought forward as well. The reader is supposed to be put off 
by Willie’s mother whilst approving of his physical changes; creating clear boundaries 
between both Willie and his mother as well as the reader and his mother, Willie is more 
firmly placed in the reader’s ingroup whilst she is firmly placed outside of it. As moral 
judgements of those Other to us highlight the negative and downplay the positive (Dunham et 
al. 2011), the reader is supposed to judge Willie’s mother strongly and severely. 
 Tom’s physical and character changes are first described by another adult character, 
with heavy focus on the act of gazing: 
Mrs Fletcher looked steadily into his eyes. His forehead had lost its old 
furrowed look. The deep pitted wrinkles above his head had softened outwards. 
Behind his scowling manner was a kindly old man and if it hadn’t been for the 
arrival of a rather insipid little boy, she might never have known, nor might 
anyone else for that matter (192). 
This description is dripping with adult authority, brought forward in the first line. By 
highlighting that it is an adult’s focalisation through which the description is delivered, the 
narrative attempts to communicate to the reader that this account accurately describes Tom’s 
character and physique. The excerpt, like the other cases of physical characterisation, is based 
on contrasts, which in this case are based on adjectives directly linked to character traits: 
“scowling”, “kindly” as well as “softened” directly link the body to the character. The way 
Willie, who at the end of the narrative reinvents himself as Will or William, views Tom 
reflects the change in both of them. When they are first introduced, Willie is scared of Tom 
whom he sees as a looming, dominant presence directly opposed to his own self-perceived 
insignificance. However, after re-evaluating his own identity Will finds that he has grown, 
both physically and emotionally. “As with the sudden discovery of the lowness of his peg 
Will noticed now how old and vulnerable Tom looked. It unnerved him at first, for he had 
always thought of him as being strong” (448). Will’s discovery of his own significance, 
revealed to him through his new identity, also changes the way that Tom appears to him; 
focalised through Will as a confident person, Tom is no longer the terrible giant he was, 
instead being “reduced” to the old man he always was. 
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 Physical descriptions like this are always present as a form of characterisation in 
literature. However, in children’s war literature and in this case evacuee stories, there is an 
added element to them. The characters in these stories are, through the war, plunged into new, 
challenging situations, their family ties broken. As a result, they must reconsider their own 
identities and personalities, because of which the narrative focus on characterisation is 
foregrounded as well. Wartime bodies reflect the intense influence war has on the character 
developments of children’s war literature. Through the changes and contrasts depicted in the 
physical descriptions of characters the narrative displays some of its underlying ideologies, as 
well as who is in- or outgroup. In Goodnight Mister Tom, the internal transformations of both 
Tom and Willie are reflected in positive changes in their appearance also; Willie gains a 
healthy appearance, and Tom starts to physically show his kindness. Stating that this is a good 
change, although it may seem obvious, is already a form of ethical discourse: Willie’s 
building confidence and self-sufficiency are not a positive in the eyes of his mother and may 
be framed negatively in different cultures and/or times. Additionally, Tom’s change (at least 
in the eyes of Willie) from a strong domineering figure to a vulnerable old man could easily 
be framed as a negative, as he has lost his power and virility. This change is based on both his 
care for Willie and Willie’s own maturation. However, by framing it in a positive light the 
narrative espouses an ethics not of the power and might of adulthood, but of gentleness and 
empathy. 
 Additionally, the reader may be moved to pity or empathy for Willie based on the way 
his looks are described, particularly when put in contrast with how he improves under Tom’s 
care. Through placing emphasis on this change, the narrative pushes the reader to engage 
emotionally with a character who is severely abused. The implied reader may not have 
experienced such abuse, so through reading this novel and having the ramifications 
foregrounded in part through Willie’s body, they are encouraged to care about Willie’s 
situation. Through this, the narrative has an ethical purpose; to talk to a child audience about 
child abuse, showing (some of) the signs, and stating that it does indeed happen. This is 
further encouraged by placing Willie in the reader’s ingroup; he is one of the protagonists, so 
we are presumably supposed to like him, and he is young, like the implied reader. However, 
physical description is a narrative strategy which acts as just one in a constellation of 
characterisation. Physical descriptions display an assumed personality and morality; however, 
through fiction we can have access to this interiority hinted at through the body. It is to this 
interiority I turn next. 
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If You Think So 
Robert Westall’s The Machine Gunners (1975) is a WWII novel placed in England, telling the 
story of Chas McGill who loots a machine gun from a downed German plane and sets up a 
fortress with his friends so they can defend their town from the Germans. Its early chapters 
appear to set up a stark binary between the English and the Germans – which is challenged 
later in the novel through the humanisation and focalisation of the German bomber, Rudi. 
This falls into line with other narratives such as Michael Morpurgo’s Friend or Foe (1982), 
Jan Needle’s A Game of Soldiers (1985) and Westall’s Blitzcat (1989). The Germans are 
Othered; they are not known, seen, or heard of by the characters nor the reader until the 
appearance of Rudi midway through the novel, and throughout the novel are framed by the 
adults as villainous. All English adult characters, who hold authority over the child characters, 
both have and express intensely negative views of the Germans, which they do not hide from 
the children. Through this strong in- and outgroup divisions are created. The children then are 
expected to pick up on this attitude, and generally do. When the children set up their fort in 
Nicky’s garden, their (mostly) pretend play is that they are holding the fort against German 
enemies, whom they intend to and do gun down when a fighter plane flies over. The implied 
child reader of this novel is of a comparable age s was the case with Needle’s analysed above; 
they deal with similar themes in a similarly straightforward fashion. The young protagonist, 
fairly simple plot and accessible levels of embedment and emotion expression mark the 
implied reader as around ten years old. 
Access to Chas’ mind complicates our ethical image of him, as it adds ambiguity and 
nuance. This is most strongly exemplified when Chas has to lie to his father, who is “the only 
one Chas could never have deceived” (43). Chas asks his father if he can swap his trainset for 
his friend’s telescope, which is much more valuable than the trainset. After hearing Chas and 
his friend got approval from his father, Mr McGill enthusiastically approves, and offers to 
make a tripod for it so it can stand up. However, Chas never wanted the tripod for the 
telescope, instead intending to use it for the machine gun. Additionally, Chas’ friend’s father 
was never involved in the made-up transaction between telescope and trainset. This lie makes 
Chas feel like “a rat. It was a much worse pain than parting with his beloved railway” (110). 
Chas chooses to lie to his father in order to have the machine gun repaired, juggling his moral 
beliefs on the importance of the machine gun and “doing your bit” for the war, and his view 
and beliefs on his father as a formidable figure of authority. As Mallan would phrase it, Chas 
chooses “to become an active subject with the power to resist [adult] domination” (2013, 
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212), his father’s domination, which foregrounds Chas’ moral dilemma. Admitting that he 
needs his father’s help with the machine gun, rather than a camera tripod, would result in the 
loss of the machine gun and all of the children involved getting in trouble. Lying would mean 
that the machine gun gets repaired, and nobody gets in trouble (in Chas’ eyes at least). From 
the perspective of doing what you can to defend for your country, this lie could be entirely 
justified. This is where Chas’ interiority becomes important, however, as Chas’ love for the 
machine gun does not come from a “doing your bit ” focus on its importance in the war; it is 
the one piece that makes his war souvenir collection the best in the land. Therefore, Chas’ 
defence of and attachment to the machine gun is not morally “pure”, and his lie is equally 
ambiguous. Highlighting Chas’ intense negative emotions resulting directly from his lie 
against his father potentially makes it more palatable for the reader, however; especially the 
comparison to the feeling of loss of a beloved toy serves to strengthen extradiegetic empathic 
engagement.  
The Machine Gunners is focused on empathy and wanting to do right by others, even 
the enemy Other. However, the narrative does not extend this empathy to all characters and 
considers some as lesser, and therefore not deserving of empathy or moral action. Covert 
communication of ideology, which Hollindale labelled organic ideology (2011, 42), is the 
strongest and potentially most dangerous as the implied reader, especially an inexperienced 
reader, is more susceptible to that than to overt means. In The Machine Gunners the most 
covert and unaddressed ideologies are classism and an undercurrent of racism. The classism is 
the most apparent when Chas sees a lower-class family in the beginning of the novel when he 
is hunting for war souvenirs. Chas immediately dehumanises them: 
The family were scurrying around like ants from a broken nest, making heaps 
of belongings they had salvaged, and then breaking up the heaps to make new 
heaps. Chas watched them as if they were ants, without sympathy, because they 
were a slummy kind of family; a great fat woman in carpet slippers and a horde 
of boys of assorted sizes; hair like lavatory brushes, coarse maroon jerseys that 
wouldn’t fasten at the neck and boots with steel heelplates (Westall 1975, 4-5; 
emphasis mine). 
The comparison of the family to ants is a means to picture them explicitly as an Other, or 
outgroup, as grotesquely different to the ingroup. As cognitive psychological research has 
demonstrated, ingroup membership greatly limits the ability to empathise with and act 
ethically towards outgroup members (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 246), which Chas 
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demonstrates by his disgust for the lower-class family. Here the family is dehumanised first in 
free indirect discourse, which blends the authority of the (implied adult) narrator and the 
opinions of the child character. The effect of this is that a character’s opinion may come 
across as true, and as this is the first description the reader gets of this family it potentially has 
a lasting impression of them as Other and lesser. The following sentence clarifies that it is 
Chas who passes the classist judgement on them.  
The narrator’s interjection of “without sympathy” is interesting as it both criticises 
Chas for dehumanising the family and at the same time implies that sympathy is an 
appropriate emotion to experience while gazing at a working-class family. Additionally, the 
next clause passes further judgement on the family once again in FID. Therefore, although the 
narrator appears to find and present Chas’ views of the family as disagreeable, the narrative 
perpetuates these views itself by presenting Chas’ classism through the medium of the 
narrator’s authority. Classism forms a part of the text’s underlying ideology, which although it 
is foregrounded by the narrative remains unresolved. Therefore, as Hollindale would say, the 
questionable values of classism which “seemed to be on trial” (2011, 48) are reaffirmed by 
the narrative. By foregrounding but not resolving the issue of classism, the narrative 
communicates not only that such values and judgements exist, but potentially that this is not a 
negative viewpoint to have. 
The power balance between adults and children informs the ethical impact of a 
narrative on an inexperienced reader in the discourse, as the age gap between narrator and 
focaliser influences the way readers are presented with the ethical discourse (Fjällström, 
Kokkola 2014). As Mieke Bal argues: when the narrator is not a child, but the focaliser is, this 
highlights the difference between the two roles (1997, 148). Additionally, the focalised 
character “will have an advantage over the other characters. The reader watches with the 
character’s eyes and will, in principle, be inclined to accept the vision presented by that 
character” (Bal 1997, 147). Thus, as the implied reader is presumed to empathise the most 
with the focalised character, they are also likely to adopt that character’s moral views. The 
discourse of The Machine Gunners is particularly interesting in regard to this child-adult 
ethical power relationship and its empathic basis. For most of the narrative, the focaliser is 
either the protagonist Chas or another of the children. However, there are also many, albeit 
brief, instances mentioned above where the chief focaliser of a chapter is an adult. The first of 
these is in chapter four which is from the perspective of English teacher Stan Liddell. Before 
this chapter, Liddell is introduced as “Mr Liddell, the English master”, “The English master”, 
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and “Captain Liddell of the Garmouth Home Guard” (13). Yet chapter four refers to him by 
his first name exclusively, and through his subordinate relationship with the Headmaster 
portrays him as similar to the children in that regard.  
School teacher Stan Liddell gets several chapters and sub chapters dedicated to his 
attempt to recover the missing machine gun, suspected to be taken and hidden by Chas, and to 
prepare the Home Guard for invasion. In all but the last chapter, Stan’s focalised chapters 
portray him as “awkward” (31) and uncomfortable with authority. This is a narrative strategy 
aimed at achieving multiple things: creating the potential for extradiegetic empathy with the 
(adult) man who is trying to apprehend Chas by infantilising him to an extent, and the linked 
goal of opening the ethical horizons of the narrative so it is not limited to Chas’ ethical 
framework. It also forms the opportunity for an ethical dialogue within the narrative; and 
generates narrative tension by adding a cat-and-mouse element to the story. During the adult 
focalised parts of the narrative the adults only interact with other adults, and the child 
characters’ actions and minds are hidden from the reader. By hiding actions and emotions, 
both of which are all ethically charged, the narrative foregrounds a different moral framework 
at different points of the narrative. The main framework shown and developed throughout 
most of the story is that of Chas, because of which it is safe to say that the narrative favours 
Chas’ moral development over the other characters’. The arrival of Rudi, again, is an intended 
complication to this setup.  
Rudi is introduced to the narrative midway through the novel, at which point 
focalisation is split almost evenly between Rudi and Chas. The language Rudi uses mirrors 
the language German characters would have used in English boy’s magazines and comics of 
the time (Lathey 1999, 225), with its unrealistic grammatical errors and misspelled “evil 
German” phrases (like “Hande hoch!” instead of Hände hoch, or “Dumkopf” instead of 
Dummkopf). Using this language provides a more modern reader insight into the ideology of 
the time, which Othered Germans and would have reduced Rudi to an unrepentant, purely evil 
Nazi. However, access to Rudi’s emotions, thoughts and fears for extended periods of time 
demystifies him and moves against simplistic Othering (ibid). Providing this much focalised 
insight into Rudi’s character is a narrative strategy with the aim of enhancing the chances of 
empathic engagement with a German character who would previously be considered the 
enemy, and therefore evil, and through that broadens the moral frameworks and implications 
within which the narrative operates. 
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 In The Machine Gunners, the narrative constructs an attempt at crossing us versus 
them boundaries by allowing friendship between the English children and the German soldier, 
and by providing focalised insight into the emotions and beliefs of both sides. However, 
through the interiority of Chas combined with the narrator’s injections, in- and outgroups are 
also constructed and fortified; the classism of the narrative is an underlying ideology made 
clear precisely because of our access to Chas’ mind. Characters’ interiority can thus add 
significantly to both characterisation and the story’s ethics; by providing the reader insight 
into the beliefs and motivations of characters, the reader can add significantly to their mind-
model of those characters. Those beliefs and motivations also lay bare the internalised 
ideologies of the characters, as well as their judgements of others and reasoning behind their 
own behaviour and circumstance. Ethics lies mostly in the mind; the reasons why we believe 
what we are doing is right originate from that key word believe. Through inner rationalisation 
and prioritisation, we are able to consider our moral frameworks. The context of war enhances 
the importance of interiority because of the foregrounded focus on in- and outgrouping. The 
unusual situation of war, for the implied reader at least, foregrounds interiority because 
characters now have to re-evaluate and be mindful of both themselves and their situation in 
ways they did not previously. By allowing insight into these machinations, the narrative 
equally foregrounds the importance of interiority and its ethical ramifications. As hinted at in 
the brief discussion on interiority and lying, speech is an enactor of our ideologies. Therefore, 
it is the focus of my next analysis. 
Whatever You Say, Say Nothing 
Siobhan Dowd’s Bog Child (2008) is a novel about the Troubles, telling the story of Fergus, 
whose brother Joe is imprisoned for being an IRA member and currently on hunger strike. In 
the novel, Fergus himself becomes involved with the IRA as well. Already, there is an intense 
ethical element to this novel; the IRA are, by many, understood to be a terrorist organisation. 
This novel is, like Heroes, a YA novel targeted at an older audience. With its themes of 
resisting the status quo, finding your own voice and power in the face of institutionalised 
oppression, young love and sexual awakening, and a complex portrayal of terrorist 
involvement, The Bombs clearly implies an adolescent audience. Having said that, terrorism is 
not an off-limits topic for younger audiences. By implicating the protagonist with the IRA, the 
reader’s empathy is challenged; do we want to be ingrouped with terrorists? Joe’s situation is 
surrounded by secrecy and lies, as Fergus is attempting to move on to Scotland and leave the 
Troubles behind him once and forever; if everyone was to know the truth, this would become 
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impossible. Because of this, as well as the danger implied when talking about the IRA to the 
wrong people, speech is intensely charged. There are four distinct areas where speech, or 
silence, is vital in this novel: Fergus’ relationship with his love interest and her mother; his 
friendship with a Welsh soldier; his own involvement with the IRA; and Uncle Tally and 
Joe’s deceit. 
Silence is an important side to the speech coin, and one which Fergus employs a lot. 
His silence acts as an erasure of his brother’s existence, a rewriting of truth. Cora, Fergus’ 
love interest, and Felicity, her mother, are from the Republic of Ireland, staying at Fergus’ 
mother’s B&B while Felicity does archaeological research on Mel, a bog body Fergus finds. 
For reasons not made explicit to the reader, Mam tells Fergus not to mention Joe to them: 
‘And remember: not a word to the guests’ (72). The reason for this could be, as Fergus 
explains earlier in the novel, that the B&B business is failing, and they desperately need the 
income. Cora and Felicity may not desire to stay at a business with direct IRA links. Fergus 
omitting Joe is not a direct lie; he does not state that he does not have a brother, he simply 
does not mention him at all. He is, however, rewriting a version of the truth narrative; in this 
version, Joe never existed. Cora and Felicity have no reason to question this; they have strong 
affective ties to Fergus, which leads to enhanced trust (De Rosnay 2009, 759), and he has not 
previously provided inaccurate or false information (as far as they are aware). Throughout his 
young relationship with Cora, he never reveals the truth to her. Ethically, this is a highly 
ambiguous situation; it is understandable, perhaps, why Fergus would not reveal the full truth. 
Additionally, he is told not to by his mother. However, his decision to never tell the truth to 
Cora means that if their relationship were to manifest (it does not), it would be based on a lie 
– which would necessarily at some point come out. Fergus’ moral framework, then, allows for 
deceit even with loved ones. 
 Owain is a Welsh soldier Fergus befriends during his runs on the mountain. To him, 
Fergus presents yet another version of the truth: he does have brother, but he is on holidays in 
Rome. Owain and Fergus’ relationship is more complicated than that between Fergus, Cora 
and Felicity; because of the nature of the Troubles Owain and Fergus are, as a Brit and a 
Republican, enemies at opposite sides of a conflict. They like each other, yet they are 
constantly cautious and hyper aware of their situation. There is also a power difference 
between the two: Owain is an armed border guard, Fergus a Republican teenager. After their 
first encounter, which was entirely friendly, Fergus fears Owain may shoot him in the back. 
Although their trusts build up, it is on shaky grounds throughout their tentative friendship. 
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Fergus also lies to Owain about his runs up the mountain; he does not admit for a significant 
time that his runs are to smuggle packages across the border for the IRA. He does, however, 
reveal this to Owain after a bombing leaves Fergus morally mortified that he was responsible 
for innocents’ deaths. At the same time, he reveals that his brother is imprisoned and on 
hunger strike. So, where Fergus could not be truthful to Cora and Felicity, he can with 
somebody who is more obviously in his outgroup.  
After telling the truth to Owain, he asks to be shot, arrested, or any way to get out of 
his situation. Owain replies: 
‘Fergus, I don’t know if I’m going to turn you in.’ 
Fergus stared at Owain, wide-eyed. ‘What?’ 
‘You’re in one trap, I’m in another.’ As he spoke, Owain sliced the silver blade 
roughly through the tape. Grey fluff from the bag’s padding floated out. ‘You 
and me – we’re like two rats in two cages looking across at one another’ (250). 
While expressing a similarity and closeness so significant to him that it interferes with his 
duty of service, Owain meaningfully also emphasises their difference; they are rats in separate 
cages, and although they are similar, they can only gaze at each other. It turns out that it was 
not Semtex, but condoms that Fergus was smuggling. After laughing together about the 
situation, Fergus runs off as Owain shouts at him: “‘You bloody bog-eyed Irish taig,’ he 
called”  (252). Again, Owain foregrounds difference and distance between the two: taig is a 
slur against Catholics in Northern Ireland, and foregrounding his Irishness combined with the 
swearwords Owain’s speech does not imply closeness, unless it is to be taken ironically as the 
characters just spent some time laughing together, and this would be a shocking mood switch. 
Novice readers cannot, however, be expected to understand irony. The speech tag is equally 
vague, as “he called” reveals nothing about the emotion behind Owain’s statement; is he 
angry? Joking? The difference in intonation would significantly change the implications of his 
statement – and through that the reader’s mind-model of him. 
 Fergus is approached by his brother Joe’s old friend, Michael, who intimidates him 
into smuggling for him. Fergus does not accept the offer until Michael implies that he can 
help Joe stop his hunger strike, something Fergus deeply desires: 
You’re a fit man. We’ve watched you. You run like the wind. There’s only 
ever one squaddie posted up there. At most. And easy to dodge. I promise you, 
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you’d be helping the Cause big time. And helping the hunger strikers. It might 
even be the saving of them. Of Joe. Len. And the rest (70). 
Michael never goes into any specifics; Fergus assumes this is because the IRA relies on 
secrecy and does not pry. Michael never tells him what he is smuggling nor who he is 
smuggling for; when Fergus assumes it is for the IRA and it is to do with explosives, Michael 
also does not correct him. He is instead smuggling condoms and birth control for Michael 
himself, for financial gain. Is this lying? It is certainly morally dubious, and its negative 
ethical implications are foregrounded because they deeply affect the protagonist.  
The more complex deception around Joe’s imprisonment is centred around Uncle 
Tally. At several points in the novel Fergus asks Uncle Tally why he does not ever come to 
visit Joe. He asks Joe the same question, and both claim that they have had a falling out about 
a girl. Fergus, who again has strong affective ties with both characters, has no reason to 
mistrust this. Joe is no longer lucid due to his hunger strike and has proffered false 
information on many occasions. However, this information was always about his state of 
hunger, never about his life before imprisonment. Further, both he and Uncle Tally, another 
not fully trustworthy character, have previously in the novel mentioned a particular, unnamed 
girl as being quite significant to their lives. Connecting these dots, Fergus trusts both in their 
claim. The implied reader is also meant to believe this, as the narrative is focalised through 
Fergus. Uncle Tally and Joe’s relationship appears peripheral to the story and its themes, and 
as this is not in the detective genre there is no reason for the reader to question everything, 
including side plots. Fergus’ faith in his brother and uncle may therefore translate to the 
reader. However, it is later revealed that Uncle Tally, who explicitly told Fergus that he was 
not a member of the IRA, yet is strangely respected throughout the town, is in fact an IRA 
bombmaker. This is revealed suddenly to both the reader and Fergus at the same time, and 
only right before Fergus discovers that Uncle Tally resisted arrest and was shot to death by 
British police. After Owain is targeted in a bombing and dies, Fergus connects the dots and 
reveals the truth to himself and the reader: 
And he saw the funeral party around the Sheehans’ family plot, the men in 
balaclavas.  
The Provos with the Drumleash slope to their shoulders. The man at the end, 
who’d reminded him of Joe.  
And then he knew. The local bomb-maker, Deus. Thaddeus.  
Part of him had known it all along. The smell of Christmas in Uncle Tally’s 
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room had been of marzipan, almond-flavoured: the smell of Semtex (Dowd 
2008, 314-315). 
The reveal of the truth here is much in the style of a detective novel, however, unlike a 
detective both Fergus and the reader were not primed from the beginning to question every 
single character and clue. It is therefore unlikely that the implied reader, who is supposed to 
adopt Fergus’ trust in the narratives presented by Joe and Uncle Tally, would arrive to this 
vision of the truth much before Fergus does. Ethically, again, this situation is extremely 
complex. Joe and Uncle Tally kept their terrorist activities from Fergus, and directly lied to 
him; both about the reason why Uncle Tally does not visit Joe, and Uncle Tally about not 
being an IRA member. Both characters are highly sympathetic to Fergus and are firmly in his 
ingroup. Their lies, as well as them being implicated not only in the deaths of innocents, but 
also in the death of Owain, a character who was also close to Fergus, complicate their moral 
standing. 
 The choice for an IRA story in my analysis of speech is perhaps on the nose, 
particularly considering their slogan (and this analysis’ heading) of “whatever you say, say 
nothing”. The specific war scenario in which this novel is set foregrounds both the power and 
danger of speech; who you can talk to and what about is determined by the context of the 
Troubles. Fergus’ story is based on deception; he lies to his love interest and her mother, his 
parents, his friend Owain, and is lied to himself by his uncle Tally and Joe’s friend. Their 
reasons for lying are complex and demonstrate the moral quandaries that come with the in- 
and outgrouping central in war stories; Joe, the subject of most of Fergus’ lies, is presumed to 
be in the outgroup for Owain, Cora and Felicity. As Fergus’ brother, however, he is firmly in 
his ingroup. Fergus also wants to add Owain, Cora and Felicity into his ingroups as well, 
however, because of the dangerous war context they are in he believes that any knowledge of 
his brother’s (and through that, close ingroup) IRA ties would destroy any possibility of them 
being ingroup as well. He therefore has to lie to them. The silence in the novel also reflects 
the oppressive war context; the purpose Fergus’ smuggling is kept from him and he does not 
ask for it, and Joe and Uncle Tally keep their true IRA roles from him as well. Not speaking 
here is powerful, but also multipurpose: Fergus is silent because of fear, Rafters is silent to 
instil fear, and Joe and Uncle Tally keep quiet presumably to protect both themselves and 
Fergus. All acts of speaking and not speaking are shaped by the war and demonstrate complex 
ethical decisions. War increases the ethical ambiguity of lies and enhances the power of 
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silence. Through the context of war, this characterisation strategy increases the ethical 
complexity. 
Can You Hear Me Now? 
In this chapter I analysed the three main ways of covert ideology characterisation; speech, 
internal representation, and physical description. Because we care about these fictional 
characters and are emotionally engaged with them, their characteristics and behaviours are 
important to us. The type of people they are and their conduct form a network of traits 
charged with moral implications; because we are emotionally affected by them, their character 
shapes and betrays the ideology of the text. These forms of characterisation are temporally 
and culturally bound; however, that does not remove the fact that they are supposed to say 
something to the reader.  
 In children’s war literature these three sources of characterisation information are 
adapted and foregrounded. For speech, who is spoken to and who has a right to speak is 
directly shaped by the war scenario. Where normally this element of characters’ speech 
demonstrates the narrative’s ideologies, in children’s war literature it also clarifies even 
further the in- and outgroup demarcations. Speech also serves this function in general 
children’s literature; however, in war the element of dangerous repercussions for 
fraternisation with the wrong people is emphasised. Additionally, as per the IRA threat 
“whatever you say, say nothing”, during war the functions of speech to inform or to conceal 
are stressed, and given added moral elements. A character can be truthful, deceitful, or 
ambiguous in their speech. Contrasts between when the truth or deceit are framed as positive 
lay bare the narrative’s moral framework. Internal representation on the other hand provides 
the reader access to the character’s motives, beliefs, norms and values. Again, the choice of 
which character traits are framed as positive shows the narrative’s ideology. The way through 
which the narrative can frame traits as positive is mostly clarified through which characters 
the narrative attempts to manipulate the reader to empathise with, and potential narratorial or 
character statements. Physical descriptions work in much the same way; they imply 
characters’ mental and moral states in an implied fashion and are mostly clarified through 
narratorial and character statements, and manipulations through empathy. 
 As is the case with all narrative elements, the three forms of characterisation I 
discussed here do not operate separately; they may even provide contrasting information, 
which further complicates the moral framework constructed and opens discussion about the 
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ethics of the text. Discussing them in this way, however, I aimed to demonstrate just how they 
work to construct the narrative’s ideology. Additionally, there are two further main means of 
characterisation which I have not yet discussed: action, and reaction. Their absence in this 
chapter may seem glaring, considering the strong ethical judgments placed on actions. 
However, by laying the foundation of characterisation with these “soft” sources of trait 
information, I aimed to demonstrate how a narrative’s covert ideology is constructed before 
moving on to the more active, direct and overt nature of action. The result of having these two 
layers of overt and covert ideology is a complex and often ambiguous or contradictory picture 












The two remaining central elements of characterisation are action, and reaction. In her 
extensive work on character, Nikolajeva states that actions “and events are elements of 
discourse that indicate a change of state” (2002, 198). Events are relevant to characterisation 
because they prompt a reaction from the character, which in turn reveals the character’s inner 
life, motivations and intentions just as much as actions do (ibid). All elements of actions are 
relevant to characterisation; the “physical, mental and communicative” all indicate the 
character’s mental and moral features (Margolin 2007, 77). However, action-based 
characterisation, unlike the forms discussed in the previous chapter, is external and authorial 
(Nikolajeva 2002, 198). Like with other forms of characterisation, this form of 
characterisation can be implicit or explicit. In the case of actions, the difference between these 
two is the clearest when combined with the previously discussed narrative techniques; is the 
reader privy to the character’s motivations, intentions, or beliefs about their own actions? This 
is decided by the narrator and the focaliser, and greatly influences both the characterisation 
and the ethics of the act. For example, a simple narrative like “a boy shoots dead his brother” 
is likely to lead the reader to an interpretation of the boy as an evil murderer. If more insight 
is allowed and the narrative turns into “a boy shoots dead his brother, knowing that it was the 
only thing he could do to save him” both the characterisation and the ethics of the act are 
greatly altered. I argue that this is because the ethics of the act are the characterisation. This is 
because to act is to act ethically. There are no actions, large or small, without ethical 
consequences nor any without moral consideration before, even if they are not conscious.  
 How actions form characterisation is highlighted through two common means; through 
either repetition or juxtaposition. The functioning of these two kinds of action is relatively 
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straightforward; repeated actions can indicate a character’s stubbornness, determination or 
perseverance (Nikolajeva 2002, 198). For instance, if a character chooses to (and every action 
is a choice) carry her little brother’s heavy rucksack for twenty miles, a couple of days in a 
row, this evokes a certain image of said character. Juxtaposition can highlight a contrast 
between characters or between situations (Nikolajeva 2002, 199). If normally a character runs 
into a shelter at the first siren, but upon seeing their pet stuck outside runs towards them 
before getting both into the shelter, this is a strong indicator of how the reader is supposed to 
see the character. Similarly, if the reader is shown two characters in this same scene, both 
aware of the pet but only one of them runs to save the pet, both characters are fleshed out 
through one character’s action. Characterisation through action seems so obvious a means that 
it is often unexamined (Nikolajeva 2002, 222). Perhaps it is more fruitful to approach the 
subject through a philosophical perspective. 
The Answers to Life, the Universe and Everything 
The study of ethics entertains “theories about human nature, explore[s] the nature of value, 
discuss[es] competing accounts of the best way to live, ponder[s] the connections between 
ethics and human psychology, and discuss[es] practical ethical quandaries” (LaFollette 2000, 
1). Within normative ethics, which studies the principles and guidelines to a “correct” life 
(LaFollette, 1) there are three main identifiable strands which focus either on consequence, 
motivation, or virtues as the sole indicator of correctness or incorrectness (Baron, Pettit, Slote 
1997). Thus, the study of ethics can be divided up into consequentialism, deontology, and 
virtue ethics. For the pure consequentialist it is only the consequences of actions that make 
them ethically correct or not (Sinnott-Armstrong 2003). Neither intention nor the act itself are 
a factor for this strand (Baron, Pettit, Slote 1997, 92-174). Deontological ethics, popularised 
by Kant, stands in stark opposition to this as it is mainly concerned with intentions. This is 
underlined by a sense of duty and obligation, or dignity. At its heart, deontology sees 
adherence to or deviation from a series of absolute rules as that which determines the morality 
of both action and character (Baron, Pettit, Slote 1997, 3-91). As summarised by Larry 
Alexander and Michael Moore, “deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that 
guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to those 
that guide and assess what kind of person we are and should be (aretaic [virtue] theories)” 
(2016). Virtue ethics is separate from both of these approaches and has its focus not on action 
but on character instead. A virtue philosopher, such as Aristotle, considers what traits make 
one “good” and how one can best allow them to realise their particular “purpose” (Baron, 
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Pettit, Slote 1997, 175-238). As emphasised by moral philosophers Rosalind Hursthouse and 
Glen Pettigrove, “virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other 
normative notions will be grounded in them” (2016). 
These are clear and different approaches, and although a character may lean towards 
or purport a certain strand more than another, or even as the only correct one, in practice these 
strands often get mixed. According to ethics philosopher and scholar Robert Roberts this is 
because: “Unlike actions, traits of character are not datable occurrences in a person’s history, 
but dispositions: temporally extended qualities that are exhibited presently in action, intention, 
desire, thought, and emotion” (2012, 1744). Instead of having solidified moral thoughts 
combined with “fixed possibilities” (Mahon 2017, 108), most people’s applied morality is 
vague and flexible. Consequently, the study of what is ethical in a psychological sense 
concerning human interaction tends to go beyond mere condemnation of an action or a thing 
as being either “good” or “bad”; instead it is the study of the philosophical virtues, of nuances 
and grey areas, of both intention and consequence (ibid.). Although the categories of 
consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics are useful tools to analyse the ethics of a 
character or action, merely labelling someone as one or the other misses the nuance that is 
part of all human motivation and action. This nuance can be analysed at length in literature, 
which unlike extra-textual life provides a complete overview of what is deemed relevant to 
the events and characters engaged with ethical problems. 
 These underlying philosophical frameworks are unlikely to be translated directly to the 
young reader, and do not need to be. Although an analysis of any given text may seem to 
suggest that a narrative blatantly states “deontology is bad, virtue ethics and consequentialism 
are good”, that is both untrue and not the intention of such a reading. Rather, studying and 
verbalising these underlying and historical philosophical concepts reveals the presence and 
potential pervasiveness of certain moral attitudes, norms and values in society. For literature 
is a form of societal self-preservation: desirable mores are written down to be taught to future 
generations in attempts to socialise them within these moral frameworks. Self-sacrifice, for 
instance, is argued to be a classic moral lesson of children’s literature, taught both overtly and 
covertly from the inception of the field (Barker 2014, 102-103); though this position is not 
universally agreed upon (Nikolajeva 2014a, 185). In children’s war literature, the context of 
the emotionally (as well as morally and physically) extreme situation brings these moral 




Why Would You Do That? 
Actions are ethically relevant due to their impact, as well as the motivation behind them. 
Insight into that is provided through interiority, discussed above. However, action does not 
necessarily come with interiority. In this case, much like in extra-textual life, the reader has to 
mind-model a motivation onto an opaque character. The nature of fiction complicates this, as 
it is necessarily structured and overtly so, unlike in extra-textual life. The expectation with 
fiction is that any action which is depicted must be relevant in some way (Nikolajeva 2002, 
175); either for the plot (as Nikolajeva argues), or thematically. This indicates that as readers, 
there is a much higher demand on and expectation of causality and intentionality in fiction 
than there is in extra-textual life (ibid). There must be a reason for this action to take place; 
there must be a motivation for the character to behave in this way. The readerly expectations 
based on fiction’s artificiality push us to engage our mind-modelling skills and come up with 
motivations for characters even when they are not provided; the expectation is that they must 
be there, otherwise the action would not be represented. We engage with fiction in this way 
and create mind-models for opaque characters even though there may not be any 
characterisation to be drawn from actions, as particularly in children’s literature they may be 
fully demanded by the plot (Nikolajeva 2002, 177) 
 In children’s literature causality is both foregrounded and complicated. As Nikolajeva 
argues, “children place still higher demands on causality as compared with adults (children 
often ask the question ‘Why did he do so?’. Therefore, the way events and actions are 
combined in children’s fiction is of overall importance” (2002, 175). Additionally, Nikolajeva 
states, children’s decisions and actions are not as major as those adults perform, as any 
failures “ are usually followed by success” and if they are not there still remains hope for 
reparations in the future, meaning a child’s actions can never be truly a failure (2002, 173). 
This statement pre-echoes Beauvais’ argument on children’s literature being hopeful by 
definition, even in the case of death (2015, 46-49). The futurity of the child diminishes the 
(moral) consequences of their actions. Speaking of the child character rather than the reader, 
children’s war literature complicates this approach to child characters’ actions. The violence 
of war, even if not experienced on the battlefield itself, dramatically changes the potential 
consequences of (in)action; although a character can recuperate, death can (in realist fiction) 
not be reversed, lost limbs cannot be grown back. The moral consequences of (in)action are 
heightened, and although the child character is inherently hopeful, the intense social emotion 
of guilt can forever be a mark on a character’s mind. 
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You Shouldn’t Have Done That 
Guilt is a social emotion based on action, whether enacted or imagined, which impacts 
another. Guilt depends on both an empathic understanding of another’s distress, as well as 
self-identified causality of said distress (Parker, Thomas 216). In his extensive discussion on 
guilt in literature (2011, 175-220), Hogan states that “guilt is bound up with compassion” 
(180), and inherently focussed on the past act (218). Compassion differs from empathy in that 
it is based on negative emotional states of others (whereas empathy can be for any emotional 
state), it does not require an understanding of another’s emotion, and it pushes to action. I 
disagree here with Hogan’s claim, as guilt can come from empathy as well and does not 
necessarily lead to action. However, later in his chapter he switches to using the more 
appropriate term of empathy, stating that guilt is “a response to an aversive event in which 
there is a victim with whom one feels empathy” (216). Guilt is dependent empathy, because 
of which it is also moderated by it. By this I mean that because our outgroup empathy is 
limited, our in- and outgrouping severely influences the amount of guilt we can experience 
(Hogan 2011, 216-217). Narratives which promote cross-binary empathy may therefore 
equally allow for guilt regarding the impact our actions have on the Other. In a similar vein, 
however, narratives which occlude empathy for the Other diminish or even remove the ethical 
element, and thus the guilt, of our actions towards those in our outgroup. Guilt is a social 
emotion based on an action (perceived to be) directly impacting another, because of which it 
is an inherently ethical emotion as well. 
Hogan also argues that guilt is moderated by degrees of salience in causality (216-
217). However, this is not the case in children’s literature, as children often feel guilty about 
others’ (especially adults’) behaviour (Nikolajeva 2014a, 200). Although complicated by 
children’s literature, the causality factor of guilt cannot be ignored; as Nikolajeva argues, 
“[g]uilt derives from accidentally or deliberately harming someone, especially the object of 
desire” (2014a, 82). She expands the idea of harm by stating that guilt is caused by “[a]n 
action that prevents another individual’s happiness” (83). Here she leaves out the crucial 
element of empathy; it is perfectly possible for people or characters (like, say, Patrick 
Bateman) to harm people without experiencing any guilt whatsoever. Characters which do 
experience guilt may do so to an extent with which the reader is not familiar, providing an 
opportunity to experience in proxy the emotions resulting from action from a cognitive, 
affective, and ethical perspective (199). 
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Guilt is omnipresent in children’s fiction, even though it can be hard for the novice 
reader to understand as they cannot be presumed to have fully developed their understanding 
of the moral issues at stake, nor their empathy and mind-modelling skills (Nikolajeva 2014a, 
199). Children’s war literature is particularly complex regarding the issue of guilt, as it 
necessarily foregrounds an us versus them narrative and enhances the consequences of 
actions. The war scenario also problematizes the empathy necessary in order to feel guilt, as it 
is possible to feel guilty regarding people you have not met. A guilt for the victims of a war 
you took part in or feel in some way responsible, for example (Sanders 2008, 198-200). 
Because there is guilt there is a presupposed type of empathy, however, this may be for 
people the character has never met, or for a considerably large amount of people. Because of 
its empathic and moral implications and consequences, guilt is a powerful if complex form of 
characterisation as well as ethics formation.  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of actions, I will first analyse the 
way through which a combination of contrasting emotions and motivations as well as 
different forms of (in)action influence both the ethics and characterisation of a text. For this, I 
turn to Brian Conaghan’s The Bombs that Brought Us Together (2016), a story about both war 
and terrorism. To this I next add an analysis regarding guilt in Nina Bawden’s Carrie’s War 
(1973). I finish my discussion of actions, ethics and characterisation by analysing the impact 
of overt didacticism in Michael Morpurgo’s Friend or Foe (1977). 
Desperate Times, Desperate Choices 
At several points above, both in the empathy section and the previous chapter, I have posed 
the difficult question that arises when we as readers are asked to empathise with terrorists. 
This moral conundrum is foregrounded in Brian Conaghan’s The Bombs that Brought Us 
Together (2016). In this novel, fourteen-year-old Charlie Law’s town (named Little Town) is 
invaded by Old Country, prompting a conflict in loyalties and emotions in Charlie. This novel 
is told in first person past tense by Charlie himself, who as a young boy is automatically in the 
reader’s ingroup. He foregrounds this himself through the style of narration; highly colloquial 
and containing many jokes, he stylistically purposefully attempts to relate to the reader. The 
implied reader is the same as for Bog Child: adolescent. Charlie’s status as a teenager 
foregrounds this, as do the themes (which are much the same as in Bog Child), and narration 
style. This is most obvious when he goes to a bookshop and encounters the girl he desires: 
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Guess who I spied flicking through the books at the Teenage Reading Section: 
Girls? 
Eh? 
None other than the amazingly stunning and utterly gorgeous Erin F. 
YES, THAT ERIN F. (67, emphasis in the original). 
The hyper stylised narration both creates an “authentic” teenage voice and characterises 
Charlie. He is funny and chatty as a narrator, which leads to an image of him as a character 
being equally funny and chatty; the kind of character the reader is supposed to like and want 
to consider ingroup to themselves. The intrusive nature of his narration also complicates the 
nature of the narration; is he writing his account down or telling it to someone? Why, and who 
to? It is not clear how much time difference there is between narrator Charlie and narrated 
Charlie. However, past tense first person narration by definition implies unreliability, as it 
relies on the narrator’s memory of their own story (Nikolajeva 2014, 257). This unreliability 
is enhanced by the intrusiveness of his narration, and complicates his image as being truly 
ingroup. Is he trying too hard to sound like a teenager, or like a likeable person? The morally 
complex situation Charlie gets involved in may explain why he would want to create a more 
likeable version of himself; his heavy hand in telling his own story creates doubt as to 
whether he has an equally heavy hand in editing either the events, himself, or both. 
 The reliability of Charlie’s account of himself as a likeable person becomes 
particularly important for the ethics of the story, as several extreme and confronting situations 
occur. First, before the invasion takes place, Charlie is confronted with an outgroup member 
in the form of Pav, who is a refugee from Old Country and his new neighbour. Charlie does 
not take an immediate liking to Pav and focuses on his appearance and accent as markers of 
Pav’s Otherness, firmly placing him in the outgroup. However, this is immediately contested 
in their first conversation, as Pav swears in Charlie’s language (albeit with a heavy accent), 
states he is the same age as Charlie and reveals that they will be going to the same school. As 
Charlie loves swearing (but censors himself in his account), this already puts Pav at least on 
the fringes of Charlie’s ingroup, to the point where Charlie vows to help Pav at school: 
  ‘I no like school’ 
  ‘Don’t worry Pav, I’ll look after you. Anyway, we still have loads of the  
  summer to go before we think about school.’ 
  The idea of getting in some decent work experience and helping Pav with the 
  lingo popped into my head. He would need a helping hand in case he made a 
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  complete arse of himself at school. And for reasons that baffled Mum and Dad, 
  I wanted to be a teacher when I left school (21-22). 
Charlie’s statement that he will help Pav is a moral act; he is promising actions in the future 
which will benefit Pav, because he recognises him as ingroup. However, again the reader is 
confronted with unreliability; does Charlie vow to help Pav out of kindness, or out of a self-
centred desire to train himself as a teacher? The uncertainty there sparks doubt on whether or 
not Charlie considers Pav ingroup at all. It also complicates the moral framework which 
Charlie operates in; if he is concerned with doing good for goodness sake or out of empathy, 
which is possible depending on the reader’s mind-model of Charlie, he would slot into the 
virtue ethics approach. However, he himself focuses on the outcome of his help, 
foregrounding a consequentialist approach. In this approach his selfish motivations do not 
matter; it brings happiness to Pav and prepares Charlie for his dreams of becoming a teacher. 
By presenting both as options, they are put into conflict, and the reader’s mind-model of 
Charlie as a moral character depend on their own assessment of his motivation. The 
characterisation, and ethics, of Charlie are thus significantly complicated, depending on the 
reader’s mind-model of him as either honest or duplicitous. 
 Over the course of time Charlie and Pav do develop a friendship, which is most clearly 
expressed when Pav gets in trouble at school. Because he is Other, and specifically from Old 
Country which is considered a violent danger to Little Town, Pav gets bullied significantly at 
school. It is as a result of that the first important ethical act occurs, as well as the 
foregrounding of unethical inaction. After Old Country invades Little Town, the danger Pav, 
being an Other from Old Country, appears to pose to the other children at school vastly 
increases, to the point of violence. Charlie is warned by a friend that Pav was attacked by the 
school bullies and that he is alone, Charlie immediately rushes to action: 
As soon as she said the word alone I was on my heels. I dropped my book, 
legged it outside and immediately saw the small gathering. A growing circle 
had formed. Not one of them doing anything to help. I couldn’t hear a kind or 
sympathetic word being uttered. No warm hand. No words of comfort. What 
was wrong with these people? Little Town people. My people (231). 
Charlie’s immediate action of rushing over to provide aid to Pav, who is foregrounded as 
Other because of the violence the nation of his birth inflicted on the people of Little Town, is 
a clear ethical act. He could potentially put himself in danger of violence as well if he is seen 
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to aid the Other, and the lack of thought he puts into the action belies his moral framework 
and priorities. He acts out of sense of deontological duty as well as virtue, neglecting his own 
interest for the welfare of, and out of loyalty, to his friend. Again, however, this is Charlie’s 
own account so he may have edited out a period of time during which he debated what he 
should do – or not. A reluctance to help would remove the virtuousness from his act; if he 
helps out of duty more than anything else, he displays loyalty and nothing more. His 
unreliability could potentially significantly change the reader’s mind-model of him as a moral 
person. However, young readers may not question the narrator’s reliability at all times, and 
the immediacy of the danger caused by the situation of war foregrounds underlying morality 
to the point where Charlie’s action necessarily feeds into the reader’s mind-model of him. 
 The quote above also foregrounds the unethical inaction of the bystanders. Charlie 
foregrounds the things they do not do, thereby expressing what he had expected from them 
instead; physical as well as emotional support for Pav, the severely injured Other. His covert 
expression of what he had expected from them reveals two things: firstly, that how he would 
have acted in this situation would demonstrate that he considers Pav an ingroup member, and 
secondly that he is surprised that the others do not. On the one hand it is surprising that they 
do not, as empirical studies have shown that when violence against the Other (particularly the 
ethnic Other) is caused by an ingroup member this results in anger at those members (Iyer, 
Schmader, Lickel 2007; Leach, Iyer, Pedersen 2006), and that similarities to violent 
perpetrators (leading to ingroup categorisation) cause feelings of anger and guilt (Gordijn et al 
2006). It is of course possible for outgroup members to help one another, and the negative 
emotions caused by violence against the ethnic other may lead to reparative action. On the 
other hand, however, aid is more readily given to ingroup than to outgroup members 
(Sierksma 2018, 95-97). Additionally, as found by Nakia Gordon and Samantha Chesney 
(2017), the more intense these negative emotions, the more likely it is that it results in 
emotional suppression (214). The bystanders’ inaction, although infuriating to Charlie, makes 
sense and accurately displays the outcome of the intense emotions caused by violence against 
ethnic Others. 
 Charlie himself foregrounds the complexity of those emotions when he becomes 
involved with the Big Man, a Mafioso-type character responsible for most of what happens in 
Little Town. After “gifting” some furniture to Charlie and Pav to put in their clubhouse, the 
Big Man manipulates Charlie into terrorist actions. He starts by clearly delimitating us versus 
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them distinctions between the “innocents” from Little Town and the “aggressors” from Old 
Country: 
‘Do you love Little Town?’ 
LOVE? NOT REALLY. 
‘Yes,’ I said, out of fear more than anything. 
‘And are you willing to do things to protect it?’ 
NO. 
‘Erm … depends.’ 
‘What if it is a them or us situation?’ He waited for an answer, which I didn’t 
have. ‘You’d pick us, right?’ he said. 
‘Erm … right … I guess.’ 
‘Well, that’s the shitstorm we now find ourselves in. it’s them or us, Charlie. 
Us or them. So you’ve got to ask yourself: which side are you on?’ This was a 
massive question. The Big Man demanded an answer. The correct one. 
‘I suppose I’m on the us side,’ I said (269). 
This entire conversation serves as an emphasis of the us versus them divide which is at the 
core of war narratives; however, it also complicates this because although Charlie does not 
agree with the Big Man (as he makes clear through his interiority), he is pushed by fear to 
subscribe to the ideological division proposed by the Big Man. The Big Man also 
foreshadows that because of the clear distinctions between Us and Them (as he sees it, at 
least), as well as the danger posited by Them, protective action is called for. The ethics he 
espouses demonstrate what Blanka Grzegorczyk found in terrorist children’s narratives; 
namely that “the retributive cycle of violence and counter-violence that depends on the 
anachronistic binary division between ‘us,’ who are never terrorists, and ‘them,’ who are, and 
against whom, therefore, violence is justified in the name of self-defence (2018, 575-576). 
Because the Big Man subscribes to and imposes this binary division, the protective action of 
violence he proposes is in his eyes both necessary and entirely justified. However, because 
Charlie does not see Old Country and Little Town as clearly in- and outgroup due to his 
friendship with Pav, he cannot view the violence asked for as morally justifiable. His agreeing 
to at least outwardly act as though he agrees, however, creates an ethically complex image of 
terrorism and intergroup violence. 
 As Little Town continues to suffer under the oppression of Old Country, Charlie is 
trained to use a gun in order to assassinate a major military target in a terrorist attack. He is 
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seduced by the feeling of power he gets from the gun but is shocked to find out the target is 
Pav’s sister. Again, it is his closeness to Pav, overriding the us versus them binary necessary 
to justify terrorist behaviour, which stops him from fully believing in the Big Man’s rhetoric. 
As Charlie finishes his training, he stows away the gun and again reveals the complexity 
leading to his situation: 
I didn’t want to do it. 
But, 
I needed to do it. 
Mum needed me to do it. 
Pav needed me to do it. 
The Big Man was making me do it. 
But, 
I didn’t want to do it (300-301). 
Charlie’s actions, in choosing to accept the Big Man’s help knowing that it would come at a 
cost, choosing to give in to fear and accept the assassination job, are enriched by the 
knowledge the reader has of his emotional experience of them. In the excerpt above, Charlie 
reveals that he is acting against his own desires both out of fear for the Big Man and out of 
love and loyalty for two people he has strong attachments to in his ingroup; his mother and his 
friend. This combination of fear and love lead to a complex moral image of Charlie’s terrorist 
behaviour; he is acting against his own wishes in a form of self-sacrifice for the Greater Good, 
which is a blend of deontology (duty towards Little Town and the Big Man) and 
consequentialism (the act is bad but the results will be good), but part of his motivation comes 
from fear. Additionally, this is a self-edited account, and his unreliability is especially 
important in this regard. The narrative is pushing the reader to empathise with a terrorist 
character, whilst expressing continuously that he does not believe in the rhetoric and his 
motivations behind his actions are muddled. His motivations are what ultimately colour the 
moral image of Charlie as a character, yet they are only available through his own intrusive 
narration. Ultimately, they are unreliable. 
 Charlie does not end up murdering Pav’s sister; instead, the day before he is supposed 
to do it, he comes clean to Pav who then comes up with a plan through which Pav’s sister is 
saved and the Big Man is shot instead by someone other than Charlie – preserving his 
innocence. The Bombs that Brought Us Together puts the reader to the test by manipulating 
them to empathy with a character who, although he does not end up fulfilling his initial plan, 
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has terrorist intentions. He had planned to go through with it, yet out of fear and loyalty for 
his friend he stopped before it came true. Charlie’s morality is ambiguous throughout; he is in 
the reader’s ingroup, because of which the reader is supposed to side with him, yet his 
unreliability and mixed motivations prevent him from being a wholly “good” character. 
However, his (eventually) genuine care for Pav most clearly expressed by his immediate 
action when Pav is in danger does cross the in- and outgroup divides set up and foregrounded 
by the narrative and belies an empathy which is framed as good. His actions, however, when 
he is embroiled with the Big Man complicate this image, as his main motivator of fear is self-
centred rather than empathically other-centred. Because the reader is presented with the 
motivations behind his actions, even if unreliable and muddled, the ethics behind his actions 
are enhanced and become especially important in the reader’s mind-model of him. However, 
the narrative stops before Charlie can fully contemplate the ethics of his own behaviour and 
have the opportunity to experience guilt. Because of this, the reader does not know if Charlie 
would have felt guilty and therefore condemn his behaviour; they can only guess. The next 
novel I analyse is focused specifically on guilt and its impact. 
Ain’t No Rest for the Wicked 
Carrie, the protagonist of Nina Bawden’s Carrie’s War (1973/2014), is consumed by guilt. 
Hers is an evacuee story, as adult Carrie returns to the site of her evacuation with her children 
and relates to them the story behind her all-consuming guilt caused by “the worst thing” she 
has ever done. Although the story is framed around adult Carrie, the majority of the story is 
focused on child Carrie. This as well as the simple language used, themes (including the 
heavy focus on guilt and naïve perspective on responsibility and causation) and heavily 
present narrator mark this as a novel for children of around eight years old. The evacuation 
basis of her story foregrounds particular concerns: as argued by Lathey the child character is 
torn from their usual surroundings and required to refigure their identity (1999, 172-174), 
foregrounding the importance of mind-modelling and the negotiation of moral frameworks as 
the character has to find their place in their new home. It takes until the end of the novel for 
Carrie to reveal what it is that she feels guilty about, as the narrative portrays the complete 
duration of her stay in Wales, detailing her relationships there and her difficulty with defining 
her new identity. The foregrounding of her guilt combined with the prolonged delay in 
explaining what it is that she feels so guilty about leads Barbara Freedman to state that 
“Carrie’s War depends on gaps regarding what it was that Carrie feels guilty about” (1991, 
37-38), meaning that the tension underlining the narrative (what is the worst thing Carrie has 
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ever done, that has led her to decades of guilt?) depends on leaving it unrevealed for as long 
as possible. Although this may to an extent be true, because the focus of Carrie’s War lies on 
both her guilt as well as her personal experiences during her evacuation, tension derives from 
both, and both are equally important in the mind-model constructed of Carrie over the course 
of the novel. Additionally, the focus on guilt emphasises the ethical and emotional 
consequences of our actions, placing ethics firmly on the foreground of the narrative. 
 Carrie’s War is told in third-person past tense; it is also an embedded story. Although 
all narration throughout is in the same tense, the first and last chapters are narrated by an 
unknown narrator, while the rest appears to be told by adult Carrie in the third-person, 
explaining her evacuee history to her children. As Lathey writes, this type of narration 
foregrounds the temporal distance between adult Carrie and child Carrie “while authenticating 
[narratorial] comments on Carrie’s responses to events and occasional interior monologues 
[…]. The adult Carrie is an omniscient narrator who allows us to share the younger Carrie’s 
misinterpretations and understand her behaviour” (1999, 175). I agree that the effect of 
Carrie’s narration is both a reflective distancing and a narratorial authentication of Carrie’s 
experiences; the narrator in this way separates adult and child Carrie as characters, making it 
possible for adult Carrie to narrate child Carrie’s story. However, as a personal narrator Carrie 
can never be omniscient; although she believes she is better informed as an adult, she cannot 
access other characters’ minds.  
Because the majority of the novel is narrated by adult Carrie, a façade of objectivism 
is created which allows both adult Carrie and the reader to judge child Carrie for her beliefs, 
naïveté and mistakes. However, as a personal narrator she is also unreliable, as she can choose 
to present herself and events in certain ways and depends on memories of thirty years ago to 
tell her story; she may lie, omit, or misremember her own story. Sainsbury points out that the 
conversational mode of the embedded narrative allows the unknown narrator to pose modal 
questions to Carrie’s children (and through that, the reader as well) which emphasise ethical 
concerns of the narrative related to family duty and loyalty (Sainsbury 2017, 163). Would 
they have been scared too, like Carrie was (Bawden 1973/2014, 202)? Would they have 
believed the “old tales” that led to Carrie’s guilt (206)? These modal questions are aimed 
directly at Carrie’s children and thus demand of them to empathise with Carrie and reflect on 
the ethical situation. The ethics is foregrounded by direct and implied questions to characters 
as well as readers. Sainsbury’s approach emphasises the importance of both narrative gaps 
and modal address in engaging the reader cognitively; the narrative asks the reader to make up 
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their own mind and consider the morality of the situation fully (2017, 166-167). Through this, 
the reader is provided the opportunity to develop their own moral understanding of guilt and 
conflicting empathy. 
 The social (and ethical) emotions of shame and guilt are pervasive throughout Carrie’s 
narrative. When she and her little brother Nick arrive in the town and their group of 
schoolchildren is to be divided amongst the town’s residents, Carrie meets Albert Sandwich 
for the first time. He is recalcitrant in a way typical for teenaged boys, refusing to participate 
in what both perceive as a dehumanising activity. Reflecting on this, child-Carrie wishes that 
she could behave in a way similar to him, but “she had already begun to feel ill with shame at 
the fear that no one would choose her” (21). Being introduced to a new community through 
evacuation enhances the emotions Carrie experiences to the point where her fear and shame 
are physically making her ill; a reaction which may be understandable. The reader’s mind-
model of Carrie may, in light of her situation, not contain a particularly harsh judgement of 
her for this. However, Carrie’s shame, guilt and fear are continuously foregrounded as 
responses to the smallest things. When after being sorted she is taken to her guardian’s home, 
she is immediately intimidated by the cleanliness of the house: “She thought she would never 
dare touch anything in this house in case she left marks. She wouldn’t dare breathe – even her 
breath might be dirty!” (25). Even the knowledge that “it wasn’t her fault” when their shoes 
leave marks on some white cloth (25) does nothing to alleviate her feeling of guilt. These 
instances both highlight that Carrie’s situation is extremely stressful to her, causing her to 
overthink everything; they also lead the reader to construct a different mind-model of Carrie. 
The consistent emphasis on shame, guilt and fear when her goals are not clear and there is no 
perceivable threat create an image of her as cowardly and desperate to please others. 
 By characterising Carrie in this way, emphasising that her responses of shame, guilt 
and fear are often disproportionate to the situation, the narrative sows seeds of doubt on the 
severity of “the worst thing” that Carrie has done. Although she has experienced severe guilt 
for over 30 years and the situation that triggered it caused her trauma (Sainsbury 2017, 162), 
the reader has reason to distrust her assessment of the situation. The priming of this distrust is 
based on the reader’s mind-model of Carrie, and the clashes between her emotional response 
to situations and the reader’s moral evaluation of them. Carrie herself complicates her own 
emotions before she tells her story, as she attempts (in direct speech) to explain her 
experience of guilt to her children: 
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I thought I had changed, that I’d feel differently now [I’m older]. After all, 
what happened wasn’t my fault, couldn’t have been, it just didn’t make sense. 
That’s what I’ve been telling myself all these years, but sense doesn’t come 
into it, can’t change how you feel. I did a dreadful thing, the worst thing of my 
life, when I was twelve and a half years old, or I feel that I did, and nothing can 
change it (11). 
In this excerpt Carrie constantly goes back and forth between stating something as factual, 
and then undermining it. “It wasn’t my fault – but I feel that it was”; “I did this terrible thing – 
but maybe not”. Already the reader is presented with a particularly conflicting situation and is 
pushed to both doubt and believe Carrie. As a result, there is a cognitive demand on the reader 
to engage actively with the moral questions the narrative proposes. This is a complex setup, 
particularly for a children’s novel, as it requires the reader to doubt the character’s own 
judgements rather than to trust the protagonist. A certain resistance to focalisation is therefore 
expected, in order for the reader to grasp the ethical complexity of Carrie’s character and 
actions. Although child readers are not fully at the mercy of the narrative and its techniques, 
they can also not be assumed to be as resistant as the idealised expert reader is. Because of 
this, the moral mind-model of Carrie is problematized; it requires a novice reader to have the 
skillset of an expert reader, which they may or may not have. 
 The reader’s mind-model of Carrie becomes particularly important when the narrative 
reveals what “the worst thing” Carrie has ever done, is. At the centre of this act lies a conflict 
between two adults; Carrie’s guardian, the cold and cruel Mr Evans, and Hepzibah, the kind 
and matronly (and implied witchy) caretaker for Mr Evans’ elderly sister. Mr Evans blames 
Hepzibah for manipulating his sister into letting her stay in the house, and after his sister dies 
evicts Hepzibah as well as her mentally disabled friend Johnny. While Mr Evans is cold and 
emotionally abuses his younger sister Lou, who lives with him and the children whom he 
resents, Hepzibah is warm and welcoming to them. Still, Carrie empathises with Mr Evans 
and attempts to understand why he is the way he is, even unknowingly helping him in his plot 
to remove Hepzibah from the house and his life. However, when he evicts Hepzibah and 
Johnny Carrie switches sides and aims to harm Mr Evans. She does this by dropping an old 
skull into a well and, as she believes, placing a curse on the house which now belongs to Mr 
Evans. 
Carrie’s thoughts were like bits of a jigsaw, whirling round in her head. 
Separate pieces but all fitting in, one to another. Albert throwing a stone and it 
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falling. Bombs falling on cities, houses crumbling like sandcastles. Horrible, 
but somehow exciting to think of. Walls crumbling – and the curse the African 
boy had put on Druid’s Bottom if his skull ever left it. It had been taken out 
once and all the plates cracked, and the mirrors. Then they brought it back and 
the house had stood safe ever since, just so Mr Evans could live here and fill it 
with his meanness and greed. But the horse pond was bottomless … 
Carrie lifted her arm and threw the skull as hard as she could. It sailed high, in 
an arc, then plopped into the pond. A few ripples, then nothing … 
She stood, staring out at the pond and the dark Grove rising up the mountain 
behind it. She was shaking all over (184-185). 
In this moral contemplation, Carrie blends three images: the War, the curse story, and the 
house. In so doing, she conflates the violence of the war with a domestic issue and views the 
curse as a supernatural solution to her problem. The form of this contemplation displays 
Carrie’s internal moral debate; as Carrie states her thoughts are a jigsaw, and they are 
represented as such as well. Sentences linking to different events, trailing off into ellipses, and 
an interjected italicised phrase; both visually and in content Carrie’s motivation is displayed. 
Already, however, her action leaves her “shaking all over” – a physical representation of an 
emotion which is left to the reader to uncover, based on their mind-model of her. Carrie’s 
action is significant because of the way it clashes with her character as described so far; she is 
a coward, and prone to follow orders even when she knows they are meaningless or come 
from malicious people. Her shaking will therefore most probably be construed as an 
expression of fear – but also possibly excitement. Carrie’s immediate emotional response is 
left ambiguous, and its meaning depends on the reader’s mind-model of her as a character. 
Therefore, the ethical ramification is equally dependent on that previous characterisation. 
 All of Carrie’s actions depend on her empathy (Sainsbury 2017, 162-163). Because 
Carrie empathises with Mr Evans, she endeavours to overlook his personal flaws, and aims to 
improve his disposition by increasing his happiness. She does this by relaying his sister’s 
dying words, as she had asked Carrie to do. However, Carrie’s friend and brother see this as a 
deep betrayal of both Hepzibah and themselves, as it puts Hepzibah in danger. Carrie had not 
considered that as an option; her focus lay on ensuring Mr Evans that his older sister had 
loved him regardless of their falling out and lack of communication. Her approach to him is 
an intricate blend of virtue ethics and deontology; unlike her younger brother she feels a sense 
of duty regarding Mr Evans, as he is their guardian. She expresses this by following his orders 
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and rules even if she does not agree with them or see their point, and by defending him 
against her little brother, even when she does not like Mr Evans much herself. Yet equally, 
she holds the virtues of loyalty and empathy highly, again expressed through her faithfulness 
to Mr Evans. She does not just sheepishly follow his command; she wants to see the good in 
him, and with every cruel action he commits attempts to find a sympathetic motivation for it. 
She equally, as expressed through her foregrounded emotions of guilt and shame, highly 
values the idea of goodness, and fears wickedness to the point where this fear causes her 
severe emotional turmoil. Her acting against Mr Evans, breaking her deontological sense of 
duty and loyalty to him, demonstrates her virtue ethics; without considering the consequences 
of her actions, she decides that his character flaws are too significant to support anymore as 
she sides with the Good character of Hepzibah. Carrie’s concern with the act is not to bring 
happiness to anyone, rather, it is to remove the house (which she views as a source of 
happiness) from Mr Evans, and through that remove herself from Mr Evans. 
 The novel further complicates the ethics of the act by seemingly making the curse 
come true, as the house burns down as soon as Carrie and her brother leave. Looking out of 
the window on the train, Carrie sees it “blazing away” (199), and assumes that the innocent 
Hepzibah, Johnny, and her friend Albert are caught in the fire and burned to death. 
She said, between sobs that seemed to tear her chest open, something that 
sounded like, ‘All my fault …’ He [her little brother] knew it couldn’t be that 
because it didn’t make sense but there was no point in asking her what she had 
said because she was crying too hard (199). 
The reader’s view on Carrie’s guilt depends on their belief in the curse story, which is never 
fully clarified. Although this is a realist novel, Hepzibah is often described as witchy, 
particularly in her gaze: “Witch’s eyes, the oldest boy thought” (206, emphasis in original). 
The curse is also never authoritatively stated to be untrue; adult, narrator Carrie has not 
resolved this issue for herself, or may be unwilling to take a stance. Its ambiguity is both 
important and irrelevant to the ethics of Carrie’s act. It is crucial because if the curse is not 
true, it is evident that Carrie has nothing to do with the fire and therefore carries no blame. 
The reader may take pity on Carrie for holding herself responsible for an accident. However, 
it is irrelevant because it is the story of her guilt, and her belief that she caused the fire and 
potential death of her loved ones is the emotional crux of the novel. The reader may then, 
based on her deontological behaviour before, morally judge Carrie for her behaviour as a 
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sense of betrayal; her loyalty to Mr Evans caused significant harm to the people who treated 
her the best. 
 The ambiguity of the novel asks the reader to engage morally and cognitively with the 
questions it poses, both implicitly and explicitly. Carrie’s sense of duty harms the people she 
loves best and causes her emotional pain for over thirty years. Particularly in a war and 
evacuation setting, both duty and loyalty are foregrounded; here they clash directly. The war 
thus forces both Carrie and, through the thought experiments the reader, to engage actively 
with issues of morality. Yet the reader’s judgement on deontology as a framework is 
dependent on both their mind-model of Carrie as a young evacuee who has to define her 
identity in a new setting, and to some extent on their understanding of the curse as either real 
or not. Through the gaps in the narrative, and the foreground of the emotional ramifications of 
actions, the reader is pushed to high cognitive engagement, which leads them to further their 
own understanding of the difficult emotion of guilt, as well as the complex nature of ethics in 
practice. Carrie’s War is notable for placing this high a cognitive and moral demand on the 
reader; it demonstrates a trust in the reader’s ability to understand and engage with the 
narrative on a deep level. Children’s war literature does not always place this trust on the 
reader, however. The impact of a more overtly didactic approach on both characterisation and 
ethics I analyse next. 
Listen to Me! 
The two novels I analysed above place a lot of demand and responsibility on the reader to 
engage with the narrative and come to their own understanding of the moral issues at hand; 
both had intricate blends of conflicting moral frameworks, and through either foregrounded 
unreliability or narrative gaps pushed the reader to moral ambiguity. Michael Morpurgo’s 
Friend or Foe (1977) avoids such moral ambiguity, instead displaying an overt didacticism. 
Although all children’s literature is by nature didactic (Nikolajeva 2014a, 179), overt 
didacticism is in modern Anglophone culture “often seen as an artistic flaw” (Nelson 2014, 
15). This does not mean that overt didacticism is not present in modern children’s literature; it 
has simply gone out of style. Friend or Foe, being a slightly older text, still displays an 
unabashed authoritative approach to morality which now would be considered unfashionable. 
However, considering the cognitive status of its implied audience and the ongoing presence of 
overt adult moralising in children’s literature, an analysis of the impact of an overtly didactic 
approach to morality in children’s war literature adds an important piece to the overall image 
of ethics within the genre. 
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 Friend or Foe is narrated in third person, past tense. Immediately this implies the 
authority of an adult, as “the third-person narrator is always an adult” (Nikolajeva 2002, 258). 
Additionally, third person narration provides the opportunity that “the focalised child 
character is not seeing everything there is to see or possibly not understanding events in the 
various ways they might be understood” (Nodelman 2008, 20). An adult narrator for a child’s 
focalised story therefore provides space for overt didacticism; the narrator may interject to 
judge a character or point out particular events the narrative wants to foreground. Carrie’s 
War also had a third person narrator; however, the majority of the narration was done by adult 
Carrie, a character in the novel herself. In Friend or Foe there is an additional distance 
between the reader and the narrator, as a nameless extradiegetic adult narrator holds a façade 
of reliability. The extradiegetic, adult narrator holds the strongest authority (Nikolajeva 
2014a, 80), meaning that there is limited space for moral ambiguity where the child reader can 
discover their own moral understandings. Instead, they are supposed to align with the adult 
narrator’s beliefs. 
 The adult narrator is not the only place where the hidden adult can voice their beliefs 
and opinions; mouthpiece characters serve this function as well. Friend or Foe is focalised 
through its young protagonist, David, whom the readers are supposed to identify as an 
ingroup member and therefore empathise with. David, as a child focaliser, has to personally 
perform the actions which form the moral framework of the narrative and learn its lessons; he 
can therefore not be the mouthpiece himself. Instead, secondary characters (either adult or 
child) “explain, preach, and warn, seldom leaving the readers room for further contemplation” 
(Nikolajeva 2002, 36). In Friend or Foe there are several mouthpiece characters aimed at 
guiding both David and the reader on the “right” moral path; David’s friend Tucky, the 
German soldier they encounter, and Ann Reynolds, the boys’ guardian during their 
evacuation. David himself is strongly deontological in his approach to (war) ethics; his 
categorisation of the Germans and English as enemies creates deep divides between the in- 
and outgroup, to the point where he dehumanises the Germans regularly. The main reason for 
this is that his father died in the war. When Tucky points out that a fighter plane which 
crashed nearby must have men on board, David cruelly states that he hopes they’re dead: 
“‘They must’ve killed hundreds of people in Plymouth tonight. I hope they’re dead. They 
deserve it’” (56). This indicates that he has Othered the Germans so severely that he wishes 
for their death, without considering them as people like Tucky does. His Othering allows him 
to hold a deeply deontological approach; because he does not empathise with the Germans, he 
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does not take their side into consideration in his moral framework. The war which strengthens 
his emotions through both his evacuation and the loss of his father also allows him to frame 
his moral framework and anti-German sentiment as the cause of a deontological sense of 
duty: “they were Germans, enemies; it was a duty to make sure they were captured” (76). The 
consequences do not matter for him. The war enforces his grouping; he hates the Germans 
because of what “they” have done, holding all responsible for the war, which unshakeably 
places them in the outgroup and makes his ingroup morally right. His ingroup is threatened by 
the outgroup because of the war, enhancing his sense of duty. 
 David’s approach to the Germans is challenged when he almost drowns on the moors 
and is saved by a lost German bomber and his injured comrade. These characters are as far 
outgroup from David as possible; not only are they German and therefore, in his eyes, 
despicable, they are the soldiers who the night before bombed Plymouth. They are, therefore, 
directly responsible for violence against David’s ingroup. However, David’s strong 
deontological approach complicates his moral framework at this point; because one of the 
Germans saved him he finds himself indebted to him, creating a sense of conflicting duty and 
loyalty: 
David looked at them both. There was nothing threatening or frightening about 
them, they were just two exhausted, pale-looking men with sad eyes and kind 
faces. They were faces he should hate. Perhaps these were the men who had 
shot down his father over the French coast and cheered as they watched him 
crashing into the beaches. These were the men who had bombed London and 
Plymouth and killed thousands. Yet one of them had saved his life (73). 
This moral re-evaluation of David’s own position regarding these specifics forces him to 
consider them as potentially ingroup. The narrative foregrounds this by forcing David to 
consider the Germans’ humanity through their physicality. However, this excerpt also 
illustrates David’s moral dilemma: although he can consider the Germans as human after all, 
he immediately switches back to his sense of duty to both his country and his father (he 
“should hate” them after all) – only to add the complicating factor of indebtedness to the 
German soldier for saving his life. The soldiers ask David to help them, as they are lost on the 
moors and one is injured. Without help, they will die. The immediacy of their need increases 
the moral demand placed on David; he has to act and decide soon. 
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 In his dilemma on whether or not he should help the soldiers, the soldier who saved 
him acts as a mouthpiece character: 
‘Help you!’ David was almost shouting. He pulled himself to his feet, 
gathering the greatcoat around him. ‘Help you? After what you’ve done? You 
come here bombing and killing and you want us to help!’ 
‘It is a war,’ he replied sadly. ‘In war people die – on both sides’ (74). 
As a German and an adult he is firmly in the outgroup for both the reader and David, 
however, he does carry the authority of the implied adult author. Him being firmly outgroup 
may prohibit the reader from taking on his argument, in which case their ethical 
understanding concern never stretches to include him. The narrative attempts to counteract 
this by continuously providing the same message in different forms. Later, the soldier adds: “I 
am sorry, my friends. Perhaps when you are older you will understand that we all do things 
we know we should not do. But perhaps you have learnt that already” (103, emphasis mine). 
This statement repeats the moral (that both sides in a war are equally implicated and bear a 
similar ethical burden) again and makes his status as an adult explicit. The tone, through this, 
turns overtly didactic. “Perhaps when you are older” you will be wiser than you are now is a 
denigrating approach to didacticism, an assumption that the child is lacking in knowledge and 
understanding, and in need of a (moral) lesson. The adult authority reveals themselves 
overtly. 
 In an attempt to ensure that, although the German soldier is outgroup, the reader 
grasps the moral lesson, there are two other mouthpiece characters who further attempt to 
enhance this image. Tucky, David’s friend, does not have the authority of an adult character. 
He is, however, firmly in the ingroup; he is an English child, and David’s school friend. 
Tucky has an almost Kantian approach to ethics, as he “kept on reminding David that the 
German had saved his life, that you couldn’t turn on someone who had saved your life, no 
matter who he was” (76). Tucky espouses an ethics of duty, a strict following of rules without 
any bending. It is always right to help those who help you; it is always wrong not to. Tucky is 
deontological in his approach just as David is, if not more; whilst David experiences severe 
moral dilemmas, Tucky is always certain of what to do, and his understanding of right and 
wrong is always based on the same prescriptive rules. His deontological approach just so 
happens to cross in- and outgroups; it could just as easily not have. The strictness of Tucky’s 
rules, combined with the soldier’s unwavering emphasis on their cross-binary humanity does 
not allow for any moral ambiguity; David has to cave in, he has to give in to a different form 
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of deontology. The final lesson comes from another adult, Ann, who is in David’s ingroup. As 
his guardian, she is both emotionally close to him and holds moral authority over him. When 
she encounters the German, she only foregrounds their similarity: “Ann came closer to the 
German and looked up into his face. ‘Just people, just ordinary people, like you and me,’ she 
said” (110). The combination of these three different mouthpiece characters closes off any 
moral ambiguity, pushing both David and, with him, the reader to only one possible moral 
framework. 
 Friend or Foe continuously pushes the reader to condemn David’s Othering of the 
Germans yet may end up achieving the opposite. David, the protagonist with whom the reader 
is supposed to empathise, never gets comfortable helping them. His attitude initially is so 
hostile that it is hard to move away from in a believable manner, and he never extends 
empathy to them. The mouthpiece characters may be off-putting to the reader, as they may 
resist the overt didacticism offered by them; particularly as one of the most prominent 
mouthpieces is that firmly Othered German himself. “’Was it wrong?’ Tucky said quietly. 
‘’Tis never wrong to do what you feel is right, Tucky,’ said Mr Reynolds, ruffling his hair” 
(121) – unless what you feel is right does not comply with the narrative’s, in which case you 
need to change it. Without narrative moral gaps, the reader is not as cognitively engaged as 
they could be; taking their hand and pushing them towards a specific morality ensures that 
there is no danger of the reader taking away the “wrong” understanding of the text. Their 
mind-modelling is tightly controlled, the “correct” message conveyed. However, this results 
in an unsophisticated story, which through its lack of cognitive demand on the reader does not 
result in moral engagement. The reader does not have to think, does not have to play with 
thought experiments in which they are pushed to analyse their own morality as they attempt to 
decipher the characters’ (Sainsbury 2017, 157-159). Without such engagement, their 
philosophical development may not flourish, and the story’s ethical potential is drastically 
limited. 
Loud Actions, Loud Words 
Philosophical concepts such as consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics are unlikely to 
be a part of the implied child reader’s understanding; although children are absolutely 
ethically aware people who hold particular and individual moral frameworks, the 
philosophical labels themselves will not be part of their moral considerations. That said, 
analysing the ethics of a narrative in this way provides that one layer deeper in the ethical 
framework as a whole; these three concepts represent the different approaches to ethics we 
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can have, and their conflicts in specific narrative situations reveal what we expect from the 
child character and audience. These approaches are only analysable through a consideration of 
actions; although motivations may play a part, characters have to act in order for us to judge 
them according to normative ethical standards.  
 The importance of actions and reactions is particularly foregrounded in children’s war 
literature, firstly because children’s literature is traditionally action based rather than character 
based. Although in more modern children’s literature there is a shift towards more character-
based literature, especially for older children and teenagers, the focus on actions is still 
prominent in children’s stories. In war literature, these actions are foregrounded even further. 
This is partially because the emotions of war literature are intensified by the extreme situation 
of war, enhancing the emotional element of characterisation. Additionally, the actions 
themselves are foregrounded because their consequences have increased importance. Child 
characters in war stories have more responsibilities weighing on them than characters in more 
prosaic settings, and the choices they make influence other characters’ lives in crucial ways. 
Their actions have direct impacts on the survival of others, which is a situation specific to 
children’s war literature. 
 The analyses in this chapter all demonstrated that the nature of war leads to conflicting 
moral frameworks. The Bombs that Brought Us Together asks the reader to empathise with a 
potential terrorist, who is unreliable in his account of himself as a good person pushed to 
horrible acts. Charlie remains morally ambiguous, even though the reader is supposed to 
consider him ingroup and empathise with him. Similarly, the reader’s ethical mind-model of 
Carrie is abstruse as well; the narrative’s modal approach combined with her moral dilemmas 
do not provide any answers for the reader. Friend or Foe, however, demonstrates that without 
this ambiguity, removed by an obtrusive adult authority, there is less opportunity for cognitive 
engagement. Unwavering grouping and moral directness mean that there is no space for 
philosophical thought experiments – or readerly development. All three protagonists display a 
focus on deontology; they all have a strong sense of duty, and whilst The Bombs that Brought 
Us Together and Carrie’s War push the reader to question their characters’ approach, 
deontology itself as a whole is not condemned. Friend or Foe does not put David’s approach 
up for questioning; instead, it pushes him to change the rules within his approach to other, 
similar ones. War does enhance the sense of duty, to one’s country, and to the ingroup. It is 
therefore not surprising that it is so pervasive in children’s war literature. 
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 The normative ethics underlying the moral framework of children’s war literature 
provides an insight into what is presented as important for the child audience in physically 
and emotionally extreme situations. Evacuee stories add the pressure of re-evaluating 
identities, pushing the characters to reconsider their ethical approaches in light of their new 
situation. These frameworks inform the actions and reactions of characters and combined with 
other characterisation techniques create a full mind-model of who these fictional people are. 
There is, however, one more moral layer foregrounded in children’s war literature. How are 
we to view the violence? How can we excuse it, or make sense of it? And what should be 
done afterwards? There is also more to stories than narrators, focalisers and characters; the 
deeper layer fundamental to our understanding of ourselves, our extra-textual lives, and 




















So far, I have built up to this final part of my thesis by demonstrating how ethics is dependent 
on empathy, and how children’s war literature complicates the nature of both in distinct ways. 
Justice as a concept is, like empathy and ethics, not exclusive to children’s war literature; 
issues of fairness are not the remit of violence alone, nor of children’s literature. However, in 
the case of war the figure of the child, both as a character and as the reader, foregrounds the 
problem of justice. Children, as demonstrated above in Part II, are morally complex. From a 
very young age on, they are morally engaged and exact moral judgements on others and 
themselves (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 243). However, cognitively and empathically they 
are still developing – and these are factors which play crucial roles both in an individual’s 
understanding of what justice is or should be, as well as in their own judgements of others and 
the situations they are part of. As I explained in my introduction, ethics and justice as closely 
connected. Whereas I had to make a case for the link between ethics and empathy, and there 
are scholars who disagree with this take on ethics (Wood 2003, Prinz 2011), I do not have to 
make the same case for justice. Instead, the issue becomes almost semantic in nature. The 
everyday verbiage for both ethics and justice is interchangeable: right and wrong, fair and 
unfair can be used to denote either. Yet, philosophically there is a distinct difference. Whereas 
ethics is concerned with living well, justice denotes an issue of distribution of goods or 
services (Hoffman 2002, 222-224). In this, justice is more specific in its focus than ethics is. 
 The difference between ethics and justice is not just philosophical, however; it is 
narratological as well. Ethics and justice, like empathy, live in many narrative elements, 
seeing a narrative function as a sum of its parts, all influencing each other. However, the most 
important narrative elements for the construction of ethics lie in characterisation; the type of 
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people the reader is supposed to side with and against, their motivations, and their actions. 
There is no ethics without thought and/or action, without character. Justice is not only more 
specific than ethics – it is also more abstract. In a narrative, justice cannot be said to lie with 
any particular narrative element. Character actions are a part of it; however, the structure of 
the narrative is even more important. The events which are depicted and the way through 
which that is done all add to the overall build of justice in a narrative. The construction and 
impact of justice is therefore fundamental to all of a narrative’s elements. Therefore, justice is 
best analysed through the element which underlies it all: scripts. 
It’s All in Your Head 
Script theory is one of the core ideas underlining cognitive poetics. Script theory accounts for 
the mental abstractions of our social experience (Mar, Oatley 2008, 176). These abstractions 
account for our structures of understanding of all concepts and extra-textual life (Stephens 
2011, 13). Scripts therefore explain the way that we understand both the world around us as 
well as fiction. There are two main concepts at play in script theory: scripts, and schemas. 
They serve the same function, namely providing shortcuts for our brains in order to make 
sense of what occurs around us, whilst differing in one basic way: a schema is static, whereas 
a script is dynamic (14). An example of a schema in children’s war literature would be, for 
instance, a soldier. Depending on our socio-cultural background, we have a particular image 
which is conjured up when we think of the concept “soldier”; in most Western cultures this 
image would be relatively young, male, white, able-bodied and heterosexual. An image of a 
child soldier, or a geriatric or feminine soldier, then clashes with the schema of a soldier 
which we hold. This clash foregrounds the child soldier; they are remarkable because they are 
unexpected, they are unexpected because of our schema. An example of a script could be a 
bombardment. Especially informed by WWI stories, a bombardment script would follow the 
steps of sirens, followed by gathering of emergency supplies and documentation, hiding in a 
(Anderson) shelter, a period of loud sounds and trembling ending in significant damage to 
property and potential death. The first experience of a bombardment requires significant 
cognitive expense in the form of planning and careful (or in this case, fearful) execution; 
increased experiences of bombardments turns the plan into a script. Through this, although the 
fear may be maintained, the experience becomes less cognitively fatiguing; you know what to 
do and what to expect. The bombardment script is an example of what Stockwell calls a 
situational script (2002, 77). There are two other types of scripts: personal, and instrumental 
(ibid). Personal scripts inform how we are expected to behave within particular social norms 
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A children’s war literature personal script could be how to act as a soldier, or as a child. 
Instrumental scripts refer, as the name implies, to literally how we should do things. Within 
this genre the reader can expect instrumental scripts referring to how to fire a gun, or how to 
heal a wounded soldier. 
Fiction is script-based. Because of this, according to Marek Oziewicz, fictional stories 
are information clusters which allow for human understanding of both tasks and the world 
(2015, 53). Scripts in fiction “express how a sequence of events or actions is expected to 
unfold” (Stephens 2011, 14). Fiction reading in itself becomes script based, as previous 
reading experiences create readers’ expectations of both plot and character development 
(Stephens 2011, 15). This is because scripts inform and are based on memory. Therefore, 
“readers’ accumulated memories have a substantial impact on their narrative experiences” 
(Gerrig, Mumper 2017, 239). These memories can be from both extra-textual life and fiction 
(240). Ellen Spolsky argues that when “faced with unfamiliar sense images, readers will 
normally fill in gaps by analogies and inferences that make use of their individual store of 
memories” (Spolsky 2015, 32), which are “not recovered or recalled but reconstructed” (49). 
This means that when readers encounter unfamiliar schemas or scripts, they understand them 
based on their own constructed memories. That memories are constructed implies an 
artificiality behind them; memories are built on our scripts and schemas, which are in turn 
shaped by our memories. This system may explain the cultural dependency of scripts and 
schemas; without memories of difference, this difference does not inform scripts, which in 
turn inform memories. To clarify: the schema of a soldier as a youngish, adult, heterosexual, 
able-bodied white man can only change if there is enough exposure to different types of 
soldiers. The memory basis of scripts can be significantly harmful; cultural understandings 
(based on memories, and therefore scripts) of land wars led to the deployment of cavalry in 
WWI, even though trench warfare and modern weaponry made cavalry dangerously outdated, 
leading to infamously significant casualties of both soldiers and horses. 
 Scripts form noticeably early on in child development. Emotion scripts, which inform 
which emotions particular situations call for, are demonstrated by 18-month-old children; an 
18-month-old understands that when someone breaks a toy, the expected emotion is sadness 
rather than happiness (Chiarella, Poulin-Dubois 2015). Harking back to the different types of 
scripts (situational, personal, and instructional), the scripts children develop early on inform 
not only how to perform certain actions or what to expect in particular situations; they 
concern in- and outgrouping as well. By the age of nine months, it is already easier for babies 
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to recognise faces of people when they are the same race as their parents (Kelly et al., 2007). 
Racial grouping, and the scripts which come with that, starts early. Childhood reading then 
can either preserve, reinforce, disrupt, refresh, or add to these scripts (Stockwell 2002, 79) 
which children are already in the process of forming. Fiction can therefore either alter or 
entrench pre-existent patterns (Dunn 2015, 1), which for childhood development is 
particularly important, as it could potentially free young readers from limiting ways to view 
the world. John Stephens is an optimist in this regard, claiming that children’s literature 
generally is disruptive of oppressive scripts and schemas, in order to “intervene in culture to 
affirm multicultural models of human rights and human equality” (2011, 13). Savoie 
disagrees, arguing instead that although children’s literature can perform this function, it 
reflects general literature in that “is, in general, script preserving” (2019, 149). I agree with 
Savoie; although there is the possibility of script disruption promoting cross binary empathy 
and moral behaviour, most children’s literature remains conservative in that regard. 
 Children’s war literature further complicates this issue. The implied reader of the 
genre will not have first-hand experience with war or its schemas, meaning that most of their 
cognitive structures underlining their understanding of the situation are developed through 
engagement with war representations, such as media, education or fiction. Disruptive and 
progressive scripts can promote broad worldviews and cross-binary empathy in general 
children’s literature, and are cognitively the most stimulating (Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 7-
8). As a result, the reader’s empathy skills are enhanced. However, the ability to do so in 
children’s war literature is limited. Because the script of war demands strong us versus them 
grouping, it will always be there in fiction, and therefore in the reader’s war scripts. If the 
reader’s war scripts are mostly based on war fiction, the way through which these narratives 
build up empathy and ethical behaviour are particularly important, as scripts inform our 
understanding both in the text and extra-textually. Fiction of course does not exist in a 
vacuum, and over the course of an individual’s life they will be exposed to war narratives in 
different forms as well (for instance through the news and schooling). However, my focus 
here lies on the formative nature of children’s war fiction specifically, and the crucial part it 
plays in the construction of children’s war scripts. 
Constructing Justice 
An important part of this formation is in the form of justice scripts. A key argument as to why 
justice functions through scripts is that scripts frame our understanding and expectations of 
situations and concepts based on causally linked sequences (Oziewicz 2015, 4), as in, 
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narratives. Justice is most overtly causally linked; because Billy stole the apples he deserves 
to be punished, and because Katie aided the resistance she deserves to be rewarded. These 
base examples also already demonstrate the ambiguity of justice, and its need for an explicit 
and complete image of the situation: did Billy steal the apples out of spite, or to give to a 
starving horse? What are the ethics of Katie’s resistance, who are they resisting, and how did 
she aid them? As I said above, concerns of justice are not limited to children’s war literature, 
as issues of fairness and due-ness are reflected in many children’s texts. Children’s literature 
has “been an important carrier of justice scripts” (4), and all forms of it add to our 
construction of justice as a concept. However, the special situation of war foregrounds justice 
concerns. Its overt causality, enhanced emotions and ethical concerns, and inherent violence 
lead to heightened demands for retribution and/or resolve. Justice scripts become part of 
cognitive development from an early age and are immediately connected to issues of 
empathy. Children are able to recognise fairness and unfairness by the age of fifteen months, 
but are not as likely to recognise unfairness when the individual on the receiving end of it is 
of a different race than the child themselves are (Burns and Sommerville, 2014). In- and 
outgrouping is thus central to the construction of justice scripts. This is another way through 
which justice is foregrounded in children’s war literature particularly. 
In my approach to justice scripts I am overtly indebted to Marek Oziewicz’s Justice in 
Young Adult Speculative Fiction (2015), the first work to analyse justice as a script. In it, he 
posited that “human understanding of justice is script-based” (6). As such, justice is moulded 
through exemplary or stereotypical narratives which include the full interiority of the actors 
involved (ibid). Justice scripts are thus culturally informed, and temporo-culturally sensitive. 
In his approach, Oziewicz asks himself the question why literary understanding can be 
applied to scripts. 
The answer is that just as scripts are not consciously created by authors, so too 
they are not consciously registered by readers. At the same time, both authors 
and readers draw on scripts in structuring and deciphering causal and 
motivational links in stories. This automatic processing of strings of events into 
patterned narratives, whose elements resonate—through contrast or analogy—
with the already stored patterns and categories in the author’s and reader’s 




I am torn about this excerpt. On the one hand Oziewicz is right in stating that scripts live in 
both the author and the reader in a subconscious fashion; once acquired, they are simply ways 
for us to make sense of the world around us and the stories we tell ourselves. However, I 
disagree quite strongly with Oziewicz’s claim that scripts are not consciously constructed. As 
demonstrated by Stephens (2011) and Savoie (2019), children’s literature can choose to be 
subversive of expectations. Expectations are expressions of internalised scripts. In order for a 
narrative to be able to surprise the reader, it must deviate from those scripts. Although it is 
true that deviation can be based on cultural changes, which are often temporal in nature, 
fiction can also aim to break with cultural expectations. Whether or not this is successful is a 
different story; the point I am making here is that the desire for subversive children’s 
literature requires a conscious breaking with and substitution of old scripts. 
 Although I am highly indebted to Oziewicz’s work on justice scripts, my approach is 
significantly different. Firstly, his focus lay on speculative fiction, whereas I include realist as 
well. Secondly, Oziewicz dedicates most of his work to the identification of six types of 
narrative scripts: poetic (2015, 87-88), retributive (114-115), restorative (142), environmental 
(169), social (198), and global (226). The purpose of this work is to both demonstrate that 
justice functions as a script, and to provide a taxonomy for different justice scripts. Although 
a useful exercise and an important contribution to both cognitive and children’s literature 
scholarship, the taxonomy itself is of no use to my project. Applying his concepts, based on a 
corpus significantly different from mine, would limit my approach. Instead of analysing 
justice scripts based on empathy and ethics, underlining all other narrative strategies, I would 
attempt to identify which strands of justice a particular narrative fits into. Therefore, although 
I am informed by Oziewicz’s work, I do not base my own analysis on his methodology. 
Instead, I analyse how justice scripts function in children’s war literature specifically. I do this 
based on my analyses of empathy and ethics in children’s war literature, in order to discover 
how the war situation foregrounds particular emotions, ethical concerns, and empathic 
groupings.  
Unlike the previous chapters, I will analyse only one novel. I do this because again, I 
am not looking to identify different types of justice scripts; I am only interested in analysing 
how justice functions as a script in children’s war literature. To discover this, I turn to The 
Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (Lewis 1950). This novel has been analysed before using a 
variety of lenses; it was even part of Oziewicz’s analysis of Lewis’ restorative justice 
tendencies (2015, 142-149). Interestingly however, the crucial element of war and its 
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influence on the empathy and ethics which underlie the justice scripts in The Lion, the Witch 
and the Wardrobe are never addressed. Instead, the focus lies on Lewis’ Christianity. By 
adding my analysis to the pre-existing wealth of scholarly discourse, I am able to deepen the 
understanding of the cognitive impact and structure of this text. Another thing of note is that, 
although I claimed in my introduction that I consider realist and speculative fiction as equal in 
my approach, this is my first fantasy analysis. There is no particular reason behind this; I 
selected novels based on appropriateness of analysis regarding specific narrative elements, 
and through that selection only approached fantasy at the final stage. Although fantasy 
significantly changes a narrative, the in- and outgrouping which is central to my approach, on 
which I have constructed my argument, functions in the same way. Through this analysis I 
demonstrate the significance of grouping even for justice, regardless of subgenre. 
It’s Simply a Matter of Good Versus Evil 
The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (1950) is generally seen as plot-driven rather than 
character-based, with a clear division between good and evil (Nikolajeva 2014a, 127). The 
apparent lack of interiority and the overt and seemingly inflexible in- and outgrouping makes 
that the novel appears “simple”. However, as argued by Nikolajeva, it is still cognitively 
demanding and complex (ibid). The same counts for its approach to war. The war in the novel 
can be described as “the war between good and evil in its purest form” (Rahn 2014, 169). The 
positioning of the Christlike figure of Aslan on one side, and the White Witch on the other 
appear to clearly delimitate which side should be preferred by the reader. The divide between 
the two sides is augmented by their allies; the most important allies Aslan has are the 
Pevensie children, the focaliser-protagonists. As the reader is supposed to empathise and side 
with the protagonist, and particularly the focaliser, placing all of them on one of two sides 
also sides the reader. Additionally, the Witch’s allies “include only creatures inherently evil 
by nature” (Rahn 2014, 169). The Other is therefore seemingly made as repulsive as possible, 
and the in- and outgrouping is clear. Additionally, any action against the Other is justified 
because it is never wrong to act against evil. This seemingly simplistic approach to war and 
in- and outgrouping, as well as the lack of interiority indicate that the implied reader is likely 
around ten years old. 
 Before turning to the script underlining the construction of justice in the story, I must 
first consider the schemas which play a part in it. On the side of evil, there is the White Witch. 
Within the war setting, she combines two schemas: the witch, and the Other invader. The evil 
nature of the White Witch is partially conjured up by the schema connected to the word 
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“witch”, which is generally associated with evil (Nikolajeva 2014a, 130). Already through the 
name “the White Witch” (for although her real name does feature in other Narnia novels, it 
does not in this one) the schema of “witch” is strongly attached to her persona. It is 
emphasised by her engagement with both seductive and destructive magic throughout the 
novel, as well as general cruelty. When the White Witch is first spoken of by Tumnus, he 
states that if he does not help the Witch, she will exact extreme violence against him: 
And she’ll have my tail cut off, and my horns sawn off, and my beard plucked 
out, and she’ll wave her wand over my beautiful cloven hoofs and turn them 
into horrid solid hoofs like a wretched horse’s. And if she is extra and specially 
angry she’ll turn me into stone and I shall be only a statue of a Faun in her 
horrible house (1950/2011, 118). 
The excessiveness of this punishment, combined with its graphic physical violence as well as 
the foregrounding of negative uses of magic affirm the evil element of her witch-ness. Her 
witch-ness enhances her Otherness as well, particularly as the protagonists are normal 
children entering her world. Although the children are technically Other in Narnia, the story is 
focalised through them, making the Witch the Other for both the protagonists and through 
them, the reader. In their eyes, the Witch is an evil invader. Her presence, as explained by the 
Beavers, is both not requested and not welcome; the Witch claims to be human in order to 
crown herself Queen, which she is not. Because of which “she’s bad all through” (147), 
according to the Beavers. Is she bad all through because she is not human at all, or because 
she claimed the throne on false pretences? Both are possible to the point of irrelevance; the 
Witch is evil and is stated to be so by all Narnians. The evil element of the witch schema is 
foregrounded by her seduction and enchantment of Edmund, the traitorous Pevensie brother. 
Her beauty and seductive nature come from a particular schema of witch-ness which may 
contrast with other, more Baba Yaga informed images, but falls in line with the beautiful 
witch of the Grimm brothers’ evil (step)mother. On the whole however, the Witch portrays a 
recognisable witch schema. 
 The side of good has both the children and Aslan. Of the children, the two most 
prominent are Lucy the innocent and Edmund the traitor. They fit into relatively simple 
schemas of “innocent little girl” and “recalcitrant middle son”. However, because they are, 
much like the implied child reader, normal children, the reader is unlikely to actively engage 
with the child schemas. Instead, their relative lack of development (although Edmund is the 
only of the Pevensie children to develop in any sense) may reaffirm any pre-existing schemas 
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of normal children (including gender roles), as they do not cause cognitive engagement 
questioning their status as children. Aslan the Christ figure is introduced by the Beavers as 
“the King” (146), “the Lord of the whole [of Narnia]” (ibid). Before it is revealed that he is a 
lion, he is appointed the king schema, particularly in fantasy settings, which adds an Arthurian 
element to his schema. This is enhanced by the prophecy that, like Arthur, Aslan will return 
when his people need him most: 
  Wrong will be right, when Aslan comes in sight, 
  At the sound of his roar, sorrows will be no more, 
  When he bares his teeth, winter meets its death, 
  And when he shakes his mane, we shall have spring again (146). 
Aslan’s goodness is, through his Arthurian schema, linked to a magical goodness. This is only 
reaffirmed later in the novel when the children encounter him in his sublime awesomeness, as 
he sacrifices himself for both Edmund’s sins and the freedom of Narnia. The Christlike and 
Arthurian elements of his schema, although obvious to an expert reader, may not be explicit 
knowledge for a young reader. However, based on readerly expectations linked to the fantasy 
genre, the reader is likely to either already have a king schema in this sense, or will have it 
established through the mysticism and awe in the way Aslan is described by the Narnians. 
Through focalisation and grouping, the reader is sided with the Narnians. Because 
none of the Narnians welcome the Witch, and the children immediately side with the 
Narnians, the Witch and her side of the conflict are portrayed as the evil Other. The only child 
who questions this grouping is Edmund; however, his questioning is clearly presented as a 
bad thing, as his siding with the Witch is based mostly on his overtly selfish desire for more 
Turkish delight and the promise to be made a prince. Yet, although he does side with the 
Witch Edmund remains in the ingroup, as his brother states: “[h]e is our brother after all, even 
if he is rather a little beast. And he’s only a kid” (149). As both a child and a close relative of 
the other children, Edmund can never be closed off from empathy. All of the Narnians are 
equally unwaveringly on the “right” side; as explained by Lucy, all Narnians “hate” the Witch 
(136). Because the in- and outgrouping is unshakeable even in the case of the traitorous 
Edmund (as he never adopts the Witch’s beliefs), the moral framework is equally 
unambiguous. 
The war script is set up as soon as all children first go into Narnia together. Before 
then, Lucy is provided with the Narnians’ perspective of victimhood, and the Witch’s 
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terrifying threats and seductive promises of Turkish delight. Only from the Beavers are the 
children provided with the story of the Witch’s false claim to the throne, and the promise of 
Aslan’s heroic saving of Narnia. The Beavers also reveal that Witch’s claim is based on the 
prophecy which implies the children’s (divine) right to rule, further cementing the rightfulness 
of their cause. The set up for the war is therefore clear; the evil Witch is a wrongful and cruel 
invader who both corrupted the heroes’ brother and the innocent country of Narnia, and both 
the children and Aslan are required to remove her perverting force in order to re-establish 
peace. 
One of the main issues at the heart of justice depicted in this novel is forgiveness 
(Oziewicz 2015, 148). First, Edmund must be forgiven for his treachery. He is returned to the 
other children and Aslan, who has to sacrifice his life so that Edmund may live. The 
forgiveness Edmund receives is not examined deeply. Aslan, whose mind is completely 
closed to the reader, simply states that “there is no need to talk to him about what is past” 
(174) and does not bring it up again. When Edmund meets with his siblings, he shakes their 
hands and apologies to each in turn, after which “everyone wanted very hard to say something 
which would make it quite clear that they were all friends with him again” (ibid). This appears 
superficial, and potentially disingenuous, as the reader is not privy to anybody’s emotions or 
reflections on Edmund’s treachery. The image of a boy shaking the hands of everyone he’s 
wronged and apologising, and them saying “[t]hat’s all right” (ibid) is reminiscent of 
schoolchildren forced to apologise when they are not sorry at all. Yet, because Edmund had 
started developing empathy which overpowered his desire to overlook the Witch’s evil nature, 
and his siblings always wanted to return him to them, there is no reason to doubt their 
forgiveness. However, the score is settled in this regard, and Edmund is accepted back into 
the fold without any questions. The moral punishment Edmund receives instead comes in the 
form of blood distribution; according to the old laws of the land the Witch owns all traitors 
who come to her freely and is owed a kill if they defect. Justice, therefore, is to honour these 
laws by providing her a kill – Aslan. The justness of this distribution of blood is never 
questioned by anyone except for Lucy, who is rebuked by Aslan “with something like a frown 
on his face. And nobody ever made that suggestion to him again” (176). The unavoidability of 
justice, particularly from the perspective of the ingroup, is complete; although it may be 
deeply unpleasant, justice must be honoured. 
The other main issue is that of retribution; the Witch’s corrupting force in Narnia is a 
wrong that must be righted. First, her influence over the land is reversed, as Winter makes 
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way for spring. After which, all of the Narnians she had turned to stone are returned to their 
living forms. However, the ultimate affront to Narnia is the Witch’s presence; as all of the 
Narnians are on Aslan’s side, and all on the Witch’s side are pure evil, they must be removed 
from Narnia as well. Therefore, the novel calls for a retributive war against the enemy Other. 
The Witch is not offered forgiveness herself; instead, during the final battle of the novel, 
Aslan kills the Witch, and “[m]ost of the enemy had been killed in the first charge of Aslan 
and his companions; and when those who were still living saw that the Witch as dead they 
either gave themselves up or took flight” (192). Because this killing is framed as Good, 
embodied by Aslan, versus Evil, embodied by the Witch, Aslan is able to act without any 
moral retribution. The Witch is purely evil and responsible for Narnia’s suffering, because of 
which Aslan’s kill is justified and he remains untarnished. The battle itself is described as 
horrible, full of bloodshed and death. Edmund himself is on the brink of death; a moment of 
redemption where he demonstrates his true loyalty to his siblings. The terror of the battle is, 
however, shown as a necessary evil both to restore peace to Narnia and to the siblings. All 
mature through their experience, and through the battle, Edmund “had become his real old 
self again” (193). Thus, although war is terrible, it is also a positive force which is required at 
times. 
The defeat of the Witch is not the end of the retribution; after the war is won and the 
siblings are installed as the rightful kings and queens of Narnia, Aslan leaves and Narnia is 
mostly peaceful. Yet still, “much of their time was spent in seeking out the remnants of the 
White Witch’s army and destroying them […]. But in the end all of that foul brood was 
stamped out” (194). The forgiveness shown to Edmund is therefore only applicable to the 
ingroup: once an enemy, always an enemy, and enemies are deserving only of death. 
Oziewicz writes that mythopoeic fantasy such as The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe relies 
on retribution and poetic justice, but that Lewis was uncomfortable with the emphasis on 
retribution because of their religion, leading to a toning down through “forgiveness and 
reconciliation” (2015, 127-128). Yet in this novel the only forgiveness and reconciliation are 
shown to Edmund and Tumnus, both characters who sacrifice themselves for redemption. The 
focus remains on retribution as demonstrated by the stamping out of the enemy Other long 
after the battles have ceased. This is only possible because the Other is never allowed to be 
anything but Other; they are demonised “foul brood” and “evil things” (194), and never 
allowed to plead their case. Because the us versus them barriers are never crossed, and the 
reader is never allowed access to the Witch’s troops’ minds or emotions, there is no reason to 
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question the need and justness of eradicating them. The treatment of the Other in The Lion, 
the Witch and the Wardrobe is a cleansing, which is framed as just because they supported a 
Lady with a false claim to the divine right to rule. 
The justice script here is therefore formed through a combination of factors. Firstly, 
there is the in- and outgrouping. As I explained throughout the analysis, this grouping is 
essential for the way through which the Other’s side is shown as being either morally right or 
wrong; because the binary cannot be transgressed (although Edmund flirts with the idea, he 
never fully crosses over) there is no space for moral ambiguity either, as you are either fully 
on Our side or fully on Theirs. Secondly, the focalisation reaffirms the effect of this grouping; 
because the Other remains opaque, the motivations behind their actions entirely unclear. 
Although some of the Witch’s thoughts and emotions are revealed in order to make her evil 
nature and intent unambiguously clear, her army does not enjoy this same treatment, 
particularly after the final battle is won. If the novel had allowed insight into the emotions of 
the “foul brood” they may have ended up humanised, and their cleansing made unethical. As 
it stands, they remain monsters who deserve only death. Thirdly, there is the temporal order of 
right and wrongful actions, the actual overarching justice script. First, before the children 
enter Narnia, the Witch invaded Narnia with a wrongful claim to the throne. She exacted cruel 
punishment to both the landscape and its inhabitants. After entering Narnia, Edmund is 
seduced by the Witch into betraying his siblings and Lucy sides with the Narnians. The 
Beavers reveal the depth of the Witch’s cruelty, then discover Edmund’s betrayal and set out 
to rescue him from the Witch, aided by Aslan. Aslan sacrifices himself for Edmund, who is 
forgiven and accepted back into the fold. Aslan returns, and all together the ingroup defeats 
the outgroup, killing all and returning peace and stability to the land through the divine right 
to rule. The concept of justice in this narrative thus underlines the whole story, and every 
action, motivation and narrative strategy builds up to the overall image of what is right and 
what is wrong, as well as what action is called for to return balance to the land.  
How Could We Do War Justice? 
Before Oziewicz’s work on speculative YA, nobody had looked at justice as a script. 
However, to my knowledge nobody has analysed justice scripts in children’s literature yet. 
Additionally, I see no need for a separation between realist and speculative fiction in this 
regard. The bases of justice, namely ethics and empathy, function the same way in both realist 
and speculative fiction. Script theory underlies both the way we perceive ourselves and the 
world, and the way we read fiction. Similarly, in my approach to justice the basis lies in the 
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genre over-arching in- and outgrouping. Without desiring to add to Oziewicz’s taxonomy or 
design a new one, my aim in this chapter was threefold: firstly, to demonstrate how justice 
builds on the previously established concepts of empathy and ethics as well as their respective 
narrative techniques; secondly, to provide an overview of script theory and how the concept 
of justice can be analysed as a script; and thirdly, to show how this functions through a textual 
analysis. 
I have found that the war script begins functioning as soon as an Other is presented as 
dangerous to the political status quo. Grouping is, therefore, crucial to war scripts. As 
demonstrated in this analysis, focalisation is key in this initial establishment of who is Good 
and who is Evil; the children are Other to Narnia, but are in the reader’s ingroup, the 
focalisers and the protagonists, so the reader is supposed to side with them. The Witch, 
however, is an evil Other. It is with her introduction, therefore, that the war script begins. The 
grouping both influences and is influenced by the schemas which inform the justice script; the 
Witch is already marked as dangerously Other because of her witch-ness, and the children 
(and  anyone they consider ingroup/allies) are marked as ingroup because of their regular 
child-ness. These schemas are not challenged, as the characters remain firmly within their 
moral bounds. Further enemies and allies are clearly delimitated; with the exception of 
Edmund, after Tumnus’ confession there is no ambiguity about who is on whose side. The 
enemies are firmly evil; the heroes are unwaveringly good. The division between these groups 
is unsurmountable; even though Edmund flirts with evil, he remains firmly ingroup.  
 The morality of the war on the whole is therefore presented in a clear cut fashion; the 
Witch and her allies are evil, and the violence they enact on Narnia is as well and must be 
stopped. Aslan and the inhabitants of Narnia through opposition are morally right, the 
innocent victims of the Witch’s violence. It does not matter that these children, as well as 
Aslan himself, kill for the cause of good, as it is always good to fight evil. The script of the 
war itself is clear: a violently successful invasion by the enemy, the heroes arrive, rebellion, 
ending in a victory leading to expulsion of the enemy. The reason why it is so clear is because 
of in- and outgrouping leading to explicit moral frameworks, which can only result in a 
straightforward type of justice. The concept of justice built up through this script is both 
retributive and selective; the Witch caused harm to Narnia and its inhabitants, so she and all 
who associate with her must be rooted and destroyed. No second chances are given to anyone 
who was not already in the ingroup. This enhances the pre-existing cognitive processing due 
to which people judge moral issues differently based on group identification; although fiction 
155 
 
has the potential to overcome these binary modes of thinking, it can also entrench them. The 
justice scripts of this novel belong in the latter category. As scripts are shortcuts for the way 
we view the world, and can be learned and updated through reading, the war in The Lion, the 
Witch and the Wardrobe can therefore establish the reader’s understanding of war as well as 
justice. This includes issues of invasion, rebellion and what counts as right and wrong. The 
depiction of the Other as unwaveringly evil, although an oversimplification of extra-textual 











Up until this point, I have established an approach for empathy, ethics, as well as justice 
through cognitive narratology. So why is there another chapter? Surely the previous chapter 
covered justice through scripts? It did. However, there was one glaring component missing, 
which I see as the top of the empathy-ethics-justice pyramid, particularly with regards to war 
literature: just war theory. Just war theory is a modern approach to an ancient debate, dating 
back to Plato (Quabeck 2013, 12). It stems from a desire to “distinguish between the morally 
acceptable and the morally unacceptable in wars and ways of fighting” (Lee 2012, 2). It is 
thus based on complex ethical issues, however, it is a concern of justice because of its 
specificity and focus on distribution. Like in the chapter above, there are foregrounded 
concerns of punishment and the distribution of goods and services. There is also, however, the 
“distribution” of violence. What kind, how much, against whom and why are justifiable, for 
all issues of distribution, are at the core of just war theory.  
One of the key figures of modern just war theory is Michael Walzer, who started the 
modern movement with his fundamental book Just and Unjust Wars (1977). In it, he claims 
that there is a need for a specific just war theory because history shows that the law does not 
apply during war, as war is a state of moral anarchy (1977/2015, 3). He observes that regular 
justice, represented by the law, leaves a vacuum; although there is a “state of moral anarchy”, 
there is still a desire for moral judgement. Acknowledging this, he states that: 
War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for 
fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind of 
judgement is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or 




Thus, Walzer provides the two foundational elements of just war theory; the analysis of jus ad 
bellum, and jus in bello. Jus post bellum was coined by Michael J. Schuck in 1994 to account 
for a country’s conduct once the war stops (982-983). The further addition of Cook’s notion 
of jus ante bellum (2013, 152) rounds off the current linear view of just war, including 
preparation, reasons for attack, conduct during the war, and conduct after it. 
Like any of the other concepts I discussed so far, just war theory is hotly debated, not 
a single agreed upon theory, and full of contradictions (Fotion 2014, 86-87). O’Driscoll takes 
particular issue with the clear temporalities implied by just war scholars, as they talk about 
before, during, and after, when war is often messy and its ending may be entirely unclear 
(2019, 907). Victory is a fundamental issue of just war theory, as stated by Walzer: “A just 
war is one that is morally urgent to win, and a soldier who dies in a just war does not die in 
vain” (1977/2015, 110). However, already in this initial definition the notion of “winning” 
causes problems: “But if it is sometimes urgent to win, it is not always clear what winning is” 
(ibid). Regarding victory Mona Fixdal only stated that wars should end in a form of peace 
which is more stable and just than the peace which existed before the war (2012, 1). Taking 
issue with the idea of neat endings, O’Driscoll continues to argue that although just war 
theorists take the condition of victory for granted, wars are unlikely to “conclude with a clear 
winner and loser, but can instead be expected to drag on in a ragged fashion to the point 
where it is difficult to discern not just who won, but whether the war is even over” (2019, 
901). An example of this is Berwick-upon-Tweed, which was excluded from the 1856 peace 
treaty following the Crimean War, a situation which was only rectified in 1960. Except, there 
was never any certainty regarding the validity of this story. More violent examples can be 
drawn from the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where there appear to be no 
winners and equally no ending.  
The main complicating issue at the core of just war theory, however, is the problem of 
responsibility/accountability. It is crucial to know who is held accountable before we can 
form a moral judgement. Considering jus ad bellum governs a seemingly purely political 
event, only political leaders (or whoever is in charge) are responsible in that element of just 
war theory (Parsons 2017, 752). It is their decision to wage war, and even though political 
leaders act within a wider socio-cultural context (blame may be assigned to the media, for 
example), as leaders the responsibility for strategy and policy is theirs. During the war, 
however, both political leaders and soldiers are held accountable (ibid). Again, political 
leaders are in charge of the policies and strategies which govern the soldiers’ movements in 
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its most basic terms, which would leave the soldiers as blameless puppets. However, the 
soldiers themselves are now directly involved in combat, and their actions become morally 
judgeable. There is as of yet no agreed upon measure for much responsibility the soldiers 
carry for the wars they fight in or their conduct within it (ibid), although it is certainly a topic 
of difficult moral debate. To draw another couple of examples from extra-textual life, 
although the Dutch government has been found to be partially responsible for the genocide in 
Srebrenica during the Bosnian war, none of the soldiers themselves have been charged with 
anything. Several of the soldiers involved with the torture practices at Abu Ghraib, on the 
other hand, were held individually accountable. Difficult scenarios such as these are why 
James Dubik explained just war theory to be a theory of applied, practical morality for the 
single most complex human activities (2016, 5). 
Jus Reading 
Justice can be argued to be the objective of war, the effort to achieve a perceived just 
outcome. However, as an endeavour necessarily involving conflict, violence, and side-taking, 
war transgresses due-ness and fairness. Therefore, any text dealing with this topic must 
negotiate its stance on what counts as justice. However, as demonstrated above, the issue of 
just wars is infinitely complex and not possible to grasp with one single approach. Therefore, 
the narrative’s approach to justice is dependent on and formed by the ethical stance taken by 
the narrative on the whole; the moral frameworks within which each character operates, and 
the judgement placed on them because of it. Therefore, justice is also delimited by empathic 
engagement: who is the reader supposed to empathise with, why, and how does this frame 
rightness and fairness in the text? Through engagement with the text, the reader is also 
engaged with the concept of justice. The narrative’s construction of justice then, through and 
because of the reader’s engagement with the text, could potentially influence the reader’s 
understanding of what justice is, particularly with young readers. 
 Just war theory is a moral analysis of specific wars rather than a theory on war in 
general, which makes literature particularly useful for just war scholars. This is because each 
war story provides a structured presentation of a war which can be revisited time and time 
again. The clear temporal structure of most children’s novels especially allows for an equally 
clear structure of jus ante bellum, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum; the structure 
of the novel follows the structure of the war and its justice issues. Children’s fiction can thus 
portray the clearest image of just war issues. Additionally, unlike extra-textual wars, wars in 
fiction are not subject to conflicting reporting; although fiction can never be objective, the war 
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presented in a particular narrative is always presented in the same way. The readings of war 
narratives allow both scholars and lay readers to engage with different wars framed with 
different moral frameworks and judgements, which challenging cognitive engagement may 
potentially lead to a developed conception of what a just war is. Children’s literature, because 
of its formative nature, provides an especially fruitful opportunity for this. 
Just War Scripts 
Adding just war theory to the justice scripts of the previous chapter allows for a more precise 
analysis of justice in children’s war literature, as it places the emphasis on war. Whereas 
justice scripts can be seen and analysed in any (children’s) narrative, the war element of this 
genre both demands a different approach to justice and foregrounds the importance of its 
scripts in extra-textual life. Just war theory has, to my knowledge, never been handled as a 
basis for script analysis. Presumably this is because up until Oziewicz’s 2015 work nobody 
had even considered justice scripts, let alone just war theory scripts. Additionally, the nature 
of just war theory appears to prevent its applicability in script theory; if it can only be applied 
to analyse particular wars and not as an umbrella approach, how could it possibly be a script? 
However, the core of the just war theory debate makes it perfect for script analysis. It has a 
clear structuring of jus ante bellum, jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum, which 
goes hand in hand with the script of war itself; preparation, attack, battle, and resolution. 
Viewing war and just war theory in this way makes both scripts; much like the scripts we 
have for our daily lives or for reading, we have expectations of how wars develop and should 
be handled. These expectations, like with any other scripts, are based on previous exposure. 
However, the implied reader is unlikely to have had any extra-textual war experience, 
meaning that their war scripts are based entirely on cultural experiences like reading. 
Therefore, their war scripts will be based, at least in part, on the highly structured and 
artificial form war takes in fiction. As will, at the same time, their scripts and therefore 
understanding of war justice. Additionally, the young reader (and dare I say even most adult 
readers) are unlikely to be actively aware of just war theory, or to be educated in it in an 
explicit manner. This places a heavy moral weight on the just war scripts in children’s 
literature; whereas the implied reader is highly likely to be exposed first-hand to differing 
justice scripts, they may never gain any non-structured just war scripts. Yet they will, 
eventually, become politically empowered people who may base their behaviour and voting, 
for example, on the just war scripts they encountered in the past. The narratives of war justice 
in children’s literature are therefore both complex and important.  
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These final analyses will demonstrate exactly that; the function of just war scripts in 
children’s war literature. To do so, I once again turn to speculative fiction. Unlike the 
previous chapter, however, my decision to do so here is not coincidental. Rather, the science-
fiction elements of the novels I analyse specifically function to allow the child characters 
more responsibility than their realist peers. Because the characters are directly involved with 
combat as well as strategy, both conflicting sides of just war theory are represented in these 
novels. This is not to say that realist fiction does not feature just war scripts, or that all 
speculative war fiction overtly does so; rather, the novels I selected foreground them most 
overtly because of the power the child holds. The first novel I analyse is Orson Scott Card’s 
Ender’s Game (1977/1991). The issue of just war theory stands at the heart of this novel and 
is approached from different perspectives. The final novel I analyse is Terry Pratchett’s Only 
You Can Save Mankind (1992). This novel, like most of Pratchett’s work, is deeply satirical 
(Hunt 2001, 86-90), specifically of novels like Ender’s Game. As such, it problematises the 
concepts and scripts of Ender’s Game by reframing them and providing a counternarrative. 
Ending the chapter with this analysis I am able to demonstrate the complete breadth of just 
war scripts in children’s war literature. 
The Enemy Is You 
There is no better text I can think of which better demonstrates the functioning of just war 
scripts than Ender’s Game. The setup of the story already shows the complex nature and 
foregrounded importance of justice for this narrative; Ender, the protagonist, is a child soldier 
persuaded to leave behind his life on Earth to train for an intergalactic, preventative war 
against an alien Other who has previously driven humanity to near extinction. There, Ender is 
trained brutally through unfair war simulations, and is ultimately tricked into committing 
unknowing xenocide (genocide against aliens). Because the story is about war empathy and 
ethics are already foregrounded, however, as the protagonist is a very young child (Ender is 
only six when he leaves for military training) the problematic elements of war justice are 
emphasised even further. The usage of such intensely young child soldiers both demonstrates 
and problematises the justice of the narrative. It shows that the adults of this story world are 
willing to use children as military weapons, regardless of their age or understanding. As it 
forces a character with traditionally very little power or responsibility to act in morally 
profound ways, the novel also inevitably comments on this type of approach to war where any 
means are justified to secure the win. The narrative is thus overtly highly concerned with just 
war theory, and questions it at every turn. Ender’s Game is also quite complex regarding who 
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the implied reader is. The novel was initially marketed at adults, but has since crossed over to 
children. Presumably this is because the protagonist is very young, and the gaming element of 
the narrative makes it highly marketable to young adolescent boys specifically. The approach 
to in- and outgrouping appears to be as straightforward as The Lion, the Witch and the 
Wardrobe, but gets complicated further along in the novel. The language used is fairly 
accessible for young ages, yet Ender’s siblings reference philosophy and political concepts 
which most adults would miss. Thus, the novel as almost two implied readers: an adult, and a 
child reader of around 10 years old. 
Jus Ante Bellum 
The concept of jus ante bellum was coined by Cook in his 2013 analysis of Ender’s Game. As 
a reminder, this concept deals with “the need to teach those involved with the war about just 
war theory” (152). It is thus the moral responsibility, on the side of those political leaders 
which decide to wage war, to ensure that anybody who is involved with the war to come be it 
on a combat or strategic level is aware of the moral frameworks within which they will 
operate. Although I find Cook’s wording to be mildly problematic, as I do not think there is 
always the need to teach about just war theory specifically, I agree that moral education is a 
site of responsibility regarding preparations for war. I would like to add to this definition, 
however, any training and selection of troops in preparation for warfare, accounting for 
example for age, sex, or class distinctions in recruitment, and conduct during/set-up of 
training. It is not surprising that this comes forward in an analysis of Ender’s Game, as it is 
one of the most foregrounded elements of the novel. Ender is selected for military training 
specifically because of his young age and abnormal intelligence and empathy. Steffen Hantke 
emphasises Ender’s age as key to his selection:  
The military intervenes before adulthood can dilute Ender's pure and natural 
impulses. Military training appears as nothing more than a specialized form of 
socialization. The disciplinary system the child is subjected to provides a 
concrete context for his skills and counteracts the childish obstacles in Ender's 
path to becoming a perfect fighting machine: short attention span, disappoint- 
ment during the socialization process, unwillingness to see the necessity for 
"sacrifice" (in the form of isolation, e.g.) (1998, 506). 
Hantke’s analysis is interesting in that the military most certainly purposefully selects young 
children and uses military training to socialise them. However, Hantke appears to forget that 
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Ender is not a normal child; he has no demonstrative short attention span, or any other “child-
like obstacles”. Military training instead is a gruelling and painful process through which 
Ender has to learn the moral chaos of war and everything that goes with it. 
 Although there are several elements to Ender’s military education, the central one 
takes place through the wargames, where the children are divided up into teams which have to 
compete in mock-battles in zero gravity. Once Ender becomes the leader of his team, at an 
unusually young age even for Battle School, the battles he partakes in are purposefully made 
unfair through unusual frequency and clashing with previously established rules. This results 
in Ender’s frustration and a loss of belief in previously established moral rules; he is in a way 
forced to act ignobly and does not display generally correct moral behaviour (Day 2012, 221). 
Eventually, the School’s unfairness completely breaks Ender away from the desire to act 
morally: “I don’t care if I follow your rules. If you can cheat, so can I. I won’t let you beat me 
unfairly – I’ll beat you unfairly first” (292). This tendency to behave against social mores is 
already present in Ender before he goes to Battle School, and is part of the reason why he was 
selected. However, the unfairness of the games is purposeful and overt. Therefore, Ender’s 
turn against previously established mores is a desired outcome of his military socialisation; it 
is because he “cheats” at the “games” that war ends in human victory. However, the severe 
consequence of that is that a break from what he considers moral behaviour is demonstrated 
as necessary and even desirable in military conduct. 
 The main concern regarding Ender’s military education/humanity’s preparation for 
war is that Ender is made purposefully unaware of the reality of his situation. After Ender 
graduates from Battle School to Command School aged eleven, the games he plays change 
from combat simulations to tactical strategy games, which he plays against the hero held 
responsible for humanity’s victory after the previous attack by the aliens. For his “graduation” 
from Command School Ender fights a final battle in front of an audience, where his troops are 
outnumbered “a thousand to one” (292). Convinced this is yet another unfair battle, Ender 
breaks away from any concern regarding acting morally completely. “Fairness wasn’t part of 
the game” (ibid). He decides to use a morally forbidden weapon of mass destruction to 
completely destroy the enemy’s home planet, thinking this breaking of rules will get him 
expelled. The realisation that he instead committed xenocide is overwhelming to him: 
  Real. Not a game. Ender’s mind was too tired to cope with it all. They weren’t 
  just points of light in the air, they were real ships that he had fought with and 
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  real ships he had destroyed. And a real world that he had blasted into oblivion 
  (297). 
Ender commits an atrocity without any knowledge about it; he had even been engaged with 
actual warfare without being aware of it. Because of this lack of awareness Ender could not 
have engaged empathically with his enemy; his moral framework never stretched to include 
the Other because the Other was merely a simulation created to spite him. The adults later 
explain that they had to trick him into believing it was a game, because he would not have 
committed this atrocity.  
Any decent person who knows what warfare is can never go into battle with a 
whole heart. But you didn’t know. We made sure you didn’t know. You were 
reckless and brilliant and young. It’s what you were born for” (Card 1991, 
298). 
By denying Ender awareness the adults in charge of his military education equally denied him 
the choice to act morally. By foregrounding this issue throughout the novel, the narrative 
emphasises the importance of moral military education. Ender is the protagonist and, most of 
the time, the focaliser. He is also very young, and therefore closer in age to the implied reader 
than the adults in charge of Ender’s education. Ender is therefore in the reader’s ingroup, and 
they are supposed to side with him. Thus, Ender’s emotions of betrayal and grief over the 
murders he unknowingly committed are supposed to signal to the reader that the adults’ 
treatment of Ender was not just. Although the war ended in human victory, it came at too high 
a cost: Ender’s morality. 
Jus Ad Bellum 
Much like the jus ante bellum, the narrative problematises jus ad bellum; both are subject to 
adult lies. Before the events of the novel take place, Earth was subject to two failed yet 
destructive invasions by the aliens, which left humanity on the brink of extinction. After these 
attacks, humanity has lived with the fear and uncertain knowledge that a third invasion will 
come. In just war theory, the threat of a devastating attack in the light of two previous 
attempts at genocide would count as a just reason to take to arms; this war would be defensive 
rather than retributive, and a necessary evil to ensure human survival. The precedent set by 
the two previous attacks further cements the justness of taking to arms; the aliens did not 
provide any diplomatic means to resolve the conflict, nor did they provide any motivations 
behind their attacks. The violence appears both senseless and unavoidable. When Colonel 
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Graff comes to recruit Ender for Battle School, he reaffirms this view of the wars both past 
and to come: 
The buggers may seem like a game to you now Ender, but they damn near 
wiped us out last time. They had us cold, outnumbered and outweaponed […]. 
We’ve scraped together everything mankind could produce, a fleet that makes 
the one they sent against us last time seem like a bunch of kids playing in a 
swimming pool […]. But it might not be enough, even so. Because in the 
eighty years since the last war, they’ve had as much time to prepare as we have 
(25). 
The extreme need of the situation is clear; humanity must act with everything it has to defend 
itself against extinction. Graff voicing this to Ender in an attempt to persuade him to abandon 
his life on Earth for the military is itself unethical; as a six-year-old, although of exceptional 
intelligence and ability Ender is not or should not be treated as if he is cognitively able to 
comprehend what it means to do either. Going to Battle School means removing himself from 
the family home entirely; being in the military implies a willingness both to kill and be killed. 
Graff’s pressing message regarding the danger humanity is in is manipulative, and morally 
deplorable. However, if the need is indeed that high and humanity is at the brink, sacrificing 
the happiness of one child may be considered excusable in both a deontological and a 
consequentialist perspective; Ender is exceptionally bright and seemingly aware of the 
implications, and if his unhappiness ensures human survival, it may be justified. 
 However, Graff eventually reveals that there is no threat of a third invasion. Much like 
the games Ender plays, the third invasion people on Earth are told may happen any day is an 
adult fiction. After the second invasion, the aliens pulled back and never attacked again. Graff 
reveals this to Ender after Ender refuses to play any further games in an attempt to once again 
persuade him, this time to return to Battle School. 
“So we’re not waiting for the Third Invasion.” 
“We are the Third Invasion.” 
“We’re attacking them. Nobody says that. Everybody thinks we have a huge 
fleet of warships waiting in the comet shield –” 
“Maybe they gave up and they’re planning to leave us alone.” 
“Maybe. You’ve seen the videos. Would you bet the human race on the chance 
of them giving up and leaving us alone?” (250).  
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This problematises the jus ad bellum significantly. In the case where there is indeed a 
significant threat against humanity from an established and intimidating enemy, any means 
may be deemed necessary to protect the inhabitants of Earth. However, the aliens have not 
indicated any further penchant for violence. They have also, however, not communicated with 
humanity in any other way. Considering the severity of the previous wars and the lack of 
clarification regarding the sudden absence of violence, it may be understandable that the 
aliens are still considered a threat in the eyes of the adults who lived through the previous 
wars. However, it is significant that they lie about who is invading whom, not only to Ender 
but to everybody on Earth. As discussed in chapter three, lying is a morally ambiguous 
activity. In this case, lying about the reason for going to war extends that ambiguity to the 
justification of warfare. Why lie if the cause is just? This type of ambiguity demands high 
cognitive engagement in order to make sense of the many layers of embedment and their 
implications for the ethics of the narrative; the usage of child soldiers is less easily justified if 
there is no pressing threat calling for everything mankind has to offer. 
 Although the scripts of both war and just war theory are highly temporal in nature, 
Ender’s Game further complicates this issue of jus ad bellum by providing the Other’s 
perspective after their defeat. The aliens, called Formics, communicate telekinetically. After 
Ender destroys them all, the last remaining queen finds a way to communicate with him in the 
same way. 
We are like you; the thought pressed into his mind. We did not mean to 
murder, and when we understood, we never came again. We thought we were 
the only thinking beings in the universe, until we met you, but never did we 
dream that thought could arise from the lonely animals who cannot dream each 
other’s dreams. How were we to know? We could live with you in peace. 
Believe us, believe us, believe us (321). 
Although the narrative already problematised the jus ad bellum, this further complicates the 
matter in two ways. Firstly, it emphasises again that the Formics were no threat after the 
second invasion; they realised that humans have sentience and had no intension of attacking 
again. Humanity was not to know this, as the Formics could not communicate with them. 
However, here the Formic queen affirms what Ender suspected earlier, because of which it is 
foregrounded for the reader. Secondly, and additionally, this first insight into the Formics’ 
mind and emotions allows for empathy with them for the first time. Their misunderstanding of 
humanity excuses their earlier transgressions but does not erase their violence. The narrative 
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promoting empathy with the Formics, and potentially sympathy for their fate, may push the 
reader to further disagreeing with humanity’s aggression towards them. Thus, the justification 
for war is both foregrounded and problematised. 
Jus in Bello 
Ender is not engaged in combat in the space war, nor is the reader privy to the conduct of his 
soldiers. As the combatants themselves are in spaceships, combat does not occur face to face, 
meaning that the responsibility for jus in bello does not lie with them. The true immoral 
behaviour is on Ender’s side, particularly his committing of xenocide. Ender is told during his 
training that that the weapon of mass destruction “Little Doctor” “could never be used on a 
planet” (272). In rebellion against the unfairness of what he thinks is his final test, Ender 
decides to cheat by using Little Doctor against the enemy’s home planet. Once it’s revealed to 
Ender that his simulation game was reality, the moral gravity of his actions immediately 
becomes clear to him: 
  “I killed them all, didn’t I?” Ender asked […]. 
  Mazer leaned in close. “That’s what the war was for.” 
  “All their queens. So I killed all their children, all of everything.” 
  “They decided that when they attacked us. It wasn’t your fault. It’s what had to 
  happen” (297, emphasis in original). 
The narrative thus foregrounds the significance of Ender’s actions, even if he was not aware 
of them. Ender is devastated by this, and as the narrative’s protagonist and ingroup to the 
reader, his extreme negative emotional reaction to the xenocide communicates that in his 
eyes, the act was not just. Because the reader is supposed to be aligned with Ender at least 
empathically, they are likely to equally consider this questioning stance. The narrative 
therefore communicates that completely eradicating your opponent is not justifiable. 
 However, a complicating factor to this view of jus in bello is Ender’s pre-Battle 
School perspective on victory. At school, Ender is approached by a group of bullies, whom he 
knows intend to beat him up. Ender fights the leader off, working him on the ground, after 
which the bully’s cronies backing off. Yet, Ender does not finish using violence at that point: 
  Ender knew the unspoken rules of manly warfare, even though he was only six. 
  It was forbidden to strike the opponent who lay helpless on the ground; only an 
  animal would do that. 
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  So Ender walked to Stilson’s supine body and kicked him again, viciously, in 
  the ribs. Stilson groaned and rolled away from him. Ender walked around him 
  and kicked him again, in the crotch (1977/1991, 7). 
Ender’s reflection on and conscious refusal of acting according to established moral rules 
regarding warfare foregrounds the moral anarchy of war mentioned by Walzer. Ender knows 
that if he holds to the mores regarding just warfare, the bullies will come back for him later, 
perhaps more violently; if he ends the conflict through a devastating demonstration of 
violence now, there will be no conflict anymore in the future. A situation echoing this one 
occurs in Battle School, when Ender is cornered by a rival captain, Bonzo, and his crew 
mates. Ender knows that Bonzo aims to kill him, and again beats him into complete 
submission in order to secure no further aggression. After, Ender cries that he never wanted to 
hurt anyone, yet he does not consider any other solution. It is later revealed that Ender killed 
both Stilson and Bonzo, information which is kept from him. This behaviour is both 
commended and admonished by the adults; reflecting on his approach to winning there is an 
argument in which they state both that “‘The kid is scary’” (ibid) and that “‘Ender Wiggin 
isn’t a killer. He just wins – thoroughly’” (226). The image of morally just behaviour here is 
highly complex; Ender hates the violence he enacts, yet he sees it as an inevitable necessity. 
In his eyes, he is justified in his behaviour both because he does not choose to put himself in 
violent situations, and because he prevents any further aggression by exacting excessive 
violence on a single occasion. It is possible that the reader follows this line of thought; 
although it is deeply unpleasant, it is sometimes just to act excessively violent in order to 
prevent further aggression. 
 Ender’s moral framework regarding his personal “battles” may therefore complicate 
the image of jus in bello in the space war. Ender’s outrage about his xenocide indicates that he 
does not agree that it was a justifiable act; yet he does consider this type of behaviour 
justifiable when it comes to his personal encounters. The xenocide is an enhanced, extreme 
version of his encounters with Stilson and Bonzo; outrageous and complete destruction in 
order to prevent any further need for violence. Ender is protected from making that decision 
himself because the adults refuse to give him the responsibility that would have come with 
awareness. However, there is no reason to assume that Ender would not extend his personal 
mores to the battlefield. It is simply because it is kept from him that he is not able to make 
that decision. Therefore, the reader is faced with a highly intricate image of just behaviour in 
battle; Ender’s behaviour is framed as both a necessary evil and “scary” – he hates behaving 
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in a violent fashion himself, yet feels both like he has to and is right to do so. However, when 
it comes to the war itself Ender does not approve of this same moral framework. This 
contradictory morality represented may be challenging for the reader and demands high 
cognitive engagement. The difficult nature of jus in bello in this narrative foregrounds it. 
There is no proper “answer” given to the question of what is or is not correct behaviour in 
warfare; instead, the reader is only shown the complicated nature of it. The reader is therefore 
not provided “the” script for just behaviour in war. Just war theory after all does not provided 
“the” answers to what it discusses. Instead, the reader is prompted to consider their own 
conceptions about just wars. 
Jus Post Bellum 
Victory, as explained above already a contentious issue in just war theory, is equally 
problematic in Ender’s Game. The aim of Ender’s gruelling military training and experience 
is to ensure victory for humanity, yet it is unclear how this is to be achieved, or even what it 
means. Through the unfair war simulations Ender learns that the end goal of victory must be 
achieved no matter what and can be achieved through loose interpretations of or ignoring the 
rules. At Ender’s final battle simulation in Battle School, he is pitted against two combined 
armies. Instead of fighting them, he decides to sacrifice all of his troops in order to have 
enough to complete the game. “Therefore, by one way of thinking, you could argue that the 
ending ritual was victory. The battleroom certainly recognized it as the end of the game” (218, 
emphasis in original). This is an early foreshadowing of the complicating nature of victory in 
the actual space war; through the game the question of what exactly constitutes victory is 
foregrounded both diegetically and extradiegetically. The problematised image of victory is 
further enhanced in Command School, as Ender goes into his final battle there. Ender decides 
once again to “cheat” in order to achieve his desired outcome. “If I break this rule, they’ll 
never let me be a commander. It would be too dangerous. I’ll never have to play a game 
again. And that is victory” (293). He considers victory here in purely selfish terms, again 
because he does not consider the battle to be real; for him, victory is freedom from the 
military and their influence in his life. This may seem insignificant in comparison to the war 
scenario, yet by bringing up the issue of victory in unfair scenarios, the narrative foregrounds 
the ambiguity of victory; Ender cheats to achieve it, and his understanding of what victory is, 
is limited to his own experience. 
 Victory in the war against the Formics takes the form of xenocide, and the assurance 
that there will be no further violence exacted against humanity. However, this is again the 
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result of cheating, in this case the adults cheating Ender out of an awareness of the situation, 
and therefore moral ambiguity.  
“Ender, for the past few months you have been the battle commander of our 
fleets. This was the Third Invasion. There were no games, the battles were real, 
and the only enemy you fought was the buggers. You won every battle, and 
today you finally fought them at their home world, where the queen was, all the 
queens from all their colonies, they all were there and you destroyed them 
completely. They’ll never attack us again. You did it. You” (297). 
Although horribly excessive, the xenocide does ensure humanity’s survival. And again, the 
humans were unable to communicate with the Formics, and could therefore not know that 
there was no threat at all to speak of. The deception at the heart of the victory complicates its 
depiction; responsibility is placed on Ender, yet he cannot fully bear it as he was unaware. 
Although the adults, and all of humanity back on Earth, do celebrate Ender’s victory over the 
Formics, Ender does not share in the festivities. He is despondent and dreams of “eyes that 
grieved for a billion, billion murders – but they were his own eyes, and he was content to 
wear them” (301). Again, the notion of victory is problematised; humanity’s survival of this 
foe is ensured, yet the “hero” responsible for it cannot celebrate it and views it as an affront to 
justice. Again, Ender is the protagonist and focaliser, and as a young child is closer to the 
reader’s ingroup than the adults who celebrate his “victory” are. Therefore, the reader is likely 
to prefer Ender’s unambiguous view of this seeming military victory over the adults’ 
perspective. 
 Instead of celebrating the xenocide, Ender proposes a different form of justice all the 
way at the end of the novel: reparation. After successfully communicating with the Formics, 
Ender makes it his mission to re-establish their existence; there is one cocoon with a living 
queen left, which if placed in the correct environment could allow the Formics to return to 
life. 
“I’ll go from world to world until I find a time and a place where you can come 
awake in safety. And I’ll tell your story to my people, so that perhaps in time 
they can forgive you, too. The way that you’ve forgiven me” (321). 
As the person responsible for their destruction, he also assumes responsibility for their 
restoration. He also, however, assumes responsibility for humanity’s understanding of the 
Formics’ perspective. The form of justice Ender here espouses is therefore reconciliatory and 
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based on forgiveness; righting the wrongs, undoing his xenocide by repairing the Formics’ 
existence. There are therefore two main competing forms of jus post bellum present in the 
novel; a celebration of the complete destruction of the Other, and a desire to instate a new 
peace based on tolerance, empathy and cohabitation between the in- and outgroup. The adults 
are aligned with the former, and carry the weight of adult authority. Ender espouses the latter, 
and carries the weight of the ingroup. Both, however, are deceptive, do not play by the 
established rules of either society or war, and both have a tendency to violence. “Far from 
simply being the good, innocent, justice-seeking opposites of deceptive adults, the young 
characters […] also demonstrate a capacity for cruelty, dishonesty, and injustice” (Day 2012, 
208). Ender’s behaviour in his personal battles combines with the adult perspective on war 
victory to provide a strong narrative supporting victory as complete destruction of the other; it 
is only all the way at the end of the narrative that the alternative is provided. Therefore, the 
reader is only presented with a single just war script for the majority of the novel, even if it is 
problematised throughout. The result is a highly complex, and cognitively demanding 
perspective on jus post bellum. 
The just war script put forward by this narrative is highly complex and ambiguous. 
The intricate elements of justice linked particularly to war concerns in this novel are portrayed 
as difficult to navigate, demonstrating the moral chaos war causes. The novel deals clearly 
with all four aspects of war and has an equally clear temporal outline of the stages of war. The 
just war script follows this clear temporality: there is a need for just training and education of 
the troops in preparation of the war; there must be a good reason for going to war; the conduct 
during the war must be morally right; and after the war is over there is foregrounded need for 
correct behaviour as well. The narrative does not have to be unambiguous about its 
perspective of what “just” conduct is in these stages; simply foregrounding the need for it at 
each phase forces the reader to engage with the issue themselves. Therefore, the reader is able 
to build a script about complex issues. There is no answer to just war theory; justice itself is 
complex enough. The need for moral reflection at each phase of warfare is the just war script 
put forward by the narrative. 
Question Everything 
In Terry Pratchett’s Only You Can Save Mankind (1992), Pratchett, the satirist (Hunt 86-90), 
problematises the setup of Card’s Ender’s Game. While computer and physical games are 
forms of training for the children in Battle School, in Pratchett’s novel the war takes place 
entirely through the videogame. This echoes Ender’s belief that he is playing a game whilst 
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unknowingly fighting battles against the Formics. However, Pratchett’s hero Johnny Maxwell 
is made aware early on in the game that his battles have a real impact on his “enemies”. 
Unlike Ender, Johnny is not exceptional in any way. He is also a bit older than Ender, as he is 
first involved with the war aged 12. Additionally, Pratchett’s novel is set during the Gulf war. 
Johnny’s preoccupation with his videogame-based war is purposefully contrasted with the 
documentation of the Gulf war, which provides a fruitful basis for analysis. The importance of 
the two contrasting wars is summarised neatly by Lykke Guanio-Uluru, who argued that 
“juxtaposing these situations in the design of the novel, the implied author invites the reader 
to make a similar mental and empathic shift relative to the victims of not only fictional but 
also actual wars” (2016). However, as the concern with justice as a script lies with Johnny’s 
space war, I focus solely on that here. The setup for this analysis is the same as it was for 
Ender’s Game, in order to demonstrate how the novel problematises justice scripts in its own 
right, and to show how a purposefully different approach to empathy and ethics results in a 
different construction of justice whilst maintaining the same structured just war script. 
Just Ante Bellum 
Johnny’s engagement with his education is not great; he mentions homework from time to 
time and discusses with his friends how they can cheat their way out of spending any time on 
it. As for moral or war education, Johnny was never meant to engage with war first-hand. His 
education is therefore general, unlike Ender’s. It seems therefore that jus ante bellum does not 
play a role in the just war script of this novel. However, the videogame itself is framed as just 
war education. Because Johnny is forcefully plunged into intergalactic warfare, he has to 
adapt rapidly and apply any previous knowledge he has got; in this case, his main concerns 
are controlling his spaceship and understanding what other human “players” understand of the 
ScreeWees’ and war’s ontological status. This knowledge is founded entirely on videogames; 
he can successfully mind-model for the other human “players” based on his own previous 
mindset in playing videogames and has vague notions regarding the functions of his spaceship 
through other gaming experience. The narrator does, however, comment ironically on this 
educational role of videogames: 
You never said to your parents, ‘Hey, I really need a computer because that 
way I can play Megasteroids.’ 
No, you said, ‘I really need a computer because of school.’ 
It’s educational (26, emphasis in original). 
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Contrasting school education with videogame entertainment, there appear to be two main 
meanings to this comment; firstly, the lie about needing a computer for formal education 
undermines a belief in the formative value of videogaming. This could be because the narrator 
mind-models that the reader’s parents may not believe in that value, however, it could also be 
because the narrative does not believe in it itself. Johnny’s relative failure with formal 
education could support this understanding. However, secondly, the notion of education 
through videogames is suggested here as well; “it’s educational” is not presented in speech 
form and can therefore be read as either “your” thoughts, or the narrator’s commentary on the 
educational value of videogames. The link between videogames and formative education, 
however, is foregrounded regardless of the irony which young readers may not recognise in 
the first place. 
 Like Ender, Johnny learns his battle strategies through what he believes are game 
simulations and is only confronted with reality after the fact. However, Johnny is embroiled in 
a war when he first has this confrontation. The poignant moment when it is suggested that all 
space war videogames are not simulations at all occurs when Johnny and the ScreeWees 
encounter the wreckage of a Space Invader. These aliens have gone extinct, and Johnny is 
forced to create a link between the enemies he fought in the past, and the ones he is forced to 
empathise with and protect in the present. The result, for jus ante bellum, is confrontational; 
these videogames provide battle training but not pre-emptively. The combatant is not prepared 
beforehand, but must learn both strategy and the empathic and moral implications during the 
conflict. Because Johnny is put in contact with the ScreeWees from the beginning of the 
novel, they are able to immediately express their emotions and desires, therefore emphasising 
the problem with a lack of proper education. Because the human players are unaware of the 
reality of their wars, they cannot and do not empathise with the enemy. They are Other in the 
most complete sense; they are presumed not to exist at all. Forcing Johnny, who is in the 
reader’s ingroup, to empathise with the ScreeWees, the narrative equally forces him to 
reconsider his moral frameworks; all wars he thought were fake turn out to be real, fought 
against sentient and moral beings. The reader, through empathy with Johnny, is also forced to 
consider their own empathic and moral standing regarding all wars, whether against a real or 
imagined enemy. This moral lesson is made clear near the end of the novel: 
‘I’m not even sure there are aliens. Only different kinds of us. But I know what 
the important thing is. The important thing is to be exactly sure about what 
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you’re doing. The important thing is to remember it’s not a game. None of it. 
Even the games’ (235). 
This moral lesson can be boiled down to a specific cry of jus ante bellum; it does not matter 
whether or not you are engaged with a simulation, as all wars require moral engagement. It is 
impossible to form a full, practical morality without the necessary preparation, without “being 
sure about what you are doing”, as what you are doing is killing an Other. Without an 
understanding of the moral implications of this killing, war is indeed reduced to a moral 
anarchy. By placing the reader’s ingroup, in the forms of Johnny and his friends, in this moral 
anarchy and forcing them to face and make up for their previous empathic and moral failures, 
the narrative foregrounds the need for the proper war education which the characters did not 
enjoy themselves. 
Jus Ad Bellum 
The issue with jus ad bellum for the initial war between humanity and the ScreeWees is 
complicated from the beginning of the narrative and foregrounded by two particular 
occurrences; Johnny’s empathy with the ScreeWees, and the ScreeWees’ own conflicting 
perspectives on just warfare. Johnny, like presumably all other human players, initially does 
not know that he is in combat with sentient beings. As far as he is aware, he is playing against 
a virtual enemy devoid of emotions and beliefs; engaged in a purely entertaining exercise. The 
war against the ScreeWees can therefore not be just in any conception of justice; the 
combatants are not aware of the ramifications of their actions, there is no point to the violence 
(victory would be meaningless except for a fleeting sense of individual satisfaction), and the 
human side is so successful that the ScreeWees face extinction if the violence is not stopped. 
Although Johnny chooses to play a videogame, he does not choose to kill sentient beings; the 
conflicting emotions and forced shift of his moral framework foreground the injustice of this 
war. This issue is further emphasised by the internal conflicts of the ScreeWees. Unlike in 
Ender’s Game, the aliens enjoy focalisation from the beginning of the conflict. In these 
sections, it is revealed to the reader that it was the Captain’s decision to surrender to Johnny 
and cease all combat against humanity. She remains steadfast in this, even when other human 
“players” continuously attack and destroy ScreeWee ships. This leads to conflict with her 
underlings, who feel a need to protect what remains of their people: 
‘No! We must fight on!’ 




‘Then we die gloriously!’ 
‘There’s an important word in that sentence,’ said the Captain. ‘And it’s not the 
word “gloriously”.’ 
The Gunnery Officer went light green with rage. 
‘He’s attacked hundreds of our ships!’ 
‘And then he stopped’ (28). 
This conflict continues throughout the novel and results in an attempted mutiny. The severity 
of this issue is thus highlighted, and the ambiguity of this decision is foregrounded. The 
ScreeWees would be justified in protecting themselves against extinction. Additionally, the 
Captain’s decision to trust Johnny, an enemy single-handedly responsible for the death of 
hundreds if not thousands of their kind, is not easy to accept for the other ScreeWees. Johnny 
is in the outgroup for them, and previously established himself as a direct physical threat to 
their wellbeing and existence. Accepting him as a protector would mean both accepting him 
as ingroup, and an implied forgiveness of his previous violent transgressions against them. 
This is highly demanding both empathically and morally. However, the Captain emphasises 
that although it is difficult to accept help from a previous enemy, it is preferable to the death 
of their entire species. Her contention is not that waging war against the humans would be 
unjust, as it would be defensive. At the same time, however, she implies that it would be 
unjust because of the impossibility of victory. In her moral framework, survival trumps 
righteous violence. Extradiegetically it requires high cognitive engagement to understand both 
sides of the conflict, particularly because it comes from an alien Other. 
Johnny’s war with the ScreeWees ends after they establish contact in the beginning of 
the novel. From then on, he is on their side and thus does not fight against them anymore. 
Instead, he turns his violence against other human players who are aggressive against the 
ScreeWees. These human characters, although largely name and faceless, are in Johnny’s 
ingroup; they are human, gamers, and presumably of a similar age. However, Johnny forces 
himself to view these human “players” as his outgroup by constantly telling himself that these 
humans are both not physically present in the war and therefore in a way not real, and that 
they are not aware of the ScreeWees’ ontological status. Johnny was only able to consider 
them as real after they surrender to him (Guanio-Uluru 2016, cf). Waging war against his 
ingroup enemies is therefore justifiable, because they do not truly suffer any physical nor 
emotional consequences from their perceived deaths. Johnny is also forced to wage combat 
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against these human characters because of his regrouping with the ScreeWees; because the 
Other has submitted to him completely, they will not fight against any other human “players”, 
not even to defend themselves. Johnny, now forced to empathise with the ScreeWees, has a 
deontological duty to protect them as they will not use force to protect themselves because it 
would break their social and moral contract of submission with Johnny. The enemy he 
thought was virtual reveals their real suffering; his ingroup remains virtual in this warfare. 
Although turning against the ingroup is an empathically and morally complex act, in 
this case there are two mitigating factors; firstly, they do not know Johnny, who enjoys 
anonymity and therefore reduced accountability. Secondly, they do not suffer the 
consequences of war to which the ScreeWees are subject. Therefore, Johnny’s usage of 
violence against his ingroup is entirely justified. Johnny’s violence against his own ingroup 
affirms the ScreeWee Captain’s perception of jus ad bellum; she was right to trust him, even 
if he is not properly prepared and slow to help them. His turn against his own kind both 
complicates and clarifies the narrative’s perspective of jus ad bellum; the ScreeWees could 
not possibly win their defensive war and are therefore right to shift the responsibility of 
violence to Johnny, however, it requires him to turn against his ingroup. The burden of moral 
responsibility is partially lifted from Johnny as he knows that he is not truly hurting his 
ingroup; the violence against them remains solely virtual. That said, the ScreeWees remain 
outgroup to the reader. Their moral debates were focalised, which allows the reader to engage 
empathically with them. Through this empathy, Johnny’s as well as the reader’s moral 
framework must be extended to include the ScreeWees’ concerns (Guanio-Uluru 2016, cf). It 
remains, however, cognitively challenging to accept violence against the ingroup in order to 
protect an alien Other previously believed to be entirely virtual. This challenging moral aspect 
of war, combined with Johnny’s previous unknowing combat against sentient beings, 
foregrounds the narrative’s concern with jus ad bellum. 
Jus in Bello 
When the ScreeWees first contact Johnny indicating a desire to talk, he is confused and 
believes it to be either a glitch or a feature of the game mechanics. Although the ScreeWees 
do not engage in combat with him, breaking with the previously established war scripts, and 
instead invite Johnny to enter into negotiations with them, Johnny can initially not be moved 
to anything other than violence. 
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Johnny fired the laser one more time. Swsssh. He didn’t really know why. It 
was just because you had the joystick and there was the Fire button and that 
was what it was for. 
After all, there wasn’t a Don’t Fire button. 
We Surrender! PLEASE! (16). 
Johnny’s lack of military education/awareness, and therefore failing jus ante bellum, here 
feeds into a failure of jus in bello. The enemy has ceased all violence against Johnny, yet he 
continues to engage in combat with them because he cannot imagine any other action. He fails 
to behave justly here firstly because he cannot experience empathy for the ScreeWees yet (he 
does not know that they are sentient), and secondly because he is unable to break from his 
previously established war script. He fights because he cannot imagine any other way to 
engage with an enemy; there is no thought and therefore no moral consideration behind his 
actions. The ScreeWees’ plea for a ceasefire is a break from this script, and therefore 
foregrounded. Breakage with previously established scripts is highly challenging and 
cognitively demanding and required by the ScreeWees’ surrender. The issue of jus in bello is 
consequently emphasised through the setup of the story. 
 When Johnny finally does engage with the ScreeWees, they surrender and show him 
images of themselves and their children in order to persuade him of their desire to live. This 
requires, however, that he can view them as sentient in the first place. Again, this requires a 
break with a previously established script. “You don’t listen to the enemy. The enemy’s there 
to be shot at. That’s why it’s the enemy. That’s what the enemy’s for” (34). Johnny’s war 
script thus requires violence to the point where non-combat-based engagement with the Other 
is unthinkable, it is also based on a difference in realities. In order for Johnny to cease conflict 
with the ScreeWees, he must break with all previously held schemas and scripts. As argued by 
Farah Mendlesohn, this is largely made possible by Johnny’s own blankness: “Johnny 
becomes a hero in part because he is ill-defined. He is willing to let the virtual world around 
him define itself, to see the world through others’ eyes” (Mendlesohn 2000, 149). It is 
possible for Johnny to break with his own beliefs and scripts early on in the novel because 
they are not clearly set in the first place; as a nigh tabula rasa Johnny is able to change his 
moral framework radically in ways more drastic than would be possible for the reader. The 
perceived impossibility of the situation (the idea of Space Invaders being sentient seems to 
belong firmly in the realm of science-fiction) is based on established scripts and schemas held 
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by the reader. Johnny, as the protagonist and the reader’s ingroup, must break with these 
cognitive shortcuts in order to foreground the jus in bello of the narrative. 
The ScreeWees explain to Johnny that although he “lives again” in the game after his 
avatar is killed, they cannot come back. During their first conversation, during which Johnny 
becomes confused about reality, Johnny agrees to provide the ScreeWees safe conduct home. 
However, Johnny does not know what safe conduct is, or where the SreeWees come from. 
Now burdened with protection of the ScreeWees, Johnny has to fight against other human 
“players” to protect the ScreeWees. When he first destroys a human enemy in defense of the 
ScreeWees, Johnny experiences moral conflict for the first time in the game. The only way for 
him to manage the moral complexity of turning against the ingroup is by emphasising the lack 
of consequences his actions have against his ingroup: “That’s all it is, Johnny told himself. 
Just things on a screen. It’s not real. There’s no arms and feet spinning away through the 
wreckage. It’s all a game” (36). However, this emphasis betrays an uncertainty; if Johnny was 
truly certain of the unrealism of his killing, there would be no need to remind himself of it. 
Johnny repeats this mantra to himself at several points in the novel. This emphasis on the 
human “players”’ virtual nature combined with the ScreeWees breaking the ontological 
schema of videogame enemies is crucial to the reader’s mind-model of Johnny. There is 
enough evidence that Johnny is not entirely sure that his human enemies are not just as 
sentient as the ScreeWees; Johnny’s behaviour in the videogame war increases in physical 
consequences in his real world as his engagement with the ScreeWees continues. This greatly 
changes the moral implications of Johnny’s violence against human enemies; if Johnny’s 
killing of his ingroup could have “real life” implications, it is no longer morally safe 
behaviour. 
The jus in bello is therefore complicated in this novel; Johnny’s continued violence 
against the ScreeWees, after they attempt to surrender to him, is clearly unjust. This injustice 
is foregrounded later on in the novel, as Johnny engages empathically with them and is forced 
to consider the reality of the consequences of his actions against them. However, the 
continued confusion regarding the ontological status of those involved with the videogame’s 
war further complicates the moral implications of his actions. Violence against the ingroup is 
more problematic than it is against the outgroup; the possibility that Johnny is truly harming 
his ingroup members is brought forward by the ongoing ontological confusion. Because it 
remains unclear, the issue is foregrounded without providing an “answer”. Johnny must 
protect the ScreeWees because of their empathic and moral connection; yet he must act 
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against people with whom he has an implied, similar connection. Although I am not analysing 
the connection made with the Gulf war in this novel, I will take the liberty to indulge in one 
further quote regarding the thorny nature of jus in bello: 
  ‘I mean – the whole world seems kind of weird right now. You watch the telly, 
  don’t you? How can you be the good guys if you’re dropping clever bombs 
  right down people’s chimneys? And blowing people up just because they’re 
  being bossed around by a looney?’ (158). 
Johnny here extends his moral confusion from the videogame war to the “real” war he sees on 
television. The purpose of this blurring between science-fiction ontological thought 
experiment is to push the reader to consider their own conceptions of empathy, ethics and 
justice. This is fundamental to changing any element of a just war script. The focus on 
breaking previously held schemas and scripts therefore foregrounds the intricate nature of jus 
in bello. 
Jus Post Bellum 
The war between Johnny and the ScreeWees is essentially finished at the start of the novel; 
after he accepts their surrender, they no longer engage in combat. The war then shifts to being 
between Johnny and the other human “players”. The ending of the conflict between Johnny 
and the ScreeWees is sudden and complete; although Johnny is confused about the reality of 
the situation he does maintain a clear moral framework regarding surrender: “[h]e wondered if 
he should launch a missile or something … No, hang on, they’d surrendered” (31). After 
accepting the surrender, further violence is unacceptable. Further post bellum Johnny must 
now serve as an escort for the ScreeWees, the basis of their surrender contract. The place the 
ScreeWees must go to is beyond the game’s “Border”; once beyond this artificial division 
between fair game and open space, the ScreeWees are perceived to be “safe. Of course” 
(212). The principles of jus in bello bleed into the jus post bellum of the narrative; all of 
Johnny’s actions take place post conflict with the ScreeWees. Any other combat takes place 
between Johnny and other human “players”, which although part of the ScreeWee situation 
could be construed as a separate conflict. However, as discussed above, the ontological status 
of these human characters is ambiguous, which also complicates post bellum considerations; 
how can one consider moral obligations regarding people who may not exist in the first place? 
The novel ends once he upholds his end of the surrender agreement, further removing the 
need for any consideration of jus post bellum with the human “players”. 
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Johnny and his sceptical companion for the latter part of the rescue mission are faced 
with a moral dilemma right when it seems they have successfully reached their objective; the 
ScreeWees are heading to the Border, behind which the humans are not sure they can exist or 
return to their own reality. When they are about to escape the ship, a mutineer threatens to kill 
the Captain and continue leading the ScreeWees in their war against the humans, effectively 
dooming the ScreeWees to extinction, so Johnny believes. Therefore, Johnny has to choose, 
with some immediacy, if he wants to risk his own existence to ensure the ScreeWees’ 
survival. He returns to the deck and confronts the mutineer, who is violent against both 
humans. This adds another factor and immediacy to the situation, which was previously much 
vaguer. Now, Johnny would potentially sacrifice himself not only for an alien Other, but also 
for a friend. After the mutineer threatens to kill Johnny’s friend, Johnny kills him. After 
shooting the mutineer, Johnny confirms this action thrice. This repetition foregrounds the 
importance of this event. The third time, Johnny expands and reiterates: “Yes, I shot him. I 
shot him. I wish I didn’t have to, but I had to. He was alive and now he isn’t” (230). This is 
the only time that Johnny engages in physical combat himself. Killing the mutineer both 
requires Johnny to accept his reality, and to therefore consider his death as final. The act of 
killing is thus morally significant; Johnny is no longer innocent of murder. The sacrifice 
Johnny had to make for the ScreeWees’ freedom is then moral ambiguity; the killing 
previously was always ontologically vague. The human characters may never have 
experienced any negative effects from Johnny’s behaviour. The ScreeWee mutineer, however, 
is unambiguously dead. 
Jus post bellum is complex and ambiguous in this narrative, both because of the 
confusing concept of videogame reality versus “real” reality, and because most of the novel is 
preoccupied with a blending of post bellum and in bello; although the ScreeWee war is over 
with regards to Johnny’s involvement, there is no guarantee that it will not continue as long as 
the game exists. Although the narrative assures that the ScreeWees “escaped, for ever” (237), 
the final page consists of an image asking, “NEW GAME (Y/N)?” (238). This poses a thought 
experiment, like the ones Sainsbury argues encourage young readers to actively engage both 
cognitively and morally (2017, 160). Therefore, jus post bellum is problematised; if the war 
may never be over, as argued again by O’Driscoll (2019, 901), how can we consider justice 
post war? Even in Johnny’s engagement with the ScreeWees the war is not truly over; 
although he does not fight them anymore, combat does continue. The main change is who is 
considered the enemy; however, this also changes the jus ad bellum, as the desired outcome, 
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the requirement for victory, changes from defeating all ScreeWees to escorting them to safety. 
Jus post bellum is therefore made almost impossible to consider fully. Morality is, however, 
foregrounded to a main concern of the narrative, and the reader will attempt to complete their 
just war script. Not finishing the script with jus post bellum would be like following the 
restaurant script without paying the bill. Cognitive responsibility for the script is therefore 
placed with the reader. This responsibility therefore enhances cognitive engagement, and 
although it does not provide a manual for just war, it does engrain a just war script in which 
the four issues of jus ante bellum, jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum are necessary 
steps which must be followed. 
They’re Jus Kids, Man 
Just war theory is not “the answer” to what is and what is not just in war; it is an approach 
which evaluates the moral aspects of specific wars step per temporal step. In that sense 
particularly just war scripts are a logical extension of justice scripts in war; the “moral 
anarchy” of war demands its own methodology, and the highly temporal setup of war makes 
script theory the best way to analyse the way we both understand and write justice in war. 
Justice is built up to through empathy, which determines the moral framework within which 
the characters operate. This moral framework is then put into specific, practical considerations 
of what is fair and unfair. As demonstrated by the analyses above, the narrative techniques I 
analysed for empathy and ethics all feed into the image of justice, as a narrative is consumed 
as a whole rather than a sum of its parts, especially by non-expert readers. Script theory 
therefore underlies and is constructed of all other narrative elements, as justice is the result of 
empathic and ethical concerns. In children’s war literature, justice concerns are foregrounded 
as both empathy and ethics are problematised; the in- and outgrouping which stands at the 
basis of war also determines who the reader can empathise with, and therefore how particular 
characters are judged within the narrative’s moral framework. Justice is of high importance in 
children’s lives, and a skill, like empathy, which children develop steadily from a young age 
onwards (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 242-244). Just war theory, an extension of justice 
concerns, is a skill the implied reader of my corpus most likely will develop through the 
highly structured form of literature, because of which the importance of scripts is emphasised 
again. 
 Both Ender’s Game and Only You Can Save Mankind foreground the issue of justice 
through a similar thought experiment; what is the impact on empathy, ethics and justice on a 
narrative when the protagonist believes they are involved with a simulation? As argued by 
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Sainsbury (2017), thought experiments encourage high cognitive engagement (158). They are 
thus particularly effective in the reader’s potential development of just war scripts. Me 
analysing two novels with different concepts of just war theory based on the same setup does 
not mean that just war scripts only come into play in narratives based on this thought 
experiment. However, it does make them the most appropriate for analysing the functioning 
of the script. Ender’s Game complicates the issue of justice in war through its focus on 
deception; because Ender commits his act of excessive violence under the false impression 
that it is not real, he cannot be truly held accountable, and the moral repercussions may not be 
fully his. However, the reader is given clues to indicate that Ender may have acted in the same 
fashion if he had known. Although Ender was selected for his purpose because of his 
exceptional ability and empathic skills, his moral framework remains complex and relatively 
ambiguous. The Formics’ absence from the novel until the very end leaves the interpretation 
of what is just behaviour against them with a past which Ender only encounters through 
propagandistic media and is revealed to be misinterpreted. Johnny, in Only You Can Save 
Mankind, is not exceptional. He is so unexceptional that the moral framework of the novel 
cannot be based on him but must be built around him. The confusion at the heart of Ender’s 
great guilt is set to the extreme in Johnny’s case, and the ontological ambiguity at the centre 
of the ScreeWee war forces the reader to high cognitive engagement. Although both wars 
enjoy the highly structured nature of fiction, they also demonstrate the consequences of 
ambiguity central to the moral anarchy of war. No answers to the question of justice are 
given, and the moral and cognitive responsibilities are left with the reader. 
 These just war scripts underlining these novels are based on the same concerns of 
ignorance and restoration, demanding high cognitive engagement from the reader. Because 
they inherently problematise every step of the just war theory script (preparatory, 
commencing, conduct during, and peace building after) these novels both foreground their 
respective scripts. However, I analysed both to demonstrate how particular changes to a 
narrative setup cause drastic deviations for the just war scripts underlining the story; because 
Johnny is immediately provided communication with the alien Other who surrenders to him, 
the empathy and ethics of the narrative stretch to include them as well, even turning Johnny 
against fellow humans. Ender’s jus in bello is drastically different from Johnny’s based on 
this main difference; he cannot know and therefore empathise with the enemy (so neither can 
the reader), which may justify his violence against them, even if he is not aware of it. Just war 
theory may denounce application to wars in general, however, as these novels demonstrate, 
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just war theory is a script, a culmination of the empathic and moral concerns of war literature 
as well as all narrative elements on which the narrative is based. These scripts become a part 











Reading literature, whether it be escapist fantasy stories where we delight in pure Good 
defeating pure Evil or gritty and horrifying realist stories of suffering in the trenches, impacts 
us significantly. This is because we react to fiction and reality in much the same way 
(Stockwell 2002, 152); we treat fictional people, cognitively if not intellectually, as if they are 
real. What this means is that cognitive skills like empathy and mind-modelling, as well as 
many others, are both necessary for and trained through our engagement with fictional texts. 
This impact has been argued by many scholars and demonstrated by a plethora of empirical 
studies. Like any other psychological research, these studies come with their own challenges 
and pitfalls. As stated by Oatley (2016, 621), many short-term causational studies which 
claim to demonstrate the impact of reading fiction on higher levels of empathy (for example 
Kidd and Castano 2013; Black and Barnes 2015) could be considered unconvincing because 
of the potential issue of priming. However, in addition to these short-term studies a 
convincing amount of longer-term ones were undertaken, such as Bal and Veltkamp (2013), 
Koopman (2015), and Vezzali et al. (2015). Considered together, both long and short-term 
studies do demonstrate that fiction has an important, potential impact on empathy ability 
(2016, 621). Because of this our moral framework, too, is shaped in part by our reading 
(Hoffman 2000, 63-93). 
The formative nature of reading highlights the importance of children’s literature. As 
readers, children are cognitively, affectively, and morally developing people. Their limited 
life experience directly impacts their emotional maturity and script building, making the 
knowledge and training they derive from reading all the more pertinent and ethically charged. 
This also includes adolescents, who like younger readers are also still developing their mind-
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modelling skills, empathy, and moral frameworks. (Moshman 2011, 80). However, I must 
again emphasise that unlike what optimistic cognitive scholars like Hoffman (2002) or Keen 
(2007) may want to believe, it is not a given that reading makes us better people. The actual 
empathic and moral impact of any given narrative is dependent on too many factors, of which 
textual strategies is just one. That said, it is equally undeniable that reading has a strong, 
potential impact on these aspects of childhood development, which can be carried from 
childhood through to adulthood. In my project, my aim was to analyse the way through which 
the extreme setting of war influences the potential cognitive impact of children’s literature in 
terms of empathy, ethics and justice – the three concepts foregrounded by war. 
How Did We Get Here? 
The foundation of my project lay with empathy; the basis for ethics, it was imperative to 
discuss it first. Emotions, in turn, are the basis for empathy; they are central both to stories 
and empathy. War intensifies these emotions because of its threat to the characters’ goals and 
plans. The main emotions common to children’s war literature I found to be grief, love, terror 
and hatred. These intense emotions, amplified by war, are easy to identify for novice readers 
and cause strong emotional reactions in turn. Therefore, the empathic engagement is 
emphasised. Empathy is then delimitated through in- and outgrouping. This grouping is at the 
core of war, as there is always an “us” versus a “them”. Children’s war literature could 
potentially encourage the reader to empathise with the Other, developing the reader’s binary 
crossing empathic skills. It could also, however, entrench previously internalised boundaries 
between in- and outgroups. Because the genre is children’s war literature, there is always an 
age-based grouping on top of any other grouping caused by the war. Therefore, the effects of 
in- and outgroup empathy are particularly foregrounded within this genre. Focalisation is key 
to in- and outgroup empathy; it pushes the reader to empathise with one particular side over 
the other and could potentially encourage challenging empathy. 
 The characters the readers are manipulated to empathise with are fleshed out through 
five main characterisation techniques: speech, interiority, physical description, actions, and 
reactions. These techniques come together to form a network of traits charged with moral 
implications. The basis of the moral implications lies again with emotion. It is the reader’s 
emotional affect by the character which shapes and betrays the ideology of the text. The 
characterisation techniques of speech, interiority and physical description construct covert 
ideologies particularly. War, again, acts as an amplifier for these three techniques. In 
children’s war literature speech not only demonstrates the narrative’s ideology; it also further 
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entrenches and clarifies the in- and outgroup demarcations at the basis of the narrative. 
Interiority then potentially provides the reader direct access to the character’s motives, beliefs, 
norms and values. These internal representations demonstrate the narrative’s ideology further. 
Physical descriptions reveal characters’ interiority in an implied way, and are mostly clarified 
through narratorial and character statements, as well as empathic manipulation. The overt 
ideological characterisation techniques of action and reaction allow the narrative to create 
normative ethical activity. Through these two elements narratives thus construct 
consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethics approaches to ethics. Action is foregrounded 
in war literature, as their consequences are enhanced, increasing the responsibilities child 
characters face. My analyses all demonstrated Walzer’s moral anarchy (1977), but also 
showed that the ambiguity that comes with this anarchy enhances cognitive engagement. 
 Although there is a moral anarchy in war, there is still a desire to judge the correctness 
and acceptability of scenarios, behaviour and actions in it. This is the realm of justice, which 
is the most specific of the three concepts. Although it is the most specific, however, it 
underlies the entire narrative in script form. To my knowledge, I am the first to analyse justice 
scripts in children’s war literature. For my approach I am deeply indebted to Oziewicz’s 
work, which I took as a starting point for my own analysis. War stories lend themselves 
particularly well to script theory analysis because of their temporal nature; wars are generally 
understood to have clear beginning, middle and ending parts – as do scripts. Scripts form the 
basis of both our perception of extra-textual life, and all narratives; they are mental shortcuts 
which we establish through both fiction and extra-textual experiences. Again, because the 
implied reader of children’s war literature will likely not have any extra-textual experience 
with war, their justice scripts will be based entirely on fiction. The in- and outgrouping first 
analysed in the second chapter forms the basis of these justice scripts, demonstrating the 
overarching importance of empathy strategies for all moral engagement. Just war theory adds 
a further depth to the construction of justice scripts in war, as it evaluates the morality of war 
at clearly delimitated temporal steps. 
Wait, Aren’t We Missing Something? 
Cognitive narratology allowed me to analyse the potential impact of children’s war literature 
on the implied child reader. In order to do so I provided a first working definition of the genre 
an sich, as well as a step by step analysis of each element which informs its empathic and 
moral importance. However, this study was not conclusive and does not provide the answers 
to every question raised. Because both the concepts of the child and of war are temporally as 
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well as culturally bound there are many avenues which can be taken after this project; my 
focus was solely on contemporary Anglo-American literature, omitting a significant amount 
of children’s war literature. Analyses of children’s war literature from different cultures and 
times would enhance the overall understanding of the genre, whilst at the same time providing 
insights into these cultural differences. Additionally, analyses of children’s war literature from 
different cultures and times may serve to reveal whether or not there are universalities in 
approaches to empathy, Othering, ethics and justice. 
 Another limitation of this study which leads to further, exciting directions is that of 
form; my project was concerned only with prose fiction, even excluding short stories. 
Nonfiction, theatre, poetry and short stories all would provide highly different and valuable 
approaches of both war and the three concepts analysed. Cognitive analyses of these forms 
must be fundamentally different from the one I conducted here, as the forms themselves are 
constructed in different ways and with different strategies, and would be valuable additions to 
the overall image of children’s war literature. Similarly, non-written media such as film, 
television, tabletop games and videogames do not shy away from war narratives and play an 
important part in childhood media consumption. These forms of storytelling engage their 
audiences in entirely different means from written texts, and are cognitively highly 
demanding. Particularly play-based narratives demand a different approach to empathy, 
foregrounding the grouping and just war issues even further as the child actively takes part in 
the war they imagine. All of these other forms are analysed in their own rights; however, as 
the genre of children’s war literature was never defined nor approached as I have in this 
project, these forms have not been put into a network together based on this core issue: the 
cognitive influence of war narratives on the implied child reader. 
 My methodology for this project was theoretical, rather than empirical. At this point, 
after 184 pages, that is not a surprise, but I bring it up to acknowledge the questions raised by 
my analyses. I spoke about potential impacts the narratives may have on child readers, my 
project being too large to encompass through a single empirical study. However, the 
constellation of empirical studies necessary to prove my findings would add to an overall 
understanding not only of the impacts of war literature, but also on empathy, ethics and justice 
development in children in general, as well as through their reading. The importance of 
literature which I stressed throughout this work could be tried and proved through empirical 
study, which would have wider implications on the way we treat literature, war media, and 
children as moral actors. Similarly, the approach to just war theory as a script was to my 
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knowledge never attempted before, at least in children’s cognitive poetics. Through this 
project I hope to both demonstrate how these scripts and concepts function in children’s war 
literature, but also to pave the way for further just war script analyses. My just war scripts are 
an addition to Oziewicz’s ground-breaking justice script approach; an element of cognitive 
poetics which can be applied to any form of narrative. It would be interesting to see my 
approach applied to “adult” war literature as well, to see how our understanding and 
construction of empathy, ethics and justice either deviates from what we can see in children’s 
(war) literature or not; and to see through my project the impact of our childhood war stories 
on the way we perceive just war in later life. 
So What Is War Good For? 
The potential real-world effect of skills and knowledge trained and gained through reading 
makes childhood reading both powerful and ethically charged. Child readers are cognitively, 
emotionally, and socially developing rapidly. This means that texts which are aimed at them 
as an audience necessarily have to consider the level of development of the reader; deep levels 
of mind-modelling embedment will most probably soon become too confusing to keep track 
of for the implied child reader, leaving them confused and frustrated. Complex or 
contradictory emotions such as someone may experience from the betrayal of a friend out of 
loyalty to a cause cannot be expected to make immediate sense, or to be easy to comprehend 
for a child reader. Additionally, some of the choices, settings, or character relations that come 
to the fore in war stories are most probably not an aspect of most Anglo-American child 
readers’ lives. This means that the narrative has to adapt its setting in order for the reader to 
make sense of it whilst maintaining that which is needed for a challenging and engaging war 
story. However, challenging readers is also a means to keep them interested and invested; as 
argued by Zunshine (2006, 18), one of the many reasons we can derive pleasure from reading 
is the sense of satisfaction we experience when we interpret emotions and mental states, 
regardless of if we are correct or not. 
 Because of the potential real-world effects of the narrative strategies on empathy, 
ethics and justice I discussed in this dissertation, there are several ways through which this 
research may be relevant outside of academia. In a general sense, any work which 
demonstrates the long lasting impact which reading has on people may influence the way 
legislators and educators approach literature for young people. Highlighting and critically 
discussing emotions and the divisions made between characters in a narrative foreground s that 
this is happening and may also lead to more critical engagement with in- and outgrouping 
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(and the moral behaviours that follow from that) in real world interactions. There are more 
specific potential applications for this particular work as well. In the Netherlands, reading for 
young people is falling more and more out of fashion. The way literature is taught focuses not 
on literature as a cultural artifact, nor on the way it can shape us as we do it. Instead, literature 
is a check box which students suffer through as they “prove” they have read certain canonical 
works. Removing the human engagement from literature in this way removes not only the 
joys from reading, but also precisely those formative moments this entire dissertation has 
focused on. Hopefully, this dissertation makes clear to the Dutch Ministry of Education and 
Culture just how important the link between Education and Culture is, and that a change in 
how literature is treated in the curriculum can lead to a more critically engaged and 
cognitively self-aware populace. 
 Such a populace is crucial at this very moment. Besides the rise of populism, and the 
extremist politics and the normalisation of their lingo mentioned in the Introduction, social 
developments such as cancel culture show that nuance is not a priority of modern popular 
discourse. Political issues have become ideological concerns, and lines drawn in the sand 
based on disagreements over issues ranging from trivial to vital have become steel walls. 
Important discussions are finally held, yet strongly divided ideological “camps” have led to 
separations which stand in the way of true interaction instead of supporting it. This research 
elucidates how extreme group membership identification, whether in war scenarios or socio-
political discourse, leads to a decrease in both care and moral responsibility for the outgroup. 
Unfortunately, however, because this research is concerned “only” with narrative techniques 
in children’s war literature it cannot offer concrete solutions to these pressing social issues as 
they lie mostly in the “Responsible” Adult World. 
 However, this methodological limitation may be circumvented by further research, for 
which this project will be the backbone. In my follow-up project, I will be looking at 
conflicting truth narratives, and how “truth” is constructed in increasingly complex narratives 
for young readers. Although it is early days I can still speculate on the importance of that 
project and how this dissertation feeds into it. Using the knowledge I have gained through this 
work on both the cognitive impact of different narrative techniques and the intricate 
relationship between empathy, ethics and justice, I will analyse how readers are supposed to 
recognise “truth” in children’s literature for different ages and at different levels of 
complexity. By scaling up the age and complexity of the narratives discussed, I will be able to 
both reflect on how young people are trained to discern truth from deceit, and how post-truth 
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has come to dominate most Western societies. The basis laid through this work will be crucial 
for further investigation into both what children are taught through literature and how this 
manifests itself. Other scholars may similarly find this dissertation useful for further research; 
for cultural studies, children’s literature, cognitive poetics, or general literature studies this 
step-by-step discussion of the role form plays in the (social) education and entertainment of 
children, our adult lives, and the remarkable ways texts and group membership influence each 
other and the ways we view ourselves and the world around us. 
 Children’s war literature is a difficult genre to explore. It is a difficult genre even to 
taxonomise. With this project, I am the first to attempt to define it. It is also an important 
genre to analyse and engage with critically. Although it is never a given that the implied child 
reader takes away from the text what the narrative appears to aim for, there is always the 
possibility or even risk that they will. Any given narrative may enhance the readers’ empathic 
subtlety and skill, or reduce it by entrenching othering mindsets, employ violence and horror 
to highlight the complexity of human life and the moral choices we must make, or reduce the 
readers to voyeurs. I am the first to analyse empathy, ethics and justice in children’s war 
literature from a cognitive narratological perspective. Additionally, my approach of dividing 
these three concepts up into the narrative techniques is equally novel. This may be because 
such a division appears to create artificial detachments between techniques which in reality 
function through conjunction; however, through my methodology I was able to foreground 
specific effects of particular techniques, whilst demonstrating how they build up to each other 
at the same time. Through my analyses I have found that the extreme setting at the basis of 
children’s war stories necessarily complicates and foregrounds the three concepts of empathy, 
ethics and justice, through which there is an enhanced possibility of the reader being affected 
on these grounds. Amidst the violence, chaos, hopelessness and presumed powerlessness 
there is a beautiful opportunity for personal growth and cognitive development, combined 
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Evvy’s Civil War. Yes Survival US 2002 
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No Military US 2005 
Card, Orson 
Scott. 
Ender’s Game. No Military US 1977 
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